Hedgpeth v. Rahim

• Decision Date: 26 June 2018
• Docket Number: No. 16-7146,16-7146
• Citation: 893 F.3d 802
• Parties: Jonathan HEDGPETH, Appellant v. Ammar RAHIM, District of Columbia Police Officer, Individually and in His Official Capacity and Matthew Rider, District of Columbia Police Officer, Individually and in His Official Capacity, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

893 F.3d 802

Jonathan HEDGPETH, Appellant

v.Ammar RAHIM, District of Columbia Police Officer, Individually and in His Official Capacity and Matthew Rider, District of Columbia Police Officer, Individually and in His Official Capacity, Appellees.

No. 16-7146

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued November 7, 2017

Decided June 26, 2018

Joseph A. Scrofano argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General.

Before: Kavanaugh, Srinivasan, and Pillard, Circuit Judges.

Srinivasan, Circuit Judge:

Jonathan Hedgpeth brought a civil suit against two police officers, alleging that they violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause and using excessive force to subdue him. The officers moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were protected by qualified immunity from Hedgpeth’s claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, and we affirm.

I.

For purposes of reviewing the court’s grant of summary judgment against Hedgpeth, we view the facts giving rise to his arrest in the light most favorable to him. Johnson v. District of Columbia , 528 F.3d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 2008). As we explain below, however, we resolve one factual dispute against Hedgpeth (concerning whether one of the officers intended to injure Hedgpeth) based on the absence of evidentiary support for Hedgpeth’s account. Hedgpeth does not himself recall the events surrounding his arrest, but introduced the testimony of Marcus Lee, a witness to the arrest.

On the evening of March 2, 2015, two officers of the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, Ammar Rahim and Matthew Rider, were coordinating medical assistance for a homeless man when a disturbance down the street caught their attention. The officers observed Hedgpeth push a tall, African–American man, who returned the push, as the pair walked towards the officers. According to the officers, the man pushed by Hedgpeth approached them and said he did not know Hedgpeth and asked whether they had seen Hedgpeth push him.

Some time later, the officers approached Hedgpeth outside a bar. At the time, Hedgpeth was conversing with a former colleague, the aforementioned Marcus Lee. The officers explained that they had received reports of someone going up and down the street hitting others. Initially, Lee attempted to explain that he and Hedgpeth had greeted each other with a benign "buddy punch," but Lee quickly realized the officers were investigating something that had happened before his arrival. (Although there is a dispute between the parties on whether Lee was the tall, African–American man whom the officers had previously seen Hedgpeth push—Hedgpeth says yes, the officers say no—we have no need to resolve that dispute, as explained below.)

The officers began to question Hedgpeth, with little success. Officer Rider asked Hedgpeth for his name and inquired whether he had been drinking, but Hedgpeth did not respond. When Hedgpeth did speak, he slurred his words and avoided answering any questions. Officer Rider then asked Hedgpeth for identification, which he reluctantly surrendered. When Officer Rider attempted to photograph the identification card, Hedgpeth continued to speak incoherently and swore at the officers. At some point, the officers asked Lee if he would be willing to take Hedgpeth home. Lee responded that Hedgpeth was "hard to handle." J.A. 69–70.

After warning Hedgpeth several times to calm down, Officer Rahim told him he was under arrest. Hedgpeth began to scream, shouting that he had done nothing wrong and demanding to be let go. Officer Rahim ordered Hedgpeth to put his arms behind his back, but Hedgpeth did not comply. After Officer Rahim repeated his order multiple times, he reached for Hedgpeth’s left arm. Officer Rahim also used his knee to push the back of Hedgpeth’s leg and take him down to the ground. As Hedgpeth fell, his head struck the grid of the paned window of the bar.

With Hedgpeth on the ground, Officer Rider grabbed his arm and the officers handcuffed him. As a result of his head hitting the window, Hedgpeth suffered a concussion, headaches, vertigo, and other post-concussive symptoms

. No criminal charges were brought against Hedgpeth.

Several months later, Hedgpeth sued the two officers in their individual capacities in the district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hedgpeth alleged that his arrest was unlawful and that Officer Rahim had used excessive force against him, both in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officers moved for summary judgment, contending that they had acted lawfully and that, in any event, they were entitled to qualified immunity against Hedgpeth’s suit.

The district court granted the officers’ motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest Hedgpeth for a number of offenses, including public intoxication. The court also held that Officer Rahim was entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive-force claim because no clearly established law prohibited the takedown maneuver he allegedly used to effect the arrest. Hedgpeth now appeals.

II.

On appeal, Hedgpeth renews his contentions that the officers unlawfully arrested him without probable cause and that Officer Rahim used excessive force against him. In order to prevail on his claims, Hedgpeth needs to surmount the officers’ claim of qualified immunity.

"The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ " Mullenix v. Luna , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ). The purpose of the doctrine is to protect officials "from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability" in civil damages actions. Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 806, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. See Lash v. Lemke , 786 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

To prevail against the officers’ claim of qualified immunity, Hedgpeth must show that: (i) the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights; and (ii) his Fourth Amendment rights were "clearly established ... in light of the specific context of the case." Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 377, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). We can take up those questions in either order. E.g. , Mullenix , 136 S.Ct. at 308. We thus have discretion to forgo assessing whether the officers infringed Hedgpeth’s Fourth Amendment rights and to resolve the claims on the ground that, regardless of whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, the officers "did not violate clearly established law." White v. Pauly , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017) (per curiam). We follow that course here.

Although the Supreme Court’s decisions do "not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established" for purposes of qualified immunity, "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). And the "clearly established law should not be defined at a high level of generality," but "must be particularized to the facts of the case." Id. at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has observed that immunity thus "protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id. at 551 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A.

We first address Hedgpeth’s claim that the officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by arresting him without probable cause. To demonstrate that their warrantless arrest of Hedgpeth was lawful, the officers would need to show they had probable cause to arrest him. See Wardlaw v. Pickett , 1 F.3d 1297, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1993). And regardless of whether they in fact had probable cause, they are entitled to qualified immunity if they "had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest were sufficient to establish probable cause." Id. ; see Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).

The officers argue that they had probable cause to arrest Hedgpeth for a number of offenses. They contend that they had probable cause to arrest Hedgpeth for public intoxication based on his belligerent behavior. They alternatively submit that they had probable cause to arrest him for disorderly conduct, simple assault, and affray, all based on their belief that he had pushed a stranger on the street. The district court accepted the officers’ assertion that Hedgpeth had pushed a stranger, finding that the record foreclosed Hedgpeth’s position that the person the officers saw him push in fact was Lee, not a third person. Hedgpeth v. Rahim , 213 F.Supp.3d 211, 223 (D.D.C. 2016). Although Hedgpeth contests the district court’s finding on that score, we need not resolve his objection. The officers had a reasonable basis for believing they had probable cause to arrest Hedgpeth for public intoxication, which alone entitles them to qualified immunity on the claim of an unlawful arrest.

Under D.C. law, it is a misdemeanor for a person to "be intoxicated and endanger the safety of himself, herself, or any other person or property." D.C. Code § 25–1001(c). For purposes of qualified immunity, then, Officers Rahim and Rider must have reasonably believed that Hedgpeth was both intoxicated and dangerous.

The record shows that the officers could have reasonably believed...