Heidi T., In re

• Decision Date: 27 December 1978
• Citation: 151 Cal.Rptr. 263,87 Cal.App.3d 864
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re Heidi Pauline TELLES and Ralph Montgomery Telles, minors. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF the COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Carol LaVonne TELLES, aka Carol LaVonne Satterlee, aka Carol LaVonne Elvey, Objector and Appellant. Civ. 42644.

Page 263

151 Cal.Rptr. 263

87 Cal.App.3d 864

In re Heidi Pauline TELLES and Ralph Montgomery Telles, minors.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF the COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Carol LaVonne TELLES, aka Carol LaVonne Satterlee, aka Carol LaVonne Elvey, Objector and Appellant.

Civ. 42644.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Dec. 27, 1978.

Nordin F. Blacker, San Jose, for objector and appellant.

Selby Brown, Jr., County Counsel, Jeffrey L. Bryson, Ann Miller Ravel, Deputy County Counsels, San Jose, for petitioner and respondent.

RACANELLI, Presiding Justice.

Preliminary to formal adoption proceedings, the Department of Social Services of the County of Santa Clara (hereafter Department) instituted proceedings pursuant to the provisions of Civil Code section 232 ¹ to declare the minor wards of the court, Heidi and Ralph (now age 12 and 11, respectively), free of parental custody and control. The trial court found that as a result of the neglect and mental disability of appellant (hereafter Carol), the natural mother, it would be detrimental to return their custody to Carol and rendered judgment freeing the minors from her custody and control and referring them to the Department for adoptive placement. ² On appeal, Carol challenges the validity of that judgment on several grounds. Our examination of the record, in light of governing principles, discloses no prejudicial error as claimed. We affirm the judgment.

Facts

The record reveals an unfortunate history of economic deprivation and social maladjustment ultimately resulting in Carol's decision to relinquish physical custody of the two minor children to a county juvenile agency; in December 1967, the minors were adjudicated dependent children of the court and placed in a foster home with the proposed adoptive parents where they have remained ever since. The impoverished circumstances of the family, compounded by the desertion of the natural father (now deceased) presented substantial obstacles for Carol in her efforts to adequately raise and provide for her family of five children. Shortly after the birth of Ralph, Carol began to manifest symptoms of emotional and mental instability resulting in several hospital confinements and a continuing need for medical treatment. On many occasions, she was observed to be in a dazed and unresponsive condition oblivious to the reality of her surrounding circumstances. Psychiatric evidence disclosed Carol suffered from a chronic mental illness, manifested by a detached reality and likely to become exacerbated when confronted with the normal stresses associated with the rearing of young children. While Carol's condition has shown improvement in recent years, two of the examining psychiatrists believed that Carol is and will remain incapable of adequately performing the role of parent; a third psychiatrist (called by Carol), while unable to evaluate Carol's present ability to provide parental care and control, stated his reluctance to disturb the children's present living situation.

I. Standard of Proof

Initially, we meet the issue presented by Carol as to the proper standard of proof to be applied in section 232 emancipation proceedings. Focusing on the grave nature of the personal interests at stake, Carol contends as she did below that due process considerations and the far-reaching consequences generated by the instant termination proceedings demand that proof be made beyond a reasonable doubt or, at least, by clear and convincing evidence. While no relevant precedents are cited for the former proposition, ³ the latter proposal finds nearly uniform support in a number of cases. (See In re Cynthia K. (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 81, 85-86, 141 Cal.Rptr. 875; In re George G. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 146, 165, fn. 14, 137 Cal.Rptr. 201; see also In re Robert P. (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 310, 318, 132 Cal.Rptr. 5 (hg. den. Oct. 28, 1976) (dependency proceedings); Alsager v. District Court of Polk Cty., Iowa (S.D.Iowa 1975) 406 F.Supp. 10; cf. In re Rose G. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 406, 420, 129 Cal.Rptr. 338 (hg. den. July 1, 1976) (proof by preponderance of the evidence).) ⁴

