Hedden v. Schneblin

• Decision Date: 07 October 1907
• Citation: 126 Mo. App. 478,104 S.W. 887
• Parties: HEDDEN v. SCHNEBLIN.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

104 S.W. 887

126 Mo. A. 478

HEDDEN v. SCHNEBLIN.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

October 7, 1907.

1. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF — PROMISES TO ANSWER FOR DEBTS OF ANOTHER.

An oral agreement to pay a debt, made with the debtor or some person interested for him, and founded on a new and valid consideration, is an independent undertaking, and is not void within the statute of frauds.

2. SAME.

An oral promise by an administrator to loan to a buyer of mortgaged chattels of the estate money to pay the mortgage debt is not a promise to answer for the debt of another within the statute of frauds.

3. SAME — CONTRACTS PERFORMED BY ONE PARTY—EFFECT.

A buyer of mortgaged chattels from the estate of a decedent paid to the administrator the price in excess of the mortgage debt, and accepted a delivery of the property, on the faith of the oral promise of the administrator to loan money sufficient to pay the mortgage debt. The buyer performed his part of the contract of sale. Held sufficient performance to take the case out of the statute of frauds.

4. GUARANTY—WANT OF CONSIDERATION—EFFECT.

A mere promise to pay an existing debt of another, without any new consideration, is void.

5. CONTRACTS — SUFFICIENCY OF CONSIDERATION.

A buyer of mortgaged chattels of the estate of a decedent agreed to pay to the administrator the price in excess of the mortgage debt, and the administrator, as a part of the transaction, orally agreed to loan to the buyer money with which to pay the mortgage debt. Without the administrator's promise, the sale would not have been consummated. Held, that the promise was supported by a sufficient consideration.

6. DAMAGES—BREACH OF CONTRACT—MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

The measure of damages for breach of contract is that compensation shall be equal to the injury, though only such consequential damages as are the natural and proximate consequence of a breach are allowed.

7. SAME.

Where there is a breach of an agreement to lend money at a particular time, the measure of damages is the difference between the interest on the loan at the contract rate and the rate, not exceeding the legal rate, which the borrower must pay for the money in the market, except where the breach results in an injury within the contemplation of the parties, in which case the delinquent party must answer for such injury.

8. SAME.

A buyer of mortgaged chattels of an estate of a decedent paid to the administrator the price in excess of the mortgage debt, and accepted a delivery of the property. The sale was made because of the administrator's promise to loan to the buyer sufficient money with which to pay the mortgage debt. The administrator knew that the buyer could not obtain the money in the open market. Held, that the buyer, on the administrator's breach of contract, was entitled to recover the special damages sustained.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Vernon County; L. W. Shafer, Judge.

Action by B. C. Hedden against George Schneblin. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

M. T. January, for appellant, Scott & Bowker, for respondent.

JOHNSON, J.

Action for damages resulting from breach of contract. It appears from the allegations of the petition, and from the evidence introduced by plaintiff, that plaintiff and one Doubet began negotiations for the purchase of the former of a dairy stock consisting of cattle, horses, wagons, and fixtures, and were progressing with them, when Doubet, the owner of the stock, died, on the 3d day of March, 1905, leaving his widow sole heir to his property. A few days after his death defendant Schneblin, brother-in-law to the widow, qualified as administrator of the estate, and the negotiations for the purchase of the dairy were resumed by plaintiff with him. The property was incumbered by a chattel mortgage to secure two sureties who had indorsed Doubet's note to a bank for $988. Plaintiff and defendant agreed on a sale at the sum of $1,800, but plaintiff was able to pay only $812 of the purchase price, and, in order to effect the sale, defendant agreed to lend him the remainder of $988 for one year, and to make the loan in time for the proceeds to be used in paying off the debt of the estate to the bank, which would become due in about one month. The sale was closed on this agreement, and plaintiff paid to defendant $812 and took possession of the property. When the bank note matured, defendant failed to advance the money necessary to pay it, and later refused to make the loan on the terms agreed. Plaintiff then attempted to borrow the money elsewhere, but was unsuccessful, and again applied to defendant for the loan. After much negotiation, defendant agreed to make the loan for six months, provided plaintiff would secure him by chattel mortgage covering the dairy stock and some other personal property which plaintiff owned. In the meantime the holders of the chattel mortgage, becoming impatient, had advertised the property for sale, and the agreement between plaintiff and defendant we have last mentioned was made on the day preceding that on which the sale was to occur. The parties separated with the understanding that they were to meet at a certain office in Nevada the next day, before the sale, to close the transaction. There is some dispute relative to the hour of this appointment. Plaintiff contends it was at 9 o'clock in the morning, and defendant that it was an hour later. Each appeared at the designated place at the time he understood to have been set for the meeting, with the result that they failed to meet, and, each thinking the other had changed his mind, proceeded to the place of sale. Defendant says that, immediately before the sale, he again offered to loan plaintiff the money on the terms of the agreement made the preceding day, but plaintiff contradicts this statement, and declares that no such offer of assistance was made. The proceeds of the sale were barely sufficient to discharge the mortgage debt, and this action is to recover from defendant in his individual capacity the value of the property above the amount of the incumbrance. Defendant, in his testimony, admits making the sale of the dairy to plaintiff for the sum of $1,800 and the payment by plaintiff of $812 of the purchase money, but denies that he agreed to lend him the sum of $988 for one year or to make him any loan. His version of the agreement is that plaintiff was to borrow the money from the bank for six months, and that defendant and his brother-in-law would become sureties on the note. He states that, when the indebtedness of the Doubet estate to the bank became due, he importuned plaintiff, without success, to close the transaction on the terms agreed, in order that the estate might be released from its obligation, but plaintiff refused, on the ground that he expected to borrow the money from a friend, and did not accept defendant's proposal until the day before that on which the property was advertised for sale under the mortgage, that from then on to the very moment of sale defendant made every effort to induce plaintiff to take the loan, but his efforts were unavailing. At the close of the evidence, the court refused to give a peremptory instruction asked by defendant, and at the instance of plaintiff instructed the jury as follows: "That if you believe and find from the evidence that on the ____ day of March, 1905, the estate of D. Doubet was the owner of a certain dairy, consisting of 47 head of cattle, horses, and wagons and dairy fixtures, and that on said date the plaintiff herein purchased the same from said estate through the defendant George S. Schneblin, and that the purchase price agreed on at the time was the sum of $1,800, and if you further believe and find from the evidence that at said time there was a mortgage on said property of Elias Dean and G. G. Ewing for the sum of $988, covering all the aforesaid property, due on the 21st day of April, 1905, and if you further believe and find from the evidence that it was agreed between plaintiff and defendant at the time that plaintiff should pay the sum of $812 in cash, and that defendant agreed to take up and discharge said mortgage held by said Ewing and Dean, and take a new mortgage from the plaintiff for one year for said amount and agreed to carry him for said time for said amount individually, and you find that was the only contract between them in regard...