Hedrick v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison

• Decision Date: 01 November 2002
• Docket Number: Record No. 992913.
• Citation: 264 Va. 486,570 S.E.2d 840
• Parties: Brandon Wayne HEDRICK, v. WARDEN OF THE SUSSEX I STATE PRISON.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

570 S.E.2d 840

264 Va. 486

Brandon Wayne HEDRICK, v. WARDEN OF THE SUSSEX I STATE PRISON.

Record No. 992913.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

November 1, 2002.

Robert Lee (Marie F. Donnelly; James O. Broccoletti; Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center; Zoby Broccoletti, on briefs), for petitioner.

Robert Q. Harris, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on briefs), for respondent.

Present: All the Justices.

OPINION BY Justice LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.

Petitioner, Brandon Wayne Hedrick, was convicted of the capital murder of Lisa Yvonne Alexander Crider in the commission of robbery, forcible sodomy, and rape in violation of Code § 18.2-31(4) and (5); robbery in violation of Code 18.2-58; rape in violation of Code § 18.2-61; forcible sodomy in violation of Code § 18.2-67.1; abduction in violation of Code § 18.2-47; and use of a firearm in the commission of murder in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. The jury fixed his punishment for the non-capital offenses within the relevant statutory ranges. The jury fixed petitioner's punishment at death for the capital murder convictions. The circuit court sentenced petitioner in accord with the jury verdicts. We affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 513 S.E.2d 634, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952, 120 S.Ct. 376, 145 L.Ed.2d 294 (1999).

As permitted by Code § 8.01-654(C)(1), petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus against the warden of the Sussex I State Prison alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel were ineffective. The warden filed a motion to dismiss, and this Court entered an order directing that the Circuit Court of Appomattox County conduct an evidentiary hearing limited to the issue whether petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel during his capital murder trial. The circuit court conducted the evidentiary hearing required by Code § 8.01-654(C), and submitted a very thorough and exhaustive written report that contained its findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. The circuit court concluded that petitioner's allegations lacked merit, and the court submitted its report to this Court.¹

While petitioner's habeas corpus petition was pending before this Court, petitioner forwarded a notarized letter to this Court and requested permission to withdraw his petition for habeas corpus. The following day, petitioner wrote another letter to this Court, which also contained his notarized signature. Petitioner stated in that letter:

"Dear Supreme Court of Virginia

"My attorneys will not do what T say when I tell them I wish to withdraw my appeals. My attorneys are against the death penalty and I am for the death penalty, so there is a conflict of intrest [sic] there. I beleive [sic] in the Bible, and if someone takes a life then that person should have his life taken as well. I am guilty of the charges in which Im [sic] being obtaind [sic] for. What I did was cruel and selfes [sic], I had no disregard [sic] for human life, there for [sic] I should be punished, for my sake and the sake of my victim. There for [sic] since my attorneys will not abide by my demand, I personaly [sic] write my owne [sic] motion to withdraw my habius corbus pititeon [sic] and to have a[sic] execution date set as soon as possibal [sic]. Thank you for your time in this matter.

"Sincerly [sic] yours,

"B.W.H.

"Brandon Wayne Hedrick"

Subsequently, petitioner forwarded another letter to this Court that had apparently been prepared by his habeas attorneys. In that letter, petitioner stated that he desired to proceed with his habeas corpus petition. This Court entered an order that directed the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and determine whether petitioner desired to proceed with his habeas corpus petition. The circuit court conducted the hearing and concluded that petitioner "desire[d] to continue with the litigation of his petition. When questioned by the circuit court, petitioner ... indicated that this was his final decision on this matter."

II.

On May 10, 1997, Trevor Jones, William K. Dodson, and petitioner were together in Jones' apartment in Lynchburg. Petitioner and Jones left the apartment and traveled in Jones' truck to an area in Lynchburg near Fifth and Madison Streets to find some prostitutes. Petitioner and Jones met two prostitutes and gave them money to purchase crack cocaine. Petitioner, Jones, and the prostitutes went back to the apartment where they smoked the crack cocaine and engaged in sexual relations. Petitioner, Jones, and the prostitutes returned to the area near Fifth and Madison Streets. Petitioner and Jones gave the prostitutes money and asked them to purchase more crack cocaine. The prostitutes took the money and did not return.

