Heilman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

• Docket Number: 2:21-CV-0476-DMC
• Decision Date: 29 July 2022
• Parties: ANNETTE KELLY HEILMAN, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

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ANNETTE KELLY HEILMAN, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 2:21-CV-0476-DMC

United States District Court, E.D. California

July 29, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DENNIS M. COTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff,^[1] who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, ECF Nos. 7 and 12, this case is before the undersigned as the presiding judge for all purposes including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C § 636(c); see also ECF No. 19 (minute order reassigning case to Magistrate Judge). Pending before the Court are the parties' briefs on the merits, ECF Nos. 16 and 17.

The Court reviews the Commissioner's final decision to determine whether it is: (1) based on proper legal standards and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence” is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). It is “. . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole, including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion, must be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The Court may not affirm the Commissioner's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the Commissioner's decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

For the reasons discussed below, the matter will be remanded for further proceedings.

I. THE DISABILITY EVALUATION PROCESS

To achieve uniformity of decisions, the Commissioner employs a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f) and 416.920(a)-(f). The sequential evaluation proceeds as follows:

Step 1 Determination whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is presumed not disabled and the claim is denied; Step 2 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, determination whether the claimant has a severe impairment; if not, the claimant is presumed not disabled and the claim is denied;

Step 3 If the claimant has one or more severe impairments, determination whether any such severe impairment meets or medically equals an impairment listed in the regulations; if the claimant has such an impairment, the claimant is presumed disabled and the claim is granted;

Step 4 If the claimant's impairment is not listed in the regulations, determination whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing past work in light of the claimant's residual functional capacity; if not, the claimant is presumed not disabled and the claim is denied;

Step 5 If the impairment prevents the claimant from performing past work, determination whether, in light of the claimant's residual functional capacity, the claimant can engage in other types of substantial gainful work that exist in the national economy; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f) and 416.920(a)-(f).

To qualify for benefits, the claimant must establish the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has lasted, or can be expected to last, a continuous period of not less than 12 months. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The claimant must provide evidence of a physical or mental impairment of such severity the claimant is unable to engage in previous work and cannot, considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. See Quang Van Han v. Bower, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The claimant has the initial burden of proving the existence of a disability. See Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990).

The claimant establishes a prima facie case by showing that a physical or mental impairment prevents the claimant from engaging in previous work. See Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f). If the claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant can perform other work existing in the national economy. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988); Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986); Hammock v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1209, 1212-1213 (9th Cir. 1989).

II. THE COMMISSIONER'S FINDINGS

Plaintiff applied for social security benefits on May 24, 2016. See CAR, 26.^[2]In the application, Plaintiff claims disability began on April 28, 2014. See id. Plaintiff's claim was initially denied. Following denial of reconsideration, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, which was held on October 25, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Michael A. Cabotaje. In a November 27, 2018, decision, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff is not disabled based on the following relevant findings:

1. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease (DDD); meniscus tear of the left knee status post arthroscopy; degenerative joint disease (DJD) of the right shoulder; carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) of the right upper extremity; and chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD).

2. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in the regulations.

3. The claimant has the following residual functional capacity:perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she can frequently push and pull with the right upper extremity; occasionally climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; occasionally reach overhead with the right upper extremity; and frequently reach otherwise with the right upper extremity. She cannot work with concentrated exposure to fumes, dusts, gases, or other pulmonary irritants; and cannot work with concentrated exposure to heavy moving machinery or unprotected heights.

4. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, residual functional capacity, and vocational expert testimony, the claimant can perform past relevant work.

See id. at 28-36.

After the Appeals Council declined review on August 26, 2019, this appeal followed.

III. DISCUSSION

In their brief, Plaintiff makes the following arguments:

1. The ALJ erred at Step 2 in finding that Plaintiff had a non-severe mental impairment, and therefore further erred in failing to consider Plaintiff's mental health impairments during the residual functional capacity analysis at Step 4;

2. At Step 4, the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the medical opinion of Dr. Stanger, a treating physician; and

3. The ALJ failed to give clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony at Step 4.

See ECF No. 16.

The Court finds each of Plaintiff's arguments persuasive for the reasons addressed below.

A. Severity Determination

To qualify for benefits, the plaintiff must have an impairment severe enough to significantly limit the physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). In determining whether a claimant's alleged impairment is sufficiently severe to limit the ability to work, the Commissioner must consider the combined effect of all impairments on the ability to function, without regard to whether each impairment alone would be sufficiently severe. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523 and 416.923. An impairment, or combination of impairments, can only be found to be non-severe if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work. See Social Security Ruling (SSR) 85-28; see also Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting SSR 85-28). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the severity of the impairment by providing medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 416.908. The plaintiff's own statement of symptoms alone is insufficient. See id.

At Step 2 of the sequential analysis, the ALJ considered the severity of Plaintiff's various impairments. See CAR 28-31. In doing so, the ALJ identified a number of physical impairments which were found to be severe. See id. at 28-29. The ALJ, however, found Plaintiff's mental impairments to be non-severe. See id. at 29-31. The ALJ concluded:

The claimant's medically determinable mental impairments of adjustment disorder and panic disorder, considered singly and in combination, do not cause more than minimal limitation in the claimant's ability to perform basic mental work activities and

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