Hedrick v. State, 91-KA-00648

• Citation: 637 So.2d 834
• Decision Date: 02 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 91-KA-00648,91-KA-00648
• Parties: Eddie Lee HEDRICK, v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 834

637 So.2d 834

Eddie Lee HEDRICK, v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 91-KA-00648.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 2, 1994.

Thomas J. Lowe, Jr., Jackson, Clarence Whitaker, Vicksburg, for appellant.

Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Deirdre McCrory, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN and BANKS, JJ.

DAN M. LEE, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

On May 29, 1991, Eddie Lee Hedrick was convicted by a jury in the Claiborne County Circuit Court of causing the death of another person by negligent operation of his motor vehicle while he was intoxicated, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 63-11-30 (1989).

We reverse, finding insufficient evidence in the record indicative of intoxication either before, or at the time of, the incident resulting in the criminal charge.

I.

Between 11:30 p.m. and midnight, June 21, 1990, the Sheriff of Claiborne County, Frank Davis, arrived at the scene of an accident on Tilman Road in Claiborne County, Mississippi, where Edgar Spruille ("Spruille") had been fatally struck by an automobile. The Sheriff's informal investigation led him to suspect that the appellant, Eddie Lee Hedrick ("Eddie"), a local resident of the Tilman community near Port Gibson, Mississippi, was the person responsible for Spruille's death. About an hour later, at 12:30 a.m., June 22, 1990, the Sheriff instructed his deputies to search for Eddie and his car. Eddie was found thirty to forty-five minutes later, arrested, and charged with causing Spruille's death in violation of Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 63-11-30 (1972), as amended.

At the trial that ensued, Alexander Jackson ("Jackson"), the boyfriend of Eddie's sister, testified for the State. According to Jackson's testimony, Eddie came by his house and woke him between 11:00 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. on the night of June 21, 1990. Eddie was visibly upset and told Jackson that he had hit something in the road, but did not know what it was. Eddie asked Jackson if he would return with him to the scene and investigate. Jackson agreed, and the two of them drove back to the scene in Jackson's truck. By the time they arrived, the Sheriff's Department was already there, along with a small crowd that had gathered.

Jackson testified that, earlier that evening, he had stopped by a liquor store, cashed a check, and bought a half-pint bottle of Seagram's gin. The unopened bottle of gin was still in the truck when he and Eddie reached the scene of the accident. After arriving at the site, Jackson opened the bottle of gin, took a drink, and threw the bottle back on the seat. Eddie remained in the truck while Jackson left the truck and attempted to determine what Eddie had hit with his automobile.

Upon re-entering his truck, Jackson told Eddie that he had "run over" Spruille. Eddie asked Jackson what he should do. Jackson replied that Eddie should tell his brother what had happened and then he should talk to the Sheriff about the incident. Jackson also testified that, although he did not see Eddie drink the gin, when he returned to his truck, he noticed that the bottle of gin was missing.

Jackson and Eddie proceeded to the house of Eddie's brother, awakening him upon their arrival. A short time later, approximately 1:00 a.m. to 1:15 a.m., as Eddie was preparing to leave for the Sheriff's Department, a Sheriff's Deputy arrived and found Eddie sitting on the passenger side of his car. Eddie was taken into custody and transported to the Sheriff's Department. There, he was read his rights and he consented to a breathalyzer test which was administered at approximately 1:48 a.m., June 22, 1990. The intoxilyzer results indicated a .13% alcohol level in Eddie's system.

Eddie was the only witness to testify in his defense. He testified that at approximately 10:45 p.m., on the night in question, he was returning home and, as he came around a deep curve that overlooked a little slope in the road, his automobile struck something in his lane of travel. He stated that he did not know that he had hit a person; that he had previously seen animals, such as deer and dogs cross Tilman Road. Eddie testified that, at the time of the accident, he had not had anything to drink, but when he and Jackson returned to the accident site he drank a half-pint of gin during the twenty-minute period Jackson was out of the truck.

When asked where he had been before the incident, Eddie testified that he had been in the nearby community of Patterson, sitting in his car at the pulpwood yard with a friend. He stated that, after about two hours of sitting in his car, he left the pulpwood yard at 10:00 p.m. After stopping to get gasoline for his car at approximately 10:15 p.m., he continued towards his home, striking something on Tilman Road at approximately 10:45 p.m. The prosecutor asked Eddie if he had been drinking while in Patterson, to which Eddie replied in the negative.

