Heideman v. Washington City
| Decision Date | 11 January 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 20050941-CA.,20050941-CA. |
| Parties | Kent A. HEIDEMAN; Kimball B. Gardner; and Birdview Manufacturing Inc., a Utah corporation, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. WASHINGTON CITY, a Utah municipal corporation; and unknown persons working for or under the authority of Washington City, Defendants and Appellees. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Justin R. Elswick and Justin D. Heideman, Ascione Heideman & McKay, LLC, Provo, for Appellants.
Jeffrey N. Starkey and Bryan J. Pattison, Durham Jones & Pinegar, St. George, for Appellees.
Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.J., BILLINGS and ORME, JJ.
¶ 1 Kent A. Heideman, Kimball B. Gardner, and Birdview Manufacturing, Inc.(collectively, Plaintiffs)1 appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Washington City (the City), claiming the trial court erred in concluding that (1) Plaintiffs' notice of claim was defective because it failed to name all possible causes of action, (2) there were no genuine issues of material fact, (3) Plaintiffs did not have a protected property interest at stake, (4) the City had not converted Plaintiffs' property, (5) the City's conduct did not amount to an unconstitutional taking, (6) the parties had not entered into a contractual relationship, (7) the City had not breached any contracts with Plaintiffs, and (8) the City had not breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We affirm.
¶ 2 On October 23, 2002, the City passed Ordinance Number 2002-13 (the Ordinance), see Washington City, Utah, Ordinance 2002-13 (Oct. 23, 3002), which increased water impact fees from $2284 to $3182 per dwelling unit.2 During the October 23 hearing at which the Ordinance was first discussed, Plaintiff Kent Heideman, a city council member and land developer, expressed concern about when the Ordinance would go into effect. Mr. Heideman argued that the city council should give developers, including himself, "thirty days to get [current projects] wrapped up." Council member Roger Bundy stated that the City of St. George "had a stampede" when it did as Mr. Heideman suggested. When it came time to vote on the Ordinance, Mr. Bundy stated that "there may be some people that have permits sitting there ready to be pulled," and he thought a two-week waiting period was necessary.3 The council ultimately voted to approve the Ordinance with a November 6, 2002 effective date.
¶ 3 On November 6, 2002, Mr. Heideman tendered two checks to the City for a total of $150,744 and requested sixty-six "water impact fee permits"4 at the prior rate of $2284. On the same day, Plaintiff Kimball Gardner, on behalf of Birdview Manufacturing, Inc., provided the City with a $34,230 check and $30 in cash for fifteen water impact fee permits at the $2284 rate. The City's front office staff accepted the payments from Mr. Heideman and Mr. Gardner and issued receipts indicating that the payments were for "66 water impact fees" and "15 water impact fees" respectively. Both checks were negotiated and deposited into the City's financial account. Prior to accepting Plaintiffs' payments, the City's front office staff had not received any instruction regarding the impact fee rate increase.
¶ 4 At the next city council meeting, on November 13, 2002, the council addressed the fact that there was some confusion regarding prepayment of impact fees. Specifically, the council discussed the fact that builders usually pay impact fees when their building permits are ready for approval, but in response to the fee increase, some were paying impact fees early. The city attorney stated that "[t]here needs to be clarification to exceptions to early payment of impact fees put on the agenda for the Council to approve." The mayor then stated that the city manager would contact those who had prepaid and let them know the issue would be on the next city council meeting's agenda for purposes of clarification. The next hearing to discuss the impact fees was set for December 11, 2002, and public notice was promptly posted.
¶ 5 At the December 11 hearing, the agenda item, "Clarification of the pre-purchasing of fees concerning the increase of the Water Impact Fee that was effective November 6, 2002," was addressed. The council discussed the following issues: the City's intent to tie impact fees to specific lots, whether the two-week time frame was meant to accommodate building permits that were being pulled during the two-week period, and how the City would proceed with prepaid impact fees from those who were not at the meeting.
¶ 6 During the meeting, the city council expressed concern that if it accepted all of the prepayments, it would simply need to raise the fees again to accommodate more growth. The council then allowed audience members to comment, at which time Mr. Gardner argued that the City should honor his prepayments and "stick by [the] contract that [it] made when [it] cashed the check." The city attorney responded that "[b]re[a]ch of contract is not an issue because the staff does not have authority to enter into a contract." Mr. Heideman requested an executive session to address his payments to the City; however, his request was not granted. He made no additional statements. At the close of the discussion, the mayor announced that "those people who have prepaid the impact fees and have not pulled their permits have two weeks until December 26[] to pull their permits, if they don't meet . . . the City's criteria then the City will refund their money." Neither Mr. Heideman nor Mr. Gardner submitted building permits to the City by the December 26, 2002 deadline.
¶ 7 On January 27, 2003, the City mailed a certified letter to Mr. Heideman stating that he was not entitled to prepay water impact fees because he failed to present the City with a building permit prior to the December 26 deadline. The City enclosed a check, dated January 2, 2003, for $150,744. Mr. Heideman returned the check on January 30, 2003. A similar letter was mailed to Mr. Gardner. However, after three failed delivery attempts, it was returned to sender. Mr. Heideman claims he eventually accepted payment after the City stipulated, at a temporary restraining order (TRO) hearing, that he could preserve his claims for litigation despite receiving the refund. However, there is no evidence of the stipulation agreement or the TRO hearing in the record on appeal. There is also no evidence regarding when Mr. Heideman actually cashed the City's check.5
¶ 8 On or about February 4, 2003, Mr. Heideman filed a notice of claim with the City.6 See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (Supp. 2003). In the nature of claims section, Mr. Heideman listed the following claims: breach of contract, "§ 1983 claims against certain city officials," and "[o]ther causes of action." On or about April 2, 2003, Mr. Heideman filed another notice of claim adding Mr. Gardner as a claimant. Other than the additional claimant, the two notices were identical.
¶ 9 On March 12, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the City alleging breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. About six months later, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging, in addition to the two previous claims, governmental taking without just compensation, conversion, violation of due process, and violation of appellants' civil rights under chapter 42, section 1983 of the United States Code. Eight months later, Plaintiffs filed yet another amended complaint, this time adding claims for attorney fees under section 1988 of the United States code and "the private attorney general doctrine," and a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic relations.
¶ 10 After filing the second amended complaint, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The City opposed, and filed its own cross-motion for summary judgment and motion to strike the substantive paragraphs of Mr. Heideman's's affidavit submitted in support of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.7 On October 22, 2004, the trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiffs'. Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied. They now appeal.
¶ 11 Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in granting the City's cross-motion for summary judgment based on its conclusions that (1) Plaintiffs' notice of claim was defective because it failed to name all possible causes of action, (2) there were no genuine issues of material fact, (3) Plaintiffs did not have a protected property interest at stake, (4) the City had not converted Plaintiffs' property, (5) the City's conduct did not amount to an unconstitutional taking, (6) the parties had not entered into a contractual relationship, (7) the City had not breached any contracts with Plaintiffs, and (8) the City had not breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Summary judgment is only appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Consequently, we review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. See Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT App 355, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 988. In doing so, "we view the [undisputed] facts in a light most favorable to the party against which the motion was granted." Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, ¶ 10, 108 P.3d 701 (alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted).
¶ 12 The trial court held that Plaintiffs' intentional interference claim was jurisdictionally barred because, among other reasons, the notice of claim was defective. The Governmental Immunity Act (the Act) requires individuals with claims against government entities to comply with the notice of claim requirements set forth in Utah Code section 63-30-11. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1997 & Supp.2003). Failure to...
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