Heidel v. Benedict

• Decision Date: 24 May 1895
• Parties: HEIDEL ET AL. v. BENEDICT ET AL.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

61 Minn. 170

63 N.W. 490

HEIDEL ET AL.

v.BENEDICT ET AL.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 24, 1895.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Blocks in the platted and laid-out part of an incorporated city were generally subdivided on the plat into lots of various sizes, but one block was not thus subdivided. The property was city or urban in character. Held, that the owner of a part of the undivided block was entitled to hold as a homestead only a tract equal in area to the average size of platted lots in that part of the city.

2. An attachment is discharged as to an assignee in a general assignment for the benefit of creditors by an amendment to the complaint and affidavit for attachment, made after the execution of the assignment, substituting an entirely different and distinct cause of action for the one set up in the original complaint and affidavit.

3. The determination of a motion is not res adjudicata, so as to prevent the parties from drawing the same matters in question again in an action.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; Charles D. Kerr, Judge.

Action by August Heidel against Henry Benedict and Henry Habighorst to determine adverse claims to land. Judgment was ordered for defendant Benedict, and plaintiff and defendant Habighorst appeal. Affirmed as to plaintiff, and reversed as to defendant Habighorst.

T. R. Palmer, for appellant Heidel and others.

L. E. Jones, for appellant Habighorst.

Ambrose Tighe, for respondent Benedict.

MITCHELL, J.

Action to determine adverse claims to real property. The contest is triangular, and grows out of the following state of facts: The plaintiff owned 227 1/2 feet by 120 feet in the southeasterly corner of block 13 in Dayton's addition to St. Paul, upon which was situated a house in which he resided. This block was not subdivided into lots, but the blocks generally in the addition had been subdivided by plat into lots, varying in size from 35 to 55 feet in width, and from 95 to 170 feet in depth. The property in the addition is strictly urban in character. On November 24, 1893, the defendant Benedict commenced an action against the plaintiff in which a writ of attachment was issued and levied on the property in question. In both the complaint and affidavit for attachment the cause of action was stated to be upon account for goods sold and delivered by Benedict to Heidel. Within 10 days after the levy of the attachment, Heidel made an assignment of all his nonexempt property to defendant Habighorst for the benefit of all his creditors. The question is raised whether this was a common-law assignment or an assignment under the insolvent law of 1881; but, as we view the case, this question is not material. After the execution of this assignment, Heidel made a motion to dissolve the attachment. Thereupon Benedict amended his complaint, setting up, in place of the original cause of action, 16 other separate causes of action, 14 of which were promissory notes executed by Heidel to various parties, and by them transferred to Benedict, and the two others, respectively, for money loaned and for goods sold to Heidel by other parties who had assigned the claims to Benedict. Benedict also made a motion for leave to amend his affidavit for attachment, so that the statement of his causes of action would conform to his amended complaint. When the motions came on for hearing, the court denied Heidel's motion to dissolve the attachment, but allowed Benedict's motion to amend his affidavit. Heidel then commenced this action, his contention being that the entire tract was exempt as his homestead, and hence was not subject to attachment, and did not pass by his assignment for the benefit of creditors. Both of the defendants denied that the whole tract was thus exempt, but, as against each other, Benedict claimed that his attachment constituted a lien on the nonexempt part of the tract prior and paramount to the assignment for the benefit of creditors, while Habighorst claimed that, as to the assignment, the attachment was discharged-First, by force of the assignment itself, as being made under the insolvent law of 1881; and, second, because of the amendment of the complaint and affidavit for attachment substituting entirely different causes of action after the rights of creditors under the assignment had intervened. The trial court held that Heidel was only entitled, as a homestead, to the dwelling and the land on which it was situated, not exceeding in size the average sized lots in Dayton's addition; and that upon the remainder of the tract Benedict's attachment constituted a subsisting lien, paramount to Habighorst's interest under the assignment. Both Heidel and Habighorst appealed.

1. We are of opinion that the decision of the court as to the extent of Heidel's homestead exemption was correct. The tract was within the laid-out or platted portion of an incorporated city. It was strictly urban in character,-a fact which distinguishes the case from that of In re Smith's Estate, 51 Minn. 316, 53 N. W. 711, relied on by plaintiff's counsel. It is almost impossible to construe the crude provisions of our homestead law without sometimes resorting to what might seem to be judicial legislation, and it is almost equally difficult to build up a line of decisions that will always be strictly...