The State did not offer the testimony of any witnesses, or any other evidence, which established the element of Eddie's intoxication at the time of the accident. Nevertheless, on May 29, 1991, the jury found Eddie guilty of violating Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 63-11-30 (1972), as amended. The sentencing hearing was postponed until June 20, 1991, at which time the judge sentenced Eddie to eight (8) years with the Mississippi Department of Corrections.

Eddie appealed to this Court, designating the issues on appeal as follows:

(A) WHETHER, IN THE ABSENCE OF TESTIMONY OR OTHER EVIDENCE, THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT ELEMENT OF Sec. 65-11-30(4) MISS.CODE ANN. (1972), AS AMENDED, REQUIRING THAT THE DEATH OF EDGAR SPRUILLE RESULTED FROM THE INEBRIATION OR NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT.

(B) WHETHER THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS THE PRODUCT OF BIAS AND PASSION AND AGAINST THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

(C) WHETHER A JURY COULD INFER FROM THE FACTS IN EVIDENCE THAT HEDRICK KILLED

SPRUILLE "IN A NEGLIGENT MANNER" WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY AS TO VISIBILITY, STOPPING TIMES, ETC.

(D) WHETHER THE STATE, IN PROSECUTING A CITIZEN FOR VEHICULAR HOMICIDE, MUST SHOW NOT ONLY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT, BUT THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE INJURIES TO ANOTHER.

Since they are dispositive of this appeal, we need only address the first two assignments of error, as discussed infra.

II.

(A) WHETHER, IN THE ABSENCE OF TESTIMONY OR OTHER EVIDENCE, THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT ELEMENT OF Sec. 65-11-30(4) MISS.CODE ANN. (1972), AS AMENDED, REQUIRING THAT THE DEATH OF EDGAR SPRUILLE RESULTED FROM THE INEBRIATION OR NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT.

It is an old and well-defined principle of criminal law that the prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt by overcoming the presumption of the defendant's innocence. In a criminal case, the burden is upon the State to prove the defendant's guilt through evidence which satisfies each element of the charged crime. McVeay v. State, 355 So.2d 1389 (Miss.1978). The burden of proving each element of an offense always remains with the prosecution, Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835 (Miss.1991), and never shifts from the State, Brown v. State, 556 So.2d 338 (Miss.1990).

The criminal statute, which Eddie was found guilty of violating, is Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 63-11-30 (1972), as amended. That statute reads as follows:

Penalties for operation of vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor or other substance that impairs ability to operate vehicle; where violation causes injury or death to another person.

(1) It is unlawful for any person to drive or otherwise operate a vehicle within this state who (a) is under the influence of intoxicating liquor; (b) is under the influence of any other substance which has impaired such person's ability to operate a motor vehicle; or (c) has ten one-hundredths percent (.10%) or more by weight volume of alcohol in the person's blood based upon milligrams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic centimeters of blood as shown by a chemical analysis of such person's breath, blood or urine administered as authorized by this chapter.

....

(4) Every person who operates any motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and who in a negligent manner causes the death of another or mutilates, disfigures, permanently disables or destroys the tongue, eye, lip, nose or other limb or member of another shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a felony and shall be committed to the custody of the State Department of Corrections for a period of time not to exceed ten (10) years.

Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 63-11-30 (1989).

The relevant portion of the statute states that, "[e]very person who operates any motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and who in a negligent manner causes the death of another...." Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 63-11-30(4) (1989) (emphasis added). Incorporating the provisions of subsection (1) Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 63-11-30 (1989), which proscribes operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, the elements of the criminal conduct defined by the statute may be extracted and enumerated as: 1) operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or operating a vehicle with ten one-hundredths percent (.10%) or more by weight volume of alcohol in the person's blood; and, 2) causing the death of another in a negligent manner.

Therefore, subsection (4) of Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 63-11-30 (1989), imposes criminal liability for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle which causes death or injury to another person, subject to the satisfaction of a condition. That condition arises out of the conjunctive integration, by subsection (4), of the provisions of subsection (1) of that same statute, making imposition of the penalty for a violation of the statute dependent upon the existence of a concurrent violation of subsection (1) and subsection (4). Accordingly, Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 63-11-30 (1989), should impose criminal liability upon Eddie...