Heflin v. State
| Decision Date | 07 December 1891 |
| Citation | 14 S.E. 112,88 Ga. 151 |
| Parties | HEFLIN v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. It does not per se disqualify a judge of the superior court to preside on the trial of an indictment for perjury that the same judge presided at the trial of the case in which the alleged perjury was committed, and also of a second case in which one of the witnesses in the first was convicted of perjury. Nor does any disqualification result as a matter of law from the judge having, by reason of his acquaintance or supposed acquaintance with the facts thus derived privately and unofficially advised the prisoner's counsel to induce his client to plead guilty, saying that there was no doubt about his guilt, and no earthly chance for him to be acquitted.
2. On a trial for perjury evidence is relevant which tends to show that the accused, in a private interview with another person endeavored to influence that person to give false testimony in the same case in which the accused afterwards gave the alleged false evidence.
3. The whole res gestæ of a transaction, including declarations of the participants made at the time, may be adduced in evidence against the accused to show that his testimony as to some of the particulars of the transaction was false.
4. As a general rule, in order to convict a witness of perjury alleged to have been committed on the trial of a case in a court of record, the record of the case, or a duly-authenticated transcript thereof, is necessary to prove the judicial proceeding in the course of which the alleged perjury was committed.
5. On a trial for perjury, where there is no direct evidence of the existence, finding, or pendency of any indictment for murder against George Eddleman, or of any issue raised upon such indictment, there is no proper foundation for a charge to the jury that, if they believed from the evidence that one George Eddleman was tried for murder in the superior court of the county of Fulton, so far as the oath having been taken in some judicial proceeding, the case to that extent would be made out. That there was a trial, and that the person now accused of perjury was sworn and testified therein as a witness, would not dispense with legal evidence of the existence of the judicial proceeding, the same being essential to show what was in fact tried, and its identity with the case described in the indictment for perjury.
6. The indictment of George Eddleman not being duly proved, and there being no evidence as to what issue was formed upon that indictment, it was error to charge the jury that if they believed from the evidence that it was an issue upon the trial of George Eddleman whether at the time he shot Gresham he (Gresham) was advancing upon him with a knife in his hand or something like a knife, that would be a matter material to the issue.
7. Other special grounds of the motion for a new trial, so far as duly verified, construing them in the light of the whole charge of the court and of all the facts in the record, show no material error; but, the evidence being deficient as to the judicial proceeding in which the alleged perjury was committed, and as to the issue, if any, involved in that proceeding, and the court having charged erroneously on that branch of the case, the accused, as matter of strict law, is entitled to a new trial.
Error from superior court, Fulton county; R. H. CLARK, Judge.
Prosecution against M. R. Heflin for perjury. Verdict of guilty and judgment thereon. Defendant brings error. Reversed.
The following is the official report:
Heflin was indicted for the offense of perjury, alleged to have been committed upon the trial of the case of State v. Eddleman, who was charged with the murder of Gresham. Heflin was found guilty, and his motion for new trial was overruled, to which he excepted. In addition to the usual grounds of the motion, that the verdict was contrary to law, evidence, etc., it was alleged that a new trial should be granted because the presiding judge in this case had presided on the trial of Eddleman and of one McCord, and before he entered upon the trial of this case became firmly of the opinion that movant had committed perjury by his testimony in the Eddleman Case. On two different occasions before the trial of movant had been entered upon the judge approached movant's attorney, and said to him there was no doubt about the guilt of movant of perjury, and advised the attorney to induce movant to plead guilty, as there was no earthly chance for him to be acquitted. Upon the foregoing grounds movant objected to the judge presiding at his trial before the trial began for lack of impartiality, and for prejudice against him, but the objection was overruled. As to this ground of the motion the judge states he had presided on the Eddleman trial, and also on one of the trials of McCord for perjury; knew that McCord was tried again, found guilty, and the conviction was final. In the interests of justice and economy he, the judge, wished to save another trial, which necessarily involved the evidence in the Eddleman and McCord Cases, that he and the public had heard so often. Nevertheless he had no prejudice against Heflin, and tried him as though he had heard of the case for the first time.
Another ground of the motion was: Because the judge was not qualified to preside on the trial of movant on account of prejudice against him, and for lack of impartiality by reason of the facts recited in the foregoing ground.
Another ground was: Because 11 jurors had been selected, and had remained together all night, and one of them, one Stegall, became too ill to remain on the jury, and was excused by the court, and the court refused, on motion of defendant's counsel, to either declare a mistrial or excuse the remaining jurors, and allow the selection of the jury to be begun over, but retained the 10 remaining jurors, who constituted part of the jury which tried defendant. As to this ground the judge states: The jurors had neither of them been sworn in chief. The jurors had simply become sick. There was no disqualification attached to him; and, as the rulings of the supreme court were understood, a juror selected and becoming sick could be excused before the whole jury was made up.
It was further alleged that a new trial should be granted because the court, in the presence and hearing of a panel of jurors that had been put upon defendant, and from which one or more jurors were selected to try defendant, said in an angry tone to the clerk: --when, in truth, the clerk had not given and had not [been] asked to give any such aid, but had only, in reply to an inquiry by counsel, informed them of the number of challenges defendant had made. It was alleged that such conduct on the part of the judge was wholly uncalled for, illegal, and calculated to prejudice defendant's case in the minds of the jurors.
Another ground of the motion was: One Bradbury, a juror of a panel put upon defendant, on his voir dire, in reply to the first question, answered that he had formed and expressed an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant. In reply to a question by the court, he said his opinion came from having had the evidence in the Eddleman Case repeated to him by a man who heard it. The court ruled him competent. The court permitted defendant petent. The court permitted defendant to put the juror before him as trier, and the juror testified his mind was not so made up that he could not be controlled by the evidence. The court, as trior, ruled the juror competent, and the state put him upon the defendant, and the defendant challenged him. Before the jury was finally completed, defendant had exhausted all the challenges allowed him by law, and the last juror selected was placed on the jury without the right of challenge by defendant. Defendant alleged that the court erred in ruling this juror competent, thereby compelling defendant to exhaust one of his challenges upon him, when the juror should have been set aside for cause. Also, because one Jones, a juror, upon his voir dire said he had formed and expressed an opinion as to the guilt of defendant from having heard the testimony in the case of the State against Eddleman, and the court ruled the juror competent, and the state put him upon defendant, who was compelled to exhaust the challenge upon him, when he should have been set aside for cause. As to this ground the court states his memory did not serve him as to how it occurred substantially, but his impression is, it is not so stated as to give a correct idea of the court's ruling.
Another ground was: Because the court refused to allow one Campbell who had been summoned by the sheriff as a tales juror, to remain upon the panel, and had him stricken from the list of jurors, and refused to allow him to be put upon defendant, as, by law, defendant had the right to have done, to which action of the court the defendant objected, said Campbell being qualified for jury service. In support of this ground of the motion the movant used the affidavit of Campbell to the following effect: He was served by the sheriff with a summons to serve as tales juror in the case of the State against Heflin. He had not been about the court-house at all during the progress of the trial, but, having some business in the sheriff's office, went there to attend to it, and while there was summoned as a juror. He reported to the court at the time named in the summons, and when the sheriff ordered all persons summoned as jurors to take their seats in a certain place deponent...
To continue reading
Request your trial