Hedlund v. Minneapolis Street Railway Company
| Decision Date | 17 January 1913 |
| Docket Number | 17,891 - (178) |
| Parties | JOHN A. HEDLUND v. MINNEAPOLIS STREET RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $26,500 for personal injury. The complaint alleged that, while in the act of driving his automobile in a prudent and careful manner over the street car tracks and while lawfully upon the street crossing, defendant negligently and wantonly, with full knowledge of the fact that plaintiff was upon the street crossing its tracks, as he had a right to do, ran one of its electric cars at a very high and dangerous rate of speed to-wit, 40 miles an hour, over said crossing and into plaintiff's automobile; that by and through the motoneer in charge of the car defendant had full knowledge and notice of the fact that plaintiff was crossing its tracks, and had full knowledge and notice of the perilous position in which plaintiff was placed by reason of such operation of its car but wholly failed to make any effort to avoid the collision. The answer, while admitting the collision, amounted to a general denial and alleged that whatever injuries plaintiff received were due to his negligence. The case was tried before Hale, J., and a jury which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $6,513.88. From an order denying its motion for judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Collision with street car -- res gestae -- questions for jury.
In this action to recover for personal injuries received in a collision between an automobile and a street car at a crossing, it is held:
1. That the questions of defendant's negligence, contributory negligence, and wilful negligence were for the jury, and the evidence sustains the verdict.
2. A certain declaration of the motorman, made immediately as the car stopped after the accident, held to be a spontaneous declaration, part of the transaction, and tending to explain and characterize the accident, and therefore admissible under the so-called "res gestae" rule. It was also admissible as impeaching evidence.
3. There was no reversible error in the rulings on the admission of evidence, or in the instructions to the jury.
John F. Dahl, W. O. Stout and N. M. Thygeson, for appellant.
Luldvig Arctander and John A. Nordin, for respondent.
This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries received by plaintiff in a collision between an automobile driven by him and one of defendant's street cars, at the intersection of Twenty-Second street and Chicago avenue, Minneapolis. Plaintiff recovered a verdict of $6,513.88. Defendant appeals from an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
The facts necessary to an understanding of the questions involved here are as follows:
Chicago avenue runs north and south, and is crossed by Twenty-Second street at right angles and on the level. Defendant operates a double-track line on Chicago avenue. The crossing is in a thickly settled mixed residence and business portion of the city. Plaintiff, who was in the automobile business, was at about 10 o'clock on the night of the accident driving his car on Twenty-Second street, on the way to his garage. As he approached Chicago avenue, at some points his vision to the south was obstructed by buildings. He saw no car approaching from that direction, but did see a south-bound car stop and discharge passengers at the crossing. He kept on at about the same rate of speed he had been going, 8 miles an hour, and when he reached the sidewalk crossing discovered a street car approaching from the south and some 500 feet away. Plaintiff testified that he then slowed his speed to three miles an hour, moved to the westerly or south-bound track, looked around the car, which was "standing there or probably moving," and discovered the north-bound car some 125 or 150 feet away. The front of the automobile was then on the easterly track, and plaintiff attempted to increase his speed and get over the track, but was unable to do so, perhaps because of the condition of the crossing. He tried to give the motorman on the car warning by sounding his horn, and "that is the last I remember of it until I woke up in the hospital." The car struck the automobile with great force, and demolished it. Plaintiff was seriously injured.
The complaint charged negligence in running the street car at a high and dangerous rate of speed, in approaching the crossing without having the car under control, and wilful negligence. The answer denied negligence on the part of defendant, and alleged contributory negligence. The trial court denied a motion for a directed verdict, and submitted the case to the jury on the issues of defendant's negligence, contributory negligence of plaintiff, and wilful negligence. The assignments of error raise the usual questions of the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the submission to the jury of these issues, and to sustain the verdict, and also questions as to the admission of evidence and as to instructions of the court to the jury.
1. On the question of defendant's negligence, it is sufficient to say that in our opinion the evidence was amply sufficient to take the case to the jury and to justify the verdict.
We reach the same conclusion as to the issue of contributory negligence. It would serve no good purpose to analyze the very voluminous evidence on the various points that are claimed to show want of care on plaintiff's part. We have considered the record with care, and on the whole case are unable to hold that it was conclusively shown that plaintiff could have avoided the accident by the use of ordinary care, or that the verdict is not fairly sustained by the evidence on this issue.
The trial court submitted the question of "wilful" negligence to the jury. The correctness of the instruction is not questioned and could not well be. Defendant's claim is that there was no evidence on which to base the instruction, or a finding that the motorman was guilty of negligence after he discovered plaintiff in a position of peril. The only doubt here is as to whether there was...
To continue reading
Request your trial