Hedges v. Hedges
Decision Date | 26 November 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 96,030.,96,030. |
Citation | 2002 OK 92,66 P.3d 364 |
Parties | Joan F. HEDGES, now Phillips, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward Lane HEDGES, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Barry K. Roberts, Norman, Oklahoma, James M. Levine, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant.
Jon L. Hester, Scott A. Hester, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellee.1
¶ 1 Two issues are dispositive of this appeal: (a) Does Obligee-Mother's laches in prosecuting this postjudgment proceeding avail as an equitable defense against her quest for satisfaction of past-due and unpaid periodical installments of a child-support obligation? and (b) If laches is not available, is the record clear that the trial court would have entered the post-divorce order for Obligor-Father solely on his statutory defense of agreement-based satisfaction of the entire obligation? We answer the first question in the negative. Because the trial court relied on both laches and "waiver"2 in denying Mother's relief quest and we cannot, on this record, determine whether it would have predicated its order solely on Mother's agreement-based relinquishment of rights (if it had ruled out laches as unavailable), the cause stands remanded for reconsideration of the latter defense alone—that which rests on the parties' oral agreement.3
¶ 2 Joan F. Hedges, now Joan F. Phillips (Mother), and Edward Lane Hedges (Father) were divorced on 13 April 1988. Three children were born of the marriage—JCH in 1973, BFH in 1977 and EMH in 1979. Father was directed to pay as child support a total of $684.00 per month. The children reached majority in 1991, 1995 and 1997. On 19 June 2000 Mother brought contempt proceedings against Father for his failure to pay child support. She alleged a total arrearage with interest of $84,992.08.4 Father interposed several affirmative defenses.5
¶ 3 The trial court (a) determined that contempt was not an available enforcement remedy and dismissed the application for that relief,6 (b) recast the proceeding into one for satisfaction of past-due and unpaid child-support obligation, (c) found that an "agreement existed between the parties" which "operated to preclude the mother from collecting all the child support that was ordered," (d) concluded that because of the "mother's waiver by oral agreement" and the length of time that had passed since the children had reached the age of majority, laches and waiver precluded her from "recovering any arrearage which may have existed as a matter of law" and (e) denied Mother's quest for relief, resting its order "upon the equitable defenses of laches and waiver."
¶ 4 Mother's appeal stands retained for this court's disposition.
¶ 5 Mother (appellant) argues on appeal that the trial court should have applied the teachings of Aguero v. Aguero7 and Cowan v. Cowan,8 two Court of Civil Appeals' opinions which pronounce that "equitable defenses" cannot be invoked to shield a parent from the legal consequences of child support's nonpayment. According to Mother, had the trial court based its decision on the Aguero and Cowan analyses9 of this court's jurisprudence in McNeal v. Robinson10 and Thrash v. Thrash,11 it would have rejected Father's equitable defenses against Mother's quest. Mother, on the other hand, claims that she has an undefeated right to pursue past-due child support based on the explicit language of 43 O.S.Supp.1996 § 137.12 If the court should agree that equitable defenses do not shield Father from his obligation to pay delinquent child support, she argues that we must confine our inquiry to the single question of what amount remains unaffected by the time bar.
¶ 6 Father counters that according to Thrash, "equitable defenses may be invoked to bar the recovery of delinquent child support payments."13 He points out that the teachings of Thrash have not been departed from and that anything to the contrary in Aguero and Cowan, though perhaps persuasive, has no precedential value. Father also notes that Swearingen v. Swearingen14 recognizes laches as an available defense in child-support enforcement proceedings. He argues that the equitable doctrines of "laches and waiver" should be upheld as a bar to Mother's recovery.
¶ 7 This postjudgment proceeding in a divorce case was brought to ascertain the quantum of arrearage, i.e., adjudicated child support then due and owing, and to enforce the declared obligation's satisfaction. Father plead multiple defense theories, but appears to have later abandoned all but those tendered by the evidence adduced at trial15—(a) laches and (b) an agreement-based reduction (or relinquishment) of a past-due, unpaid obligation. Laches is the only equitable defense implicated here. This is so because the latter defense, characterized by the parties and by the trial court as "waiver,"16 is statutorily declared17 and its effectiveness stands limited to matured and unpaid installments either reduced or relinquished by "mutual agreement."18 We need not globally address ourselves today to the continued invocability of laches as an equitable defense in arrearage enforcement proceedings. This is so because, on this record, we hold that it does not avail in this case.19
¶ 8 Laches is an equitable defense against the tardy prosecution of stale claims not yet barred by limitations.20 Before a claim will be considered barred by laches it must be shown that (a) there has been an unreasonable delay in the commencement of proceedings to enforce the claim and that (b) by reason of this delay the defendant has been materially prejudiced. The party invoking the doctrine's benefit as an affirmative defense has the burden of proof and persuasion.21 There is no bright-line rule for ascertaining when a claim becomes barred by laches or what delay is excusable.22 Application of the doctrine is discretionary and varies with the facts and circumstances of each case.23 The defendant is required to show more than mere lapse of time.24 Equity must follow the law. It may not allow legal limitations to be abridged unless there are equitable considerations of a compelling nature which demonstrate prejudice-dealing delay.25
¶ 9 In support of his laches defense, Father argues that Mother's ten-year delay in prosecuting her quest has caused a substantial amount of interest to accrue ($32,032.58) for a total child-support arrears of $82,080. He urges that he is put at a severe disadvantage and will be irreparably damaged if he were ordered to satisfy the full amount of the arrearage that is pressed. At the time of trial his gross annual income was $30,300. He argues that because of his age (he is in his 50's), he will never earn enough money to pay off the obligation and the large amount of interest that Mother has allowed to accrue during the years of her inaction and failure to enforce the unpaid child-support obligation.