In light of the more serious consequences flowing from a permanent severance of the parental relationship (In re Jacqueline H. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 170, 175, 145 Cal.Rptr. 548, 577 P.2d 683) and the strong policy considerations favoring parental custody over that of nonparents (In re Carmaleta B. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 482, 489, 146 Cal.Rptr. 623, 579 P.2d 514) we are persuaded that the holdings in Cynthia K., George G., and Robert P. are soundly reasoned and should be followed. Thus, we hold that the appropriate standard to be applied herein requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. While the record is silent as to which standard was employed, we may properly presume that the correct "clear and convincing evidence" standard was applied. (See In re Cynthia K., supra, 75 Cal.App.3d 81, 86, 141 Cal.Rptr. 875.) The evidence under review (discussed Infra ) adequately demonstrates compliance with that more stringent standard. (See In re Robert P., supra, 61 Cal.App.3d 310, 319, 132 Cal.Rptr. 5.) That standard is for the guidance of the trial court only; on review, our function is limited to a determination whether substantial evidence exists to support the conclusions reached by the trial court in utilizing the appropriate standard. (See Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750, 106 Cal.Rptr. 187, 505 P.2d 1027; see also Witkin, Cal. Evidence, § 209, pp. 190-191.)

II. Sufficiency of the Findings

Carol challenges the sufficiency of the findings underlying the judgment grounded upon neglect (subd. (a)(2)) and incapacitating mental illness (subd. (a)(6)). We consider the latter claim initially.

Preliminarily, we focus upon Carol's contention that the statutory test sanctioning termination of parental custody of "incapable of supporting or controlling the child in a proper manner (due to) . . . mental illness" (subd. (a)(6)) is unconstitutionally vague and incapable of objective application. We disagree. A substantially similar claim was urged and rejected in In re Baby Boy T. (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 815, 88 Cal.Rptr. 418, which held that the legislative intent in enacting the subdivision (formerly § 232, subd. (g)) was to adopt the substantive definitions then provided by Welfare and Institutions Code former section 5550 ⁵ (at pp. 820-821, 88 Cal.Rptr. 418). (See also In re Eugene W. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 623, 628, fn. 2, 105 Cal.Rptr. 736.) Significantly, our state Supreme Court has expressly approved the definitions of mental illness relied upon in the In re Baby Boy T. and Eugene W. decisions. (See In re Carmaleta B., supra, 21 Cal.3d 482, 490-492, 146 Cal.Rptr. 623, 579 P.2d 514.) The resulting effect measured against a standard of inability to support or control the minor in a "proper manner" is generally understood to mean "such control as parents ordinarily exercise . . . (and implies) . . . the usual incidents of the exercise of control" over the child. (See Marr v. Superior Court (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 527, 530, 250 P.2d 739; see also In re Edwards (1930) 208 Cal. 725, 733, 284 P. 916.) No vagueness or fatal uncertainty is manifested in the statutory language either facially or in its application. (Cf. In re Robert P., supra, 61 Cal.App.3d 310, 318, 132 Cal.Rptr. 5.) We so hold.

In assessing Carol's further claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the challenged finding, our function is governed by clearly defined principles of review: It has been repeatedly held that "When a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court Begins and Ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact. (Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal.2d 567, 583, 2 Cal.Rptr. 609, 349 P.2d 289 . . . ; Primm v. Primm, 46 Cal.2d 690, 693, 299 P.2d 231. . . .) (Further) (P) When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court. (Brewer v. Simpson, supra, 53 Cal.2d 567, 583, 2 Cal.Rptr. 609, 349 P.2d 289; Primm v. Primm, supra, 46 Cal.2d 690, 694, 299 P.2d 231.)" (Green Trees Enterprises, Inc. v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 66 Cal.2d 782, 784-785, 59 Cal.Rptr. 141, 143, 427 P.2d 805, 807.) And, as summarized by our Supreme Court in Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925-926, 101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 571, 496 P.2d 480, 483: "In resolving the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, we are bound by the established rules of appellate review that all factual matters will be viewed most favorably to the prevailing party (Leming v. Oilfields Trucking Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 343, 346, 282 P.2d 23; Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. McHugh (1913) 166 Cal. 140, 142, 134 P. 1157; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) § 245, at p. 4236) and in support of the judgment (Waller v. Brooks (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 389, 394, 72 Cal.Rptr. 228). All issues of credibility are likewise within the province of the trier of fact. (Estate of Teel (1944) 25 Cal.2d 520, 526, 154 P.2d 384.) 'In brief, the appellate court ordinarily Looks only at the evidence supporting the successful party, and disregards the contrary showing.' (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, Supra, § 249, at p. 4241.) All conflicts, therefore, must be resolved in favor of the respondent. (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429, 45 P.2d 183.)"

In the light of the foregoing principles, we consider the evidence in the record to determine its sufficiency to support the challenged finding. In so doing, we disregard the conflicting and unfavorable evidence which Carol emphasizes in her brief. (See Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925, 101 Cal.Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480.)

Two qualified...