Hector v. Warren

• Decision Date: 02 February 1910
• Citation: 124 S.W. 1119,225 Mo. 255
• Parties: HECTOR et al. v. WARREN et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

124 S.W. 1119

225 Mo. 255

HECTOR et al. v. WARREN et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

February 2, 1910.

ESTOPPEL (§ 92) — EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL — ACQUIESCENCE.

Where plaintiffs accepted the proceeds of a partition sale and retained them under such circumstances that they must be held to know that they arose from the partition sale, they thereby elected to affirm the sale, and were estopped to question it.

In Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Pemiscot County; Henry C. Riley, Judge.

Suit by Cynthia G. Hector and others against J. T. Warren and another. From a decree for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

C. G. Shepard and Sam J. Corbett, for appellants. Ward & Collins, for respondents.

LAMM, J.

This case is twin to Hector et al. v. Mann (handed down at this delivery) 124 S. W. 1109. Plaintiffs here were plaintiffs there. There the Mann brothers bought 185 acres of land at a partition sale in case pending in the Pemiscot circuit court entitled Riley v. Hector et al. Here the Warrens at the same sale bought 164.85 acres, viz., lots 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8 in section 19, township 20, range 12, in Pemiscot county, Mo., on a bid of $110, and received a sheriff's deed; paying all the land was worth. This land was not affected by the deed of trust given the Manns, mentioned in the Mann Case. Such question is, therefore, out of this case. Presently, after their purchase, the Warrens went into possession, reclaimed some of the land from swamp and marsh, fenced it, and it is now worth many times more than when knocked down by the sheriff at public vendue. Barring said mortgage, the pleadings and facts in this case differ in no essential particular from those in the Mann Case. The court below found for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. The errors assigned here are the same errors assigned in the Mann Case. In fact, the two cases were heard together nisi, and the evidence in the Mann Case was read into the record in this. Hence, that case should be read with this.

On the Mann record we held that plaintiffs, by accepting the proceeds of the sale in partition and retaining the same under such circumstances, must be held to know that those proceeds arose from a partition sale; that they thereby elected to affirm the sale, and were estopped to question it. Moreover, it was ruled that no reversible error was committed. Such rulings dispose of this case and there is no use to reformulate questions there under exposition or restate conclusions so freshly and fully resolved and ruled.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. All concur, except VALLIANT, C. J., who dissents in an opinion filed.

VALLIANT, C. J.

I am unable to concur in the conclusion that the plaintiffs are estopped to assert their title to the land, or that they ratified the sale in the partition suit, or that they have been guilty of such laches as to close the doors of an equity court against them. Estoppel is a doctrine that had its origin in equity jurisprudence, and when it is applied to forbid one asserting title to his own land the circumstances ought to show very clearly that he has been guilty of such conduct as would render it unjust to the person who has relied on and been misled to his disadvantage by such conduct. I am unable to see anything in the evidence in this that would justify the application of estoppel to these plaintiffs. I see nothing in the conduct of the defendants that particularly appeals to a court of conscience for their protection against the cold law of the case. They bought the land for a small sum at a sheriff's sale, and if that sale was valid it is their land by law, if it was not valid the title is still in the plaintiffs. Defendants have already reaped off it more than they have expended, and if they lose now they will lose not what has been added to the value of the land by their own skill or industry, but simply the increased value of the land owing to the general development of the country, what is sometimes called the unearned increment. The small amount of money which the plaintiffs received and which they testify they received, supposing it was the surplus coming to them on the foreclosure of a mortgage, after paying the mortgage debt, they offer to return, and even if they did not so offer the court in its decree would require them to return.

