Reid v. True
| Citation | 349 F.3d 788 |
| Decision Date | 26 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-27.,No. 03-2,02-27.,03-2 |
| Parties | James Edward REID, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Page TRUE, Warden, Sussex I State Prison, Respondent-Appellee. James Edward Reid, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Page True, Warden, Sussex I State Prison, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
ARGUED: Marie Frances Donnelly, MIDWEST CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Evanston, Illinois, for Appellant.
Katherine P. Baldwin, Senior Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Clifford L. Harrison, James C. Turk, Jr., STONE, HARRISON & TURK, P.C., Radford, Virginia, for Appellant.
Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General of Virginia, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Shedd joined.
James Edward Reid appeals a district court order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp.2003), in which he challenged his conviction and death sentence for the murder of 80-year-old Annie Lester.1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the rejection of Reid's claims by the district court.
Lester's body was discovered on October 12, 1996. She had been brutally murdered; an autopsy revealed that Lester had suffered 22 stab wounds. Lester had also been beaten about her head with a blunt instrument, and a bone in her throat had been crushed by strangulation or being struck with a hard object. A trail of blood led from Lester's kitchen to her bedroom, where her body was found. Lester's clothing was in disarray, and the room had been ransacked. A bottle of wine was found on the floor at the foot of the bed.
Substantial evidence connected Reid to the murder. Reid was acquainted with Lester and had received an automobile ride to her house in the mid-morning of the day of the murder; on the way, he purchased a bottle of wine. Late in the afternoon, Reid was observed walking from the direction of Lester's house, drunk and covered in blood. The blood on Reid's clothing was later determined to be consistent with Lester's DNA. Reid's fingerprints were found in blood on the telephone in Lester's bedroom, his saliva was found on a cigarette butt left in the room, and his handwriting was found on pieces of paper in the house.
Reid, who claimed to have no memory of Lester's murder, subsequently entered an Alford plea to one count each of capital murder, attempted rape, and attempted robbery. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (). After a sentencing hearing, the trial judge imposed the death penalty, finding that the murder satisfied the vileness predicate of Virginia law. See Va.Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000) (permitting imposition of the death penalty if the court determines that the defendant's conduct in committing the murder "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim").
On direct appeal, Reid claimed that the trial court failed to consider uncontradicted mitigating evidence in reaching its sentencing determination. The Virginia Supreme Court characterized this argument as a "complaint that the trial court must not have considered [Reid's] mitigating evidence since the court imposed the death penalty" and rejected it, concluding that "the trial court did, in fact, consider Reid's mitigating evidence." Reid v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 561, 506 S.E.2d 787, 792 (1998). The United States Supreme Court thereafter denied Reid's petition for a writ of certiorari. See Reid v. Virginia, 528 U.S. 833, 120 S.Ct. 91, 145 L.Ed.2d 77 (1999).
Reid subsequently sought habeas relief in the Virginia Supreme Court, contending, as is relevant here, that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that counsel were constitutionally ineffective for advising him to enter an Alford plea. The Virginia Supreme Court denied relief, ruling that the first claim was defaulted and that the second was without merit.
Reid filed this federal habeas petition on November 6, 2000, claiming that counsel were constitutionally deficient for advising him to enter an Alford plea, that his Alford plea was not knowing and voluntary, and that the trial court failed to consider mitigating evidence. The district court denied Reid's motions for discovery and to expand the record but conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine "what Reid's trial counsel told him about the effect of his Alford pleas" and "Reid's understanding about the effect of his Alford pleas." J.A. 379. Following the hearing, the district court denied the petition, concluding that Reid's claims regarding counsel's ineffectiveness and the voluntariness of his plea were without merit and that Reid's claim regarding consideration of mitigating evidence by the trial court was procedurally defaulted.
Under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, an individual cannot appeal a denial of collateral relief without first obtaining a certificate of appealability (COA). See generally 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c) (West Supp.2003). A COA "may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" and must specify the issue or issues as to which the COA has been granted. Id. § 2253(c)(2); see id. § 2253(c)(3).
Prior to oral argument, we granted a COA as to all issues. Thus, the question of whether to issue a COA in this case is no longer before us. We nevertheless take this opportunity to explain procedures we have recently adopted for deciding when to certify issues for appeal in collateral review cases. These procedures were initially found in Standing Order 03-01, which this court adopted on May 9, 2003. On July 8, this order became new Local Rule 22(a). A copy of the new rule is appended to this opinion.
Local Rule 22(a) divides appeals in collateral review cases into three categories. The first category includes all cases in which the appellant expressly requests a COA — or expansion of a COA, if the district court has already certified some issues for review-before this court enters its briefing order. In such cases, the court will review the request and (a) grant a COA and direct the parties to file briefs addressing the issues certified for review or (b) deny a COA and either dismiss the appeal — if the district court did not grant a COA — or direct the parties to file briefs regarding the issues certified by the district court (if the district court granted a COA).2 See 4th Cir. R. 22(a)(1)(A), (2)(A).
The second category consists of cases in which the district court did not issue a COA and the appellant has not explicitly requested one from this court. In such cases, the notice of appeal will be treated as a request for a COA. See Fed. R.App. P. 22(b)(2). To guide its inquiry into whether to grant a COA, the court will enter a preliminary briefing order directing the appellant to file a brief addressing the merits of the claims the appellant wishes to raise. The court will then review that brief and determine whether to grant a COA as to any of the issues raised in the brief. Upon determining that the appellant has made the showing required by § 2253(c) as to any issue, the court will grant a COA as to that issue and enter a final briefing order directing the parties to complete the briefing process. If the appellant fails to make the required showing, the court will deny a COA and dismiss the appeal. See 4th Cir. R. 22(a)(1)(B).
The third category created by the new rule includes cases in which the district court granted a COA as to some issues and, as of the time for entering a briefing order, the appellant has not requested that the COA be expanded by this court. In such cases, the court will enter a standard briefing order directing the parties to brief the issues certified for review by the district court. The appellant may raise additional claims in his opening brief, but the court will not consider them unless the appellant files a separate statement noting that the brief contains claims beyond the scope of the COA issued by the district court. The statement need not be elaborate or contain any reasoning; its sole purpose is to notify this court of the appellant's desire to expand the COA. Upon receipt of such a statement, the court will stay further briefing and decide whether to expand the COA. Once the court makes its decision, it will lift the stay and allow the parties to complete the briefing process (as to all issues certified for review by either this court or the district court). See 4th Cir. R. 22(a)(2)(B).
Regardless of the category into which a case falls, matters concerning the grant or expansion of a COA will be referred to a three-judge panel. See 4th Cir. R. 22(a)(3). The panel will review the request to determine whether the appellant has made the showing required by § 2253(c) but will not consider the ultimate question of whether the claim has merit. If any member of the panel determines that the appellant has made the requisite showing as to any issue, the court will grant a COA as to that issue. See id.
Finally, the rule authorizes the court to request additional materials from any party. See 4th Cir. R. 22(a)(4). The rule is silent on...
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