¶ 10 Child-support proceedings are of equitable cognizance.26 In suits of that class, a trial court's decree will be set aside only if it is found to be clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence or to some governing principle of equity jurisprudence.27
¶ 11 The record here is grossly deficient. Father's failure to pay the decreed child support in reliance on the alleged oral agreement with Mother and the resulting accumulation of arrearage (with interest) do not, in contemplation of law, constitute the prejudice that is necessary to support the defense of laches. Although as a result of Mother's delay he now owes a substantial amount of accrued interest, his proof does not demonstrate that the delayed institution of enforcement proceedings placed him in a far more detrimental or disadvantaged position. It indicates only that he would now owe more money.
¶ 12 Because there has been no record showing of a material prejudice-dealing delay injurious to Father's interest, we hold that Mother's quest for enforcement of unpaid child-support obligation is not barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.
THE DEFENSE OF AN AGREEMENT-BASED REDUCTION (OR RELINQUISHMENT) OF CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION IS STATUTORILY LIMITED TO MATURED (PAST-DUE) AND UNPAID INSTALLMENTS
¶ 13 Father argues that Mother "waived" her right to collect past-due and unpaid child support because of an oral agreement she made with him shortly after the divorce petition was filed but before the decree's entry. By its terms she is said to have agreed to accept fifty percent less than the amount reflected in the decree. According to his testimony Mother thought the amount to be decreed as child-support obligation was excessive. She allegedly agreed that if he would assume responsibility for all the bills and not ask for the return of any items she took out of the house she would accept as full satisfaction the reduced amount of child support.28 This agreement was not incorporated in the decree.
¶ 14 Father also testified that after his post-decree bankruptcy,29 Mother informed him that the mortgage company and a finance company sought a judgment against her. According to Father, she then agreed to accept a lesser amount of child support in return for his keeping her whereabouts unknown to process servers. He testified that arrearages began accruing in August of 1989 and that he stopped paying child support in 199530 because his second child had reached the age of majority. Father claimed that Mother never pressed him for payment of any arrearages until she brought contempt proceedings in June of 2000, when the youngest child was 21 years old and the oldest 27. He argues Mother's silence and her inaction for such a long time show that she acquiesced in receiving lesser sums of...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Warren v. Stanfield (In re Stanfield)
...of competent jurisdiction. See the opinions cited herein on this point. Court approval prior to payment is thus a prudent course of action. 48.Hedges v. Hedges, 2002 OK 92, ¶ 8, 66 P.3d 364, 369 (when invoking laches a party is required show more than a mere lapse of time; the party must sh......
-
State v. Pigg (In re M.K.T.)
...not make first-instance determinations of disputed issues of either law or fact in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction."); Hedges v. Hedges, 2002 OK 92, ¶ 23, 66 P.3d 364, 373("But when reviewing an equity case, an appellate court cannot exercise first-instance cognizance by making o......
-
Osage Nation v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Osage Cnty.
...(the objection of laches was "fatally apparent" and demurrers were properly sustained on this defense as one ground therefor).32 Hedges v. Hedges, 2002 OK 92, ¶ 8, 66 P.3d 364, 369. See Sears v. State Dept. of Wildlife Conservation, 1976 OK 56, 549 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Laches is delay that is u......
-
Holleyman v. Holleyman
...facially and fatally void. Nothing short of Mother's stipulated admission (or concession) will support the dissent's analysis. 50. Hedges v. Hedges, 2002 OK 92, ? 26, 66 P.3d 364, 374; Evans v. Evans, 1993 OK 59, ?? 10-11, 852 P.2d 145, 149; Messenger v. Messenger, 1992 OK 27, ? 12, 827 P.2......