Hedrick Nat. Bank v. Hawthorne

Decision Date12 November 1929
Docket Number40006
Citation227 N.W. 403,209 Iowa 1013
PartiesHEDRICK NATIONAL BANK, Appellee, v. T. C. HAWTHORNE et al., Appellants
CourtIowa Supreme Court

REHEARING DENIED FEBRUARY 22, 1930.

Appeal from Keokuk District Court.--D. W. HAMILTON, Judge.

Action for foreclosure of a mortgage. On motion of plaintiff, the alleged affirmative defenses of the defendants were stricken and, the note and mortgage being introduced in evidence judgment was rendered against defendants, and a decree of foreclosure granted. The defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Roberts & Roberts, for appellants.

Gillies & Daugherty, for appellee.

WAGNER, J. ALBERT, C. J., and STEVENS, MORLING, and GRIMM, JJ., concur.

OPINION

WAGNER, J.

This action is founded upon a note and mortgage securing the same, executed by the defendants on October 1, 1926. The defendants, in their answer, admit the execution of the note and mortgage. In subsequent paragraphs of their answer, they aver certain alleged affirmative defenses. The answer is quite voluminous, consisting of 16 paragraphs, and covering more than 10 pages of the abstract.

The plaintiff filed a double-barreled motion, denominated "Motion to Strike and for judgment on the Pleadings," which is also very voluminous. It asks that the separate paragraphs of the answer, in which the claimed affirmative defenses are alleged, be stricken, for numerous reasons. As a part of the same pleading, the plaintiff alleges:

"Subject to the ruling on the foregoing motion [motion to strike], the plaintiff moves the court for judgment on the pleadings," etc.

Said motion was submitted and sustained, and, plaintiff having introduced in evidence the note and mortgage upon which suit was brought, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants for the amount due upon the note, and a decree of foreclosure of the mortgage was granted.

The motion of appellee to strike the various portions of appellants' answer, as hereinbefore stated, is based upon numerous and various reasons. To illustrate, it is alleged therein:

"Plaintiff moves to strike Paragraph 7 of said answer for each of the reasons urged as to Paragraph 5 of said answer, and for the further reason that the alleged contract sought and attempted to be pleaded therein is void for uncertainty, indefinite, and failing to show with required certainty that any amount or amounts of money were to be furnished to the defendant, and fails to show with any degree of certainty the time of furnishing said moneys, and the terms of the payment of said money, and no time of performance was ever agreed upon, and that, if such talk ever did occur, it did not amount to a contract, but was random conversation, prior to the execution of the note and mortgage sued on, and any such pretended oral agreement is void, and not binding on the plaintiff, and ultra vires, the plaintiff being a national bank, organized and existing under the banking laws and statutes of the United States of America, and said paragraph does not plead or state any matter that is or could be defensive to plaintiff's cause of action."

The foregoing quotation from the abstract is a fair sample of the various matters urged by the plaintiff in the motion to strike the separate paragraphs constituting the alleged affirmative defenses. That portion of the motion constituting the so-called motion for judgment on the pleadings also contains several different grounds alleged by the plaintiff as to why the relief should be granted.

It is apparent from the record that the trial court sustained appellee's motion generally, and upon the introduction of the note and mortgage in evidence, rendered judgment and decree of foreclosure. The appellants, in their brief, under the heading "Errors relied upon for a reversal," allege:

"The court erred in sustaining the plaintiff's said motion as to each and all of the grounds there stated."

It is thus apparent that the appeal is prosecuted without regard to the rules of this court, as we have repeatedly held that sweeping, omnibus "errors relied upon for a reversal" in blanket form, such as the foregoing, are not sufficient, under the rules of this court, to present anything for our consideration and determination. See Erlanson v. University of Commerce (Iowa), 223 N.W 756 (not officially reported); Central Tr. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 204 Iowa 678, 216 N.W. 41; In re Estate of Butterbrodt, 201 Iowa 871, 208 N.W. 297; Blakely v. Cabelka, 207 Iowa 959, 221 N.W. 451; Ryan Bros. v. Rate, 203 Iowa 1253, 213 N.W. 218; State v. Briggs, 207 Iowa 221, 222 N.W. 552; Reynolds & Heitsman v. Henry, 193 Iowa 164, 185 N.W. 67; Fisher v. McCarty, 197 Iowa 369, 195 N.W. 608; Harrington v. Southern Sur. Co., 206 Iowa 925, 221 N.W. 577; Reynolds v. Chehak, 199 Iowa 561, 202 N.W. 268; Town of Waukon v. Strouse, 74 Iowa 547, 38 N.W. 408; Guyer & Hoshaw v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co., 97 Iowa 132, 66 N.W....

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