Heddleston v. Stoner

• Decision Date: 17 October 1905
• Citation: 105 N.W. 56,128 Iowa 525
• Parties: HEDDLESTON ET AL. v. STONER ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

128 Iowa 525

105 N.W. 56

HEDDLESTON ET AL.

v.STONER ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 17, 1905.

Appeal from District Court, Iowa County; O. A. Byington, Judge.

Action in equity for an accounting, etc. The opinion states the case. The trial resulted in a decree for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.Dutcher & Davis and Milton Remley, for appellants.

A. E. Swisher and M. J. Wade, for appellees.

BISHOP, J.

The plaintiffs are Maggie Heddleston and her children by her first husband, Cyrus Stoner. The principal defendant, John Stoner, was the father of said Cyrus. The marriage of Cyrus and Maggie took place in 1877, and at the time the former was 21 and the latter 19 years of age. Soon after the marriage they went to live on the farm involved in this controversy, theretofore owned and the title to which was in said John Stoner, and so continued in possession down to January, 1896, when Cyrus died It is conceded that no writing was entered into, but it is the allegation of plaintiffs that possession was so taken under and by virtue of a contract of sale between Cyrus and his father. Before his death, and in January, 1896, Cyrus, his wife, Maggie, joining, executed and delivered to his father, said John Stoner, a quitclaim deed of the farm. It is the substance of the allegation that this deed was procured by fraud and without consideration; that defendant John Stoner by further fraud has obtained possession of the farm, and has since sold the same to his codefendants. Wherefore the accounting is asked. One who goes into possession simply of the real estate of another is presumed to be a tenant, in the absence of any proof to rebut such presumption. The proof sought to be adduced to establish the contract of sale here alleged is payments made to apply on the purchase price; and admissions claimed to have been made by defendant to the effect that a sale had been made by him to his son. As in the nature of these latter, counsel for appellant also rely upon the circumstance of the taking of the quitclaim deed. Upon authority of Chamberlin v. Robertson, 31 Iowa, 408, and other like cases, counsel insist that a parol contract for the purchase of lands may be proven where payment is made, or possession is taken thereunder. There will be found no one to dispute the proposition of law thus advanced. But as to the matter of payments, the court below, with the witnesses personally present before it, found that the evidence did not bear out the contention as made. And in the conclusion reached we are disposed to agree. We need not enter upon any detailed discussion of such evidence. What has just been said is also true in respect of the verbal admissions relied upon as having been made by defendant.

Now, without explanation, the taking of the quitclaim deed might well be looked upon as a circumstance indicating that John Stoner at least considered that his son had, or might have, some interest in the property other than such as is usually possessed by a mere tenant. But the court was warranted in finding that during the years of his occupancy Cyrus never asserted title to the property as against his father; that the relations between them never assumed a form higher than that of landlord and tenant. True, Cyrus made some improvements on the place; but, on the other hand, it would seem that the rental charged him was nominal. And, quite readily, it may be inferred that it was within the contemplation of each that at some...