Hecko v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 14 January 1975
• Docket Number: 57912,Nos. 56498,s. 56498
• Citation: 25 Ill.App.3d 572,323 N.E.2d 595
• Parties: Jerry H. HECKO and Clarice Hecko, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees. CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerry H. HECKO and Clarice Hecko et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 595

323 N.E.2d 595

25 Ill.App.3d 572

Jerry H. HECKO and Clarice Hecko, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerry H. HECKO and Clarice Hecko et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 56498, 57912.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

Jan. 14, 1975.

P. C. Noonan, Park Forest, for Jerry and Clarice Hecko.

Richard L. Curry, Corp. Counsel of the City of Chicago, for City of Chicago; William R. Quinlan, Jerome A. Siegan, Roseann Oliver, Asst. Corp. Counsels, Chicago, of counsel.

STAMOS, Justice:

This appeal concerns two actions, one at law and one in equity, in connection with the City of Chicago's demolition, on September 14, 1967, of a building belonging to Jerry H. and Clarice Hecko (hereafter the Heckos). On August 1, 1968, the Heckos brought an action at law against the City of Chicago for damages allegedly incurred when the City, without their knowledge and without notice to them, demolished a building on property they owned jointly. This suit was dismissed because the allegedly required statutory 'notice of injury' failed to state the residence address of the person injured, and the Heckos have appealed (No. 56498). (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 85, par. 8--102.) The Heckos have also appealed (No. 57912) from the trial court's denial of their motion to vacate the decree of foreclosure of the City's demolition lien because the City did not provide them with any notice either of the proceedings leading to the decree of demolition (which also created the lien sought to be foreclosed) or of the subsequent proceedings to foreclose the demolition lien. On this consolidated appeal, the Heckos contend: (1) their complaint at law for wrongful demolition should not have been dismissed for failure to comply with the six-month notice requirement of the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (hereafter 'Tort Immunity Act'), because Section 2--101 of the Tort Immunity Act specifically exempts from its provisions an action, such as this one for a wrongful demolition, brought under the provisions of Section 1--4--7 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 85, pars. 2--101 & 8--102, and ch. 24, par. 1--4--7); (2) both the decree of demolition and the decree of foreclosure were void because entered without notice, and the filing of a special appearance on behalf of the Heckos in the original demolition proceedings did not waive the jurisdictional issue.

These demolition proceedings were initiated July 24, 1967, when the City of Chicago filed a complaint in chancery (case no. 67 CH 3788) against the Heckos alleging that on April 3, 1967, and at other times, certain violations of the Municipal, Code of Chicago existed in property owned jointly by the Heckos and commonly known as 1618 North Burling, in Chicago. The complaint, which set out in detail the alleged violations sought a fine in the amount of $800; the appointment of a receiver, if necessary, to correct the conditions; an order to demolish the premises; judgment against the defendants and a lien on the property for the costs of demolition, reasonable attorneys' fees, and court costs; and a temporary and permanent injunction requiring the defendants to correct the violations.

It appears from the pleadings that the City demolished the building on the property on September 14, 1967, pursuant to a decree of demolition entered on July 13, 1967, of July 21, 1967, although this decree is not in the record. ¹ The common law record contains no proof of service of process in 67 CH 3788.

On November 9, 1967, the Heckos filed a special appearance in the demolition suit (67 CH 3788) questioning the jurisdiction of the court over their persons in that they had 'not been served with summons.' At a hearing on December 24, 1967, the trial court stated that there was nothing in the court file 'to indicate' that the Heckos were 'served by the Sheriff's Office,' and nothing in the file to show that the City of Chicago 'published.' The court concluded: 'If that is the case, the default order was entered erroneously.' The court advised the Heckos' attorney that his clients might have an action at law against the City for wrongful demolition.

On June 18, 1968, the City filed a complaint to foreclose its demolition lien and the case was assigned no. 68 CH 2506. Following service by a publication, a decree of foreclosure in favor of the City in the amount of $1,759.69 was entered on March 19, 1970. On May 20, 1970, an order was entered confirming a Sheriff's sale of the property to the City of Chicago for the amount of $1,869.50 in satisfaction of the demolition lien.

On May 26, 1971, the Heckos Filed a petition to vacate, which, as subsequently amended, alleged that the original decree of demolition entered in case 67 CH 3788 on July 13, 1967, was 'void' because the Heckos were not served with summons and no publication was made; that they had had no notice of the complaint to foreclose the demolition lien, or of the subsequent Sheriff's sale; that, in May of 1971, their attorney had examined the tract book in the office of the Recorder of Deeds and had discovered that the lien had been filed and that the City had purchased the property at the Sheriff's sale; that the petition to vacate was filed a few days later. Although the petition stated that it was brought under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act, the Heckos questioned 'the jurisdiction of the court' stating: (1) the original demolition suit (67 CH 3788) was void because they were not served with summons and no publication was made; (2) the affidavit for publication filed in the demolition lien foreclosure suit (68 CH 2506) which stated that upon diligent inquiry the Heckos could not be found was 'defective,' 'erroneous' and 'faulty,' and did not set out the last known address of the defendants; (3) there was no 'diligent inquiry' made to discover their address in case 68 CH 2506, because the City could have inquired as to the whereabouts of the Heckos from the attorney they had employed who had filed a special appearance in the demolition proceeding (67 CH 3788) and who had, on March 14, 1968, served the City with a notice of claim for wrongful demolition.

The City moved to strike and dismiss the amended petition on several grounds: that the Heckos were precluded from collaterally attacking the 1967 demolition decree because of the two-year statute of limitations contained in Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act; that the filing of the special appearance in the original demolition suit charged the Heckos with knowledge of the demolition lien; and that the Heckos' failure to participate further in the demolition proceedings barred their Section 72 petition because it showed a lack of due diligence. The motion of the City was granted on May 11, 1972, and the trial court subsequently refused to vacate that order in a written order dated June 29, 1972, in which the court stated, in part, as follows:

'(T)he court finds:

'1. That the decree of demolition entered in the previous case of City of Chicago v. Jerry Hecko, et al, 67CH3788, not having been appealed within the prescribed time and the remedy under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act having not been pursued, and the defendant, (sic) Jerry and Clarice Hecko, having knowledge of such proceeding by their counsel, that said decree was valid.

'2. That the said defendants have shown no affirmative, valid defense in this instant action.'

Meanwhile, on August 1, 1968, the Heckos had brought an action at law against the City for wrongful demolition. This suit was dismissed for failure to comply with the statutory six-months notice requirement because the notice did not state 'the residence of the person injured.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 85, par. 8--102.

Plaintiffs' first contention is that Section 2--101 of the Tort Immunity Act exempts from its six-monty notice provisions actions, such as that in the case at bar, brought under Section 1--4--7 of the Illinois Municipal Code. Paragraph 2--101(e) of the Tort Immunity Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 85, par. 2--101(e)) provides:

§ 2--101. Construction--Other relief

Nothing in this Act affects the right to obtain relief other than damages against a local public entity or public employee. Nothing in this act affects the liability, if any, of a local public entity or public employee, based on: . . .

e) Section 1--4--7 of the 'Illinois Municipal Code', approved May 29, 1961, as heretofore or hereafter amended. 1965, Aug. 13, Laws 1965, p. 2983, § 2--101.

Paragraph 1--4--7 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1964, ch. 24, par. 1--4--7) provides:

§ 1--4--7. Damages to property by removal, etc., of unsafe or unsanitary buildings--Liability

The municipality shall be liable for any injury occasioned by actionable wrong to property by the removal, destruction or vacation, in whole or in part, of any unsafe or unsanitary building, by any...