Petitioner and Jones met two different prostitutes and took them to Jones' apartment where petitioner and Jones drank bourbon, smoked marijuana, and engaged in sexual relations with the prostitutes. Around 11:00 p.m., petitioner, Jones, and the prostitutes left the apartment and returned to the area near Fifth and Madison Streets. The prostitutes got out of Jones' truck, and Jones saw Lisa Crider, the victim in this case.

Jones knew that Crider's boyfriend sold crack cocaine, and petitioner and Jones decided to "pick up" Crider, have sexual relations with her, and rob her of any crack cocaine in her possession. Jones approached Crider and asked her if she wanted to have sex. Crider got into the truck and went to the apartment with Jones and petitioner. Jones paid her $50 and had sexual intercourse with her. Petitioner did not have sexual relations with her at the apartment.

Jones left his bedroom after he had sexual intercourse with Crider, and while she was "getting dressed" Jones went to another room and spoke with petitioner. Jones and petitioner devised a plan in which petitioner would pretend to rob Jones and Crider. Jones did not want Crider to know that he was involved in the robbery because she knew where Jones lived, and Jones was afraid that Crider's boyfriend would retaliate against him. Jones directed petitioner to leave the apartment and retrieve Jones' shotgun from the truck. When petitioner entered the apartment with the shotgun, he "racked" the pump on the shotgun and "motioned for" Crider and Jones and told them to go into a bedroom. Petitioner told Jones to empty Crider's pockets, and Jones took the $50 bill that he had paid her, cigarettes, and a cigarette lighter. Jones placed handcuffs on Crider, covered her eyes and mouth with duct tape, and placed a shirt over her face. Petitioner took Crider out of the apartment and placed her in the truck.

Petitioner, Jones, and Crider left the apartment at about 1:00 a.m. Petitioner and Crider were seated in the back of the truck, and Jones drove the truck. Petitioner removed the shirt and duct tape from Crider. Jones stopped the truck and got out while petitioner raped Crider.

Petitioner and Jones decided that they would kill Crider because they feared that her boyfriend might retaliate against them. Jones drove the truck while he and petitioner tried to find a suitable location to kill Crider, who cried and pled for her life. As she pled for her life, Crider asked, "[i]s there anything I can do to make y'all not do this?" and petitioner replied that if Crider performed oral sex on him, he would "think about it." Crider performed oral sex on petitioner.

Around "daybreak," Jones drove the truck to a location near the James River, where he, petitioner, and Crider got out of the truck. Jones removed the handcuffs from Crider, bound her hands together with duct tape, and placed duct tape around her mouth and eyes. Petitioner and Jones took Crider to the river bank. Jones "turned [Crider and] faced her back to the river." As Jones began to walk to the truck, petitioner killed Crider by shooting her in the face with the shotgun.

III.

A.

This is the first opportunity that we have had to discuss the standard of review that we apply when we consider a circuit court's findings of fact and conclusions of law made in its report pursuant to Code § 8.01-654(C). We conclude that the circuit court's recommended conclusions of law, as required by Code § 8.01-654(C), involve mixed questions of law and fact subject to our de novo review. The circuit court's factual findings, however, are entitled to deference and are binding upon this Court unless those findings are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them.

B.

In this habeas corpus proceeding, petitioner claims that his trial counsel were ineffective. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court established the legal principles that we must apply. The circuit court properly applied these principles in its report filed in this Court. The Supreme Court has stated that "actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice." Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052; accord Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 394-95, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)

; Basden v. Lee, 290 F.3d 602, 616-17 (4th Cir.2002); Sheikh v. Buckingham Correctional Center, 264 Va. ___, ___, 570 S.E.2d 785, 786 (2002) (this day decided). The Supreme Court held in Strickland that "[e]ven if a defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were unreasonable the defendant must show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense." 466 U.S. at 693,

104 S.Ct. 2052; accord Moore v. Hinkle, 259 Va. 479, 487, 527 S.E.2d 419, 423 (2000); Murray v. Griffith, 243 Va. 384, 388, 416 S.E.2d 219, 221 (1992).

The Supreme Court has articulated the following test that we must apply to ascertain prejudice:

"The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

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