Heideman v. PFL, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-0010-CV-W-JWO.,88-0010-CV-W-JWO.
• Citation: 710 F. Supp. 711
• Parties: Leo HEIDEMAN, et ux., Plaintiffs, v. PFL, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

710 F. Supp. 711

Leo HEIDEMAN, et ux., Plaintiffs, v. PFL, INC., Defendant.

No. 88-0010-CV-W-JWO.

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, W.D.

April 11, 1989.

Mark J. Klein, Dennis E. Egan, Popham, Conway, Sweeny, Fremont & Bundschu, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiffs.

John F. Wymer, Paul T. Stagliano, John R. Phillips, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, Atlanta, Ga., John R. Phillips, Blackwell, Sanders, Matheny, Weary & Lombardi, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDERS ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JOHN W. OLIVER, Senior District Judge.

I

The above-captioned case pends on defendant's motion for summary judgment in which the defendant asserts that all five counts¹ of plaintiffs' complaint are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs maintain that "there are no statute of limitations issues in the instant litigation that properly may be resolved by summary judgment. Defendant has not carried its burden of showing that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact; to the contrary, plaintiffs have indicated the existence of substantial issues as to material facts on each of their causes of action." Plts' Memo in Oppos. to Deft's Motion for S.J. on Stat. of Limit. Issues at 12.

Pursuant to discussion at a pretrial conference held August 31, 1988, the parties agreed and the Court approved that the statute of limitations issues presented in defendant's pending motion for summary judgment should be separated for determination pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. An order to that effect was entered on August 31, 1988 and an agreed schedule of briefs for the presentation of the statute of limitations issues to this Court for resolution was established. The parties were also able to agree upon a partial stipulation of facts which was filed together with both parties' reports of facts each considered material to the statute of limitation issues to which the other was unwilling to stipulate.

This Court has reviewed those stipulations, defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs' opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, both defendant and plaintiffs' reports on the statute of limitation issues and defendant's reply brief together with all depositions and exhibits submitted.²

We find and conclude that neither the principles of equitable estoppel nor equitable tolling can be said to toll the statute of limitation applicable to either plaintiffs' ADEA claim or to plaintiffs' ERISA claim. We further find and conclude that all three remaining State common law claims are also barred by the applicable statute of limitations. PLF's motion for summary judgment on Count I (ADEA claim), Count II (ERISA claim), and the three State claims (Counts III, IV, and V) will be granted because the charge for each count was not timely filed for the reasons set out below.³

II Standard for Summary Judgment

The Supreme Court has recently decided three summary judgment cases, Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This trilogy of cases clearly advocates a more liberal use of summary judgment. "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555, quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. See also City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Electric Corp., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988) ("A trilogy of recent Supreme Court opinions demonstrates that the Eighth Circuit should be somewhat more hospitable to summary judgments than in the past. The motion for summary judgment can be a tool of great utility in removing factually insubstantial cases from crowded dockets, freeing courts' trial time for those cases that really do raise genuine issues of material fact.").

The purpose of summary judgment is "to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." See Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 56. Summary judgment "must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555.

Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53.⁴

The Supreme Court has made clear that the "party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'<sup>5</sup> which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. "Rule 56(e) then requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits or by `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.

The nonmoving party cannot merely rest upon allegations and denials in his pleadings to get to the jury without any meaningful probative evidence that tends to support his complaint. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510 citing First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1593, 20 L.Ed. 2d 569 (1968). A genuine issue of material fact exists, "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 citing First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968).

It must be emphasized, however, that nothing in these most recent Supreme Court cases cited above negates the rule of law mandated by earlier cases that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is the court's duty to view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and to allow that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence presented. Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Inland Oil and Transport Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725, 727-28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991, 100 S.Ct. 522, 62 L.Ed.2d 420 (1979). See also 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.153 (2d ed. 1987).

III

Findings of Fact

The parties have stipulated to the following pertinent facts:

1. Plaintiff Leo Heideman (Mr. Heideman) was hired by defendant on or about July 12, 1964 as Regional Manager, North Central Region. Stip. ¶ 1.

2. Defendant is a Minnesota corporation whose corporate name at all times pertinent to the instant litigation was Northland Foods, Inc.; Jeno's, Inc.; or PFL, Inc. Stip. ¶ 2.

3. In 1967, Mr. Heideman was promoted to the position of National Field Sales Supervisor and from 1970 to 1978 worked in several different management positions with defendant, as a vice president, the last of which was Vice President, Sales, for the Central Division of defendant. Stip. ¶ 5.

4. During the course of his employment with Jeno's, Inc., Mr. Heideman worked primarily out of his home in Kansas City, Missouri and traveled on a varying basis (approximately on a monthly basis) to the corporate headquarters of Jeno's, Inc., in Duluth, Minnesota. He would ordinarily stay in Duluth when making these visits, a day and a night.

5. On or about December 6, 1978, Carl Hill (Mr. Hill) was employed by defendant as Senior Vice President, Marketing and Sales. He had previously been employed by defendant from about 1967 or 1968 until 1972. At the time he left defendant's employment in 1982, he was Executive Vice President of Marketing and Sales. Stip. ¶ 9.

6. On or about January 3, 1979, Mr. Hill's actual authority was made co-extensive with that of the then president of defendant, Dick Jones (Mr. Jones), and Mr. Hill reported directly to the chairman and vice chairman of defendant, not to Mr. Jones. Stip. ¶ 10.

7. On or about December 21, 1978, Mr. Hill wrote a confidential memorandum (the Hill memo) to Mr. Jones regarding what Mr. Hill referred to as "additional responsibilities for Parr and Carpenter." Parr and Carpenter, as referred to in the Hill memo, were John Parr (Mr. Parr), then the Vice President of Sales of defendant, and Morris J. Carpenter (Mr. Carpenter), then the Vice President of Marketing of defendant, both of whom reported to Mr. Hill. Mr. Parr was then Mr. Heideman's immediate supervisor. Stip. ¶ 11.

8. Courtesy copies of the Hill memo⁶ were directed to be delivered to Messrs. Parr, Carpenter, and Mick Paulucci (Mr. Paulucci). Mr....