Heffter v. N. States Power Co.

• Decision Date: 23 December 1927
• Docket Number: No. 26376.,26376.
• Citation: 217 N.W. 102,173 Minn. 215
• Parties: HEFFTER v. NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

173 Minn. 215
217 N.W. 102

HEFFTER
v.
NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.

No. 26376.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 23, 1927.

Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; Hugo O. Hanft, Judge.

Action by Israel Heffter against the Northern States Power Company. Verdict for defendant. From an order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that, when a thing, which has caused an injury, is shown to be under the management of the defendant charged with negligence, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who have the control use proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that it arose from want of care.

The doctrine of ‘res ipsa loquitur,’ when applicable, is only a substitute for direct evidence, and rests upon necessity. It should be used only when the facts and demands of justice make its application essential, and when the necessary evidence is absent or not available. It has no application when all the facts attending an accident are disclosed in the evidence.

There being evidence tending to show negligence which was properly submitted to the jury, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires no consideration.

[217 N.W. 102]

Denegre, McDermott, Stearns & Stone, of St. Paul, for appellant.

Gustavus Loevinger and Othniel Brandt, both of St. Paul, for respondent.

WILSON, C. J.

Appeal from an order setting aside a verdict for defendant and granting plaintiff a new trial. The order was based exclusively upon the failure of the court to include in the charge to the jury the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Plaintiff was driving his automobile north on Lexington avenue, St. Paul. At University avenue he stopped his car near the curb on the right side of Lexington to wait for the electric stop sign to change to ‘Go.’ He intended to turn left toward Minneapolis. Defendant's truck, pulling a trailer loaded with poles, drew up on the left side of plaintiff's car. When the sign changed to ‘Go,’ the truck proceeded to cross University avenue. Plaintiff's proof tends to show that before his car had moved it was struck by the poles on defendant's trailer, doing damage. Defendant's proof tends to show that plaintiff gave a left turn signal, and started his car, which swerved enough to the left to get in the way of the poles on the trailer. The several men on the truck, including the driver, and all the occupants of plaintiff's car, disclosed all the facts relative to the respective claims of the parties. The alleged negligence was the careless operation of the truck with its trailer and load.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that, when a thing, which has caused an injury, is shown to be under the management of the defendant charged with negligence, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who have the control use proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that it arose from want of care. Olson v. G. N. Ry. Co., 68 Minn. 155, 71 N. W. 5;Sullivan v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 161 Minn. 45, 55, 200 N. W. 922; Matthews v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 162 Minn. 313, 320, 202 N. W. 896;O'Rourke v. Marshall Field & Co., 307 Ill. 197, 138 N. E. 625, 27 A. L. R. 1014;Plumb v. Richmond Light & Ry. Co., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504, 25 A. L. R. 685;Dierks Lbr. & Coal Co. v. Brown (C. C. A.) 19 F.(2d) 732. The circumstances take the place of evidence to make a prima facie case to take the case to the jury. Sullivan v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., supra; Ryan v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 168 Minn. 287, 210 N. W. 32. ‘The thing speaks for itself’ is a short way of saying that the circumstances attendant upon the

[217 N.W. 103]

accident are themselves of such character as to justify a jury in inferring negligence as the cause of the accident. 2 Jones on Ev. § 518. The fact may be established by such circumstances, in the absence of direct evidence. Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 33 S. Ct. 416, 57 L. Ed. 815, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 905. The doctrine is not applicable where the responsibility for the accident is divided. Laurent v. U. F. G. Co., 101 W. Va. 499, 133 S. E. 117. The agency must be under the exclusive control of defendant. Lehman v. Dwyer Plumbing & Heating Co., 104 Minn. 190, 116 N. W. 352. The importance of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is found in the province of the trial court, and not in the province of the jury. It is called upon, in the first instance, to say whether there is any evidence of negligence to go to the jury. In the absence of direct evidence, the court must, in cases where the maxim applies, hold that the circumstances, if unexplained, are such as will permit the jury to draw the inference of negligence. Hughes v. Atlantic City & S. R. Co., 85 N. J. Law, 212, 89 A. 769, L. R. A. 1916A, 927. It still remains for the jury to decide whether the preponderance is with the plaintiff, even though no explanation is given. Sullivan v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., supra. The application of the maxim presents principally the question of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to justify the jury in inferring the existence of defendant's negligence. Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925,52 L. R. A. 922, 82 Am. St. Rep. 630;Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lbr. Co. v. Jeffery (C. C. A.) 169 F. 609. It is not the accident, but the circumstances, that justify the application of the doctrine. It is a mere rule of evidence. The circumstances surrounding a case where the maxim applies amount to evidence from which the fact of negligence may be found. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to defendant, but inaccessible to the injured person. 5 Wigmore, Ev. § 2509, p. 498. It may happen that a plaintiff makes a prima facie case by showing the accident with its attendant circumstances, and yet he may destroy by his own evidence the application of the doctrine. Buckland v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry. Co., 181 Mass. 3, 62 N. E. 955.

In the absence of an explanation, the maxim, where applicable, may support a verdict. The theory is that the adversary, in control of the instrumentality in the absence of explanation, may have superior knowledge to the disadvantage of the injured. He may also readily produce evidence which would naturally be difficult for plaintiff to get. Plaintiff would often have to resort to indirect and circumstantial evidence, and doubtless some meritorious causes would fail for want of the truth, while the defendant can usually disclose the truth by direct and positive evidence. If he is free from fault, the demand upon him cannot be harmful. Necessity seems the best support for the rule, although some authorities base it on the doctrine of probabilities. We recognize the rule as resting on inference and not presumption. The distinction is discussed in Glowacki v. N. W. O. Ry. & Power Co. (Ohio) 157 N. E. 21. See 23 Mich. Law Rev. 785. It must therefore follow that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no...