Heeter v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 July 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-0557
• Citation: 195 F.Supp.3d 753
• Parties: Julie L. HEETER, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Bryan E. Harris, Plaintiff, v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

195 F.Supp.3d 753

Julie L. HEETER, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Bryan E. Harris, Plaintiff,

v.HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-0557

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed July 1, 2016

Dion G. Rassias, Lane R. Jubb, Jr., The Beasley Firm, LLC, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

James T. Moughan, Bennett, Bricklin & Saltzburg LLC, Philadelphia, PA, Jeannine L. Lee, Minneapolis, MN, Charles C. Eblen, Kerensa Cassis, Shook Hardy & Bacon LLP, Kansas City, MO, Joanna T. Vassallo, Shook Hardy & Bacon LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, District Judge.

This case arises from the tragic murder of Bryan Harris by Cea Jay Chattin at Harris's apartment on March 26, 2015. But the specific events giving rise to the claims in this case preceded the murder by fifteen hours and occurred at a different place, several miles from Harris's apartment. According to the Amended Complaint, about fifteen hours before the murder, Chattin broke into the residence of Harris's mother, Plaintiff Julie Heeter, and stole the gun that he later used to kill Harris. Plaintiff's residence was equipped with an alarm system that was manufactured, sold, or installed by Defendants ADT, LLC and the ADT Corporation (collectively, "ADT"), and Honeywell International, Inc. ("Honeywell"). When Chattin broke into Plaintiff's residence, the alarm system failed to notify either Plaintiff or the police that there was an intrusion. Plaintiff now seeks to hold ADT and Honeywell¹ liable for the death of her son, Bryan Harris.

Defendant ADT has filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Defendant Honeywell has moved to dismiss. The decisive issue as to both motions is whether the failure of the ADT/Honeywell alarm system to notify the Heeters that an intruder, who turned out to be Chattin, had gained unauthorized access to their residence was the proximate cause of Bryan Harris's death.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND²

On or about October 11, 2014, a sales representative for Defendant ADT met with Plaintiff and her husband, Robert Heeter, at their weekend residence in Benton, Pennsylvania,³ for a security consultation and survey. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 17-19. Plaintiff told the ADT representative that she was principally concerned with keeping certain individuals, including Chattin, off of her property. Id.¶¶ 15, 23. She also stated that she was "not so much concerned about the property in the house but want[ed] a system that w[ould] alert [her and her husband] when someone comes into the house." Id.¶ 26(a).

After negotiations,⁴ Plaintiff agreed to purchase the "ADT Pulse" system, which was installed at her residence on November 8, 2014. Id.¶ 37. This system included a control panel allegedly manufactured by Honeywell. Id.¶¶ 54, 83, 84. The "ADT Pulse" system also "operates using the Honeywell ‘LYNX PLUS' a/k/a the ‘Safewatch® QuickConnect Plus' " system. Id.¶ 116.

On March 26, 2015, at approximately 7:00 a.m., when the Heeters were not at their residence, Chattin entered through a window. Id.¶ 53. He disconnected the phone lines for the alarm system and removed the system's control panel from the wall. Id.¶ 54. With the alarm system silenced, Chattin went to the location of the Heeters' heirloom firearms and took the. 30 caliber rifle involved in this case. Id.¶ 55. Chattin then proceeded to Harris's apartment, which was located approximately twenty minutes away, where he waited for Harris to return from work. Id.¶ 57. Plaintiff received no alert from the alarm system that an unnamed person had gained access to the residence and that the phone lines had been disconnected. Id.¶ 65.

When Harris returned to his apartment from work, he saw Chattin waiting for him, and the two men had a conversation outside of the apartment.⁵ Id.¶ 58. Their conversation occurred at approximately 8:00 p.m.—twelve hours after Chattin had broken into Plaintiff's residence. Id. After their conversation, Harris entered his apartment alone, watched television, and spoke with his employer on the phone at around 10:30 p.m. Id.¶¶ 59-60. Sometime later that evening, Chattin entered Harris's apartment and shot Harris in the face with the. 30 caliber rifle that he had stolen from Plaintiff's residence earlier that morning. Id.¶ 61. Approximately fifteen hours had elapsed between the time that Chattin broke into Plaintiff's residence and the time that Chattin killed Harris with the. 30 caliber rifle he had stolen from Plaintiff's residence. Id.¶ 89.

The next day, before Plaintiff and her husband began their usual Friday trip to their weekend residence, Plaintiff called Harris, but he did not answer. Id.¶¶ 62, 63. When she was approximately one hour away from their residence, Plaintiff logged into her phone's ADT app, which did not indicate any intrusion had occurred. Id.¶¶ 64, 65.

When the Heeters arrived at their residence, they discovered that there had been "a burglary." Id.¶ 68. They immediately called Harris to ensure he was safe, but there was no answer.⁶ Id. Plaintiff called the police, id.¶ 69, and Mr. Heeter called ADT, id.¶ 70. ADT stated that it did not see any problem with the alarm system. Id. Later that evening, Harris's employer found Harris's body inside Harris's apartment. Id.¶ 76.

According to the Amended Complaint, "[h]ad ADT alerted the authorities to the burglary in the early morning of March 26, Mr. Chattin would not have been able to murder Bryan Harris more than, and at least, fifteen hours later, unsuspectingly." Id.¶ 89.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initiated this action on February 3, 2016, alleging (1) fraud against Defendant ADT, (2) product liability for defective design against both Defendants, (3) negligence against both Defendants,⁷ (4) a wrongful death claim on behalf of Harris's estate against both Defendants, (5) a survival act claim on behalf of Harris's estate against both Defendants,⁸ and (6) a Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 201–1 to 201–9.3, claim against Defendant ADT.

Plaintiff later moved for leave to file an Amended Complaint, ECF No. 27, which the Court granted, ECF No. 28. Defendant Honeywell moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, ECF No. 30, and Defendant ADT filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 38. Following a hearing, Defendants' motions are now ripe for disposition.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering such a motion, the Court must "accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 F.3d 209, 215 (3d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). To withstand a motion to dismiss, the complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). This "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. Although a plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged, a plaintiff's legal conclusions are not entitled to deference and the Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986).

The pleadings must contain sufficient factual allegations so as to state a facially plausible claim for relief. See, e.g., Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir.2009). " ‘A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ " Id.(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court limits its inquiry to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments, matters of public record, and undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir.1994) ; Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if the moving party "clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Society Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris, 632 F.2d 1045, 1054 (3d Cir.1980) (citation omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(c) motion, a court "must view the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290–91 (3d Cir.1988) ).

When a party's Rule 12(c) motion is "based on the theory that the plaintiff failed to state a claim," the motion is "reviewed under the same standards that apply to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 146–47 (3d Cir.2013).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants raise several arguments as to why Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed. However, Plaintiff's claims against both Honeywell and ADT may be dismissed on one ground alone: neither Defendant's conduct and/or products proximately caused Harris's death.

Causation under Pennsylvania law requires the existence of two separate components: cause-in-fact...