To prove the alleged estoppel the defendants introduced evidence as follows: One of the defendants testified that when he and his brother bought the land at sheriff's sale it was all wild land, since then they have cleared and put in condition fit for cultivation about 20 acres. It is worth $12 to $15 an acre to clear it and put it in cultivation. They put about $150 or $200 worth of fencing on the land, but have not put any house on it. The land is worth now 20 times as much as it was when they bought it. The price they paid for it at the sheriff's sale was its reasonable value at that time. They had sold timber off the land to the amount of about $500. The use they have had of the land would a little more than pay for placing it in cultivation, and the timber would more than pay for the taxes and cost of fencing. So far they have not lost anything in the transaction. They are not acquainted with the plaintiffs. "I have never seen them (the plaintiffs) since I have owned the land. They have never been in my part of the country that I know of. I don't know what opportunity they had to lay claim to the land. I do not know where they live now. I don't know anything about them except from the records and the evidence produced. None of these people were present at the time this land was sold, so far as I know. I never notified them. I bought this land because I thought it was the officer's duty that sold it. I do not know whether they knew this land was sold."

The ex-sheriff testified to the effect as follows: He was sheriff from 1893 to 1897. During his term of office he sold some land under a judgment in a partition suit between Wm. Riley, plaintiff, and Cynthia G. Hector, Carrie G. Frazier, James Frazier, her husband, and Watson L. Stewart were defendants, and he distributed the money he received from the sale to the defendants in that suit. He sent the checks for the several shares in a letter to each of them inclosing a receipt for each to sign which they did, and he had the receipts present in court to produce. He was not sure whether he wrote a letter to each one or inclosed all the checks and receipts in one letter to Mrs. Hector, but thinks he wrote a letter to each. There were two partition suits between the same parties, and he made two sales and sent the money to the parties entitled. He has no receipts for the money he sent them for the first sale, but these receipts are for the last sale. He has no copy of the letter or letters he wrote, and does not know what he said in the letters, but thinks he told them what the checks were for. Did not go into any detail report because he guessed if they wanted to know they would ask some questions. A typewritten and type-signed letter was shown him, and he was asked if it was a copy of the letters he sent to the parties, but he was not prepared to say that it was a copy, although it was about such a letter as he would have written. He made two sales and two reports of sales, and two remittances. He has here checks which he sent for the proceeds of the first sale dated December 28, 1895. They are not for any money received for the sale of the land in question. If the typewritten letter mentioned is not a copy of the letter he wrote to Mrs. Hector, it is just such a letter as he would have written. He has no recollection of having written her a letter explaining any more fully how the money was derived than is shown in that letter. It is something like the one he wrote her. None of the letters he wrote gave any description of the land. Receipts were then introduced dated from the office of the sheriff, August 18, 1898, one for $31.85 signed by Mrs. Hector, one for $172.13 by W. L. Stewart, one for $55.73 by Mrs. Frazier, all reciting: "Being amount in full due me from distribution of funds derived from the sale of certain real estate sold for partition on the 9th day of February, 1897, under an order issued by the circuit court of Pemiscot county, Missouri, in the case of William Riley vs. Cynthia G. Hector et al." Plaintiffs introduced the typewritten letter in evidence as follows:

"Gayoso, Mo., Aug. 19, 189. Mrs. Carrie Frazier, Pine Bluff, Ark. Dear Madam: Herewith I inclose you check for your interest in the Goah Stewart estate less your interest in the "Long field," which was decreed to go to Mann Bros. The synopsis of the matter is as follows, to wit:

                Gross proceeds........................ $768 93
                Total expense.........................  154 13
                                                       _______
                Net proceeds.......................... $614 80
                Mrs. Hector's dowry deducted..........   98 40
                                                       _______
                Am't to be divided among three heirs.. $516 40
                1/3 of your share of the whole...  172 13
                Your interest in Long Field which
                 Mann Bros. got.......................  116 40
                                                       _______
                Your interest in balance of the estate $ 55 73
                

"I suppose that you understand that this is the proceeds of the balance of the Stewart land, which was sold in February term of our circuit court in '97, and that Mann Bros. were subrogated to your interest in the Long field on account of a trust deed signed by you to them. I send you duplicate receipts to sign as I need one receipt to keep and one to file in court. Please sign and return them as soon as suits your convenience and oblige,

"Yours respectfully, J. H. McFarland.

"I just collected this a few days since is the reason it has not been sent ere now" The ex-sheriff was recalled and testified as follows: "Q. I will ask you, Mr. McFarland, if these receipts which have been identified by you and read to the court were for the...