Hedtke v. State
| Decision Date | 12 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-19-00308-CR,02-19-00308-CR |
| Parties | AMY M. HEDTKE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1 Wise County, Texas
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Gabriel and Wallach, JJ.
The jury found Amy M. Hedtke guilty of disregarding a police officer's lawful order, an offense under Section 542.501 of the Texas Transportation Code, and the municipal court judge assessed a fine of $200 in accordance with the jury's verdict. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 542.501. Hedtke appealed to the county court, which affirmed the municipal court's judgment. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 30.00014. Hedtke now appeals to this court. See id. § 30.00027. In three issues, she argues that (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to show that she committed the offense and that the trial court erred by denying her motion to include in the jury charge an instruction from Section 542.001 of the Texas Transportation Code; (2) Section 542.501 of the Texas Transportation Code is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the police officer's order that Hedtke was convicted of disregarding. We affirm.
Hedtke and her passenger, her 17-year-old son, were driving from Wichita Falls to Ellis County for her son's Boy Scout meeting when City of Rhome police officer Bryan Pickler stopped Hedtke for speeding, an offense under Chapter 542 of the Texas Transportation Code. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 542.301, 545.351, 545.352. Hedtke stopped her van in the parking lot of a Grandy's restaurant; she had already intended to stop there on their trip so that she and her son could get something to drink and use the restroom. After Pickler took her license and returnedto his patrol car, Hedtke got out of her van briefly to take off her coat and then got back in. While Pickler was in his patrol car, Hedtke's son got out of the van to go into the restaurant. Before Hedtke's son had taken more than a few steps, Pickler ordered him to return to the van. In response, Hedtke argued with Pickler about whether he could stop her son from going into the restaurant. Justin Hunter, another Rhome police officer, arrived and, over Hedtke's objections, began questioning Hedtke's son. Hunter patted down her son during his questioning.1 At some point Hedtke again got out of her van to object to the questioning of her son and to record the interaction on her cell phone. At multiple points in Pickler's conversation with Hedtke, he ordered her to return to her van, and when she continued to not comply, Pickler arrested her for failing to comply with a lawful order of a police officer.2
Hedtke filed a motion to suppress, arguing that "[t]he officers in this case engaged in an unlawfully prolonged detention by asking non-consensual unrelated questions" of her son and attempted to keep Hedtke from being present while theyquestioned him. She argued that "[e]verything after the officers began to delay the purposes of the stop by engaging in unrelated questions of the juvenile passenger should be suppressed as fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation." After hearing both sides' arguments, the municipal judge denied the motion.
The evidence at trial consisted of Hedtke's testimony, Pickler's testimony, and the video of the stop from Pickler's dashboard camera. The jury found Hedtke guilty and assessed a fine of $200. The municipal judge rendered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict, and Hedtke appealed to the county court.
The county court affirmed the municipal court's judgment. The county court concluded that Texas Transportation Code Section 542.501, which requires persons to comply with lawful orders of police officers, relates "to instructions given by police personnel pursuant to a traffic stop for a moving offense, including the face to face contact with police and the individuals involved" and is not unconstitutionally vague. The court further concluded that the municipal court's denial of Hedtke's suppression motion was proper because "[t]he extended period of detention was not created by unlawful or improper actions of the police officer."
A person convicted of an offense in municipal court of record may appeal to a county criminal court, or, if the county has no county criminal court, to a county court at law. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 30.00014(a). The county court may not retry the case and instead must determine the appeal on the basis of the errors shown in themunicipal court record. Id. § 30.00014(b); Swain v. State, 319 S.W.3d 878, 879 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.). If the county court affirms the municipal court's judgment, the defendant may appeal to the court of appeals if the fine assessed against the defendant exceeds $100 or the sole issue is the constitutionality of the statute or ordinance on which the conviction is based. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 30.00027(a). Our review in such an appeal is limited to those issues considered by the county court. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 30.00027(b)(1).
In the first part of her first issue, Hedtke argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the offense for which she was convicted. Section 542.501 of the Texas Transportation Code provides that "[a] person may not wilfully fail or refuse to comply with a lawful order or direction of . . . a police officer."3 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 542.501. Section 542.501 appears in Subtitle C, "Rules of theRoad." Per Section 542.001 of that subtitle, "[a] provision of this subtitle relating to the operation of a vehicle applies only to the operation of a vehicle on a highway unless the provision specifically applies to a different place." Id. § 542.001. Subtitle C defines "highway or street" as "the width between the boundary lines of a publicly maintained way any part of which is open to the public for vehicular travel." Id. § 541.302. Hedtke argues that because the officer gave her an instruction when she was standing by her car in a parking lot—not operating her vehicle and not on a "publicly[-]maintained way"—she could not be guilty of an offense under Section 542.501. She contends that reading the provision to apply outside of the context of operating a vehicle on a highway "would lead [to] an absurd result, applying the Transportation Code4 to situations where one is seated inside one's own home, for example." However, for the reasons below, applying the provision here does not lead to an absurd result.
The legislature could have drafted Section 542.001 to read, "any provision of this subtitle applies only to the operation of a vehicle on a highway." It did not. Instead, it provides that if a provision in Subtitle C relates to the operation of avehicle, then in that case, the provision generally applies only to the operation of a vehicle on a highway and would not apply to the operation of a vehicle elsewhere. By its own terms, the section does not apply to a provision that does not relate to driving or otherwise operating a vehicle. Section 542.501 does not relate specifically to the operation of a vehicle; it relates to the order of a police officer. While this offense may be committed while a person is driving, it may also be committed, as in this case, after a person has stopped and exited her vehicle during the course of a lawful traffic stop. Section 542.001 thus does not apply to limit Section 542.501's application.
Hedtke further argues that "[c]ities around Texas understand that [Section] 542.501 applies to vehicles being operated on the highway, which is why they have taken the additional step of more broadly prohibiting disobedience to police orders in their municipalities." Hedtke cites to no authority to support her understanding of cities' motivations in passing the ordinances to which she refers, and she cites to no cases to show that courts have agreed with her interpretation. Regardless, however, of how cities view Section 542.501 or how broadly it applies, Section 542.001 is not a limit on Section 542.501's application.
Finally under this part of her issue, Hedtke points to a Texas Administrative Code provision to argue that, because she was not operating a vehicle on a public road at the time that she failed to comply with the officer's order, insufficient evidence supports her conviction. See 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 15.89. This Department of Public Safety (DPS) administrative regulation, which appears in a chapter providingdriver licensing rules, concerns moving violations. The regulation first defines "moving violations" as an act that is "committed in connection with the operation of a motor vehicle on a public street or highway, which constitutes a hazard to traffic and is prohibited by state law or city ordinance" and then sets out a "list of traffic offenses that constitute a moving violation." Id. While "fail to comply with a lawful order of a police officer" is not on that list, "disregard police officer" is, see id.; 29 Tex. Reg. 3776, 3776-77 (2004), adopted by 29 Tex. Reg. 5945, 5945-46 (2004) ().5 We read Hedtke's brief as arguing that, because Section 15.89 designates disregarding a police officer as a moving violation, and because that section's moving violation definition includes "the operation of a motor vehicle on a public street or highway," the offense set out in Section 542.501 necessarily requires the operation of a motor vehicle on a public road. Although this argument is facially persuasive, it ultimately fails because Section 15.89 does not apply here.
DPS did not adopt Section 15.89 to add the element of "operating a motor vehicle on a public road" to the listed Transportation Code offenses, and the legislature did not authorize it to do so.6 Rather, DPS originally adopted Section...
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