Heimann v. Adee
| Decision Date | 23 September 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 22903,22903 |
| Citation | 1996 NMSC 53,924 P.2d 1352,122 N.M. 340 |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
| Parties | J Casper HEIMANN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Johnann ADEE, Bobby Adee, and Farmers Home Administration, an agency of the United States Government, Respondents, Craig L. Reeves, First National Bank in Clayton, Robert O. Beck, Beck & Cooper, Ray A. Snead, Jr., Claire W. Snead, Ray A. Snead, III, Will Snead, Tom M. Hills and Ann B. Hills, d/b/a Alamo Ranch, Respondents-Appellees, and State of New Mexico, Commissioner of Public Lands, Respondent-Amicus Curiae. |
Appellant J Casper Heimann appeals from the district court's affirmance of an administrative decision of the Commissioner of Public Lands (the Commissioner) and dismissal of his declaratory judgment action. He contends he had an interest as a result of a sublease in a state grazing lease sold at a sheriff's sale and assigned by the Commissioner to the purchaser at that sale. This appeal requires us to consider initially whether a sheriff's sale ordered by a district court to enforce its judgment is subject to collateral attack in another district court. We determine that NMSA 1978, Section 39-4-1 (Repl.Pamp.1991) precludes such an attack. We also conclude that the Commissioner was not an indispensable party to either the sheriff's sale or the underlying proceeding. Finally, we conclude that although the Commissioner had authority to resolve the question of whether Heimann's interest, if any, survived the sheriff's sale, we hold that the trial court did not err in affirming the Commissioner's administrative decision. Our disposition of the foregoing issues resolves all issues raised by the declaratory judgment action. Therefore, we affirm.
In 1970 ranchers Johnann and Bobby Adee and the Commissioner entered into GS-1239, a state grazing lease encompassing some 6,275 acres in Harding County. The parties have renewed this lease several times, most recently in 1992.
In July 1993 Appellee First National Bank in Clayton obtained a $2.4 million judgment against the Adees in Reeves v. Adee, Union County District Court Cause No. 93-6-CV (Reeves). Thereafter, the Union County District Court issued a writ of execution, and the Harding County Sheriff levied against the Adees' leasehold interest in GS-1239. Following advertisement in the local newspaper, the sheriff sold the leasehold to Appellees Ray A. Snead, Jr., Claire W. Snead, Ray A. Snead, III, Will Snead, Tom M. Hills, and Ann B. Hills d/b/a Alamo Ranch, at a public auction held on November 16, 1993 (Alamo Ranch). Heimann, Johnann Adee's brother, was present at that auction, and he unsuccessfully bid for the leasehold.
Heimann claims that he entered into a written lease contract with the Adees wherein they agreed to sublease 1 GS-1239 to him and his son for a term of six years. Heimann asserts that this agreement was executed on January 1, 1993 and that he paid the Adees $52,320 (one year's rental) at that time. He also claims that he had been subleasing the subject grazing rights from the Adees for several years prior to 1993 pursuant to an oral agreement. There is a factual dispute over whether the Adees in fact ever previously sublet GS-1239 to the Heimanns pursuant to an oral lease. There is also a factual dispute about whether the Adees and the Heimanns actually executed the written lease agreement in January 1993. Appellees claim that the Heimanns and the Adees in fact executed the sublease documents in September 1993 following the dismissal of the Adees' bankruptcy petition.
On September 14, 1993, two months prior to the sheriff's sale, the Adees submitted to the Commissioner an application to sublet GS-1239 to the Heimanns. The Commissioner, however, took no action on the application until after the sheriff's sale. When he finally acted on the application in December 1993, the Commissioner took the position that the sheriff's sale was valid, and that the property therefore could not be sublet as requested. The Commissioner accordingly disapproved the request.
On November 12, 1993, one week prior to the sheriff's sale, Heimann filed with the State Land Office a petition contesting the sale of GS-1239. The Commissioner dismissed that claim without elaboration in an "order denying notice of contest." Heimann then filed the instant action, a de novo appeal, in the Harding County District Court.
While Heimann's appeal from the Commissioner's dismissal was pending in the Harding County District Court, Heimann attempted to intervene in Reeves, the Union County District Court proceeding. The Union County District Court denied the motion to intervene, filed nearly four months after the sheriff's sale, on the grounds that the motion was untimely and Heimann's property interest in the leasehold was not "sufficient to bring his claim of interest within [the purview of NMRA 1-024(A)(2) (1996) ]." In reaching the latter conclusion, the court reasoned that the Adees' purported sublease to Heimann was void because the Commissioner had never consented to that sublease.
Heimann subsequently moved for summary judgment in Harding County District Court. In his motion he asked that the sale of GS-1239 be declared void and that the Commissioner be ordered to set aside the assignment of GS-1239 to Alamo Ranch. Heimann sought to have the Harding County District Court vacate the execution sale on the ground that it failed to comply with various requirements applicable to real property. The Harding County District Court, however, declined to revisit the execution sale proceedings, concluding that Section 39-4-1 precluded it from doing so. The Harding County District Court entered a final order denying the motion for summary judgment, affirming the decision of the Commissioner, and dismissing Heimann's petition for declaratory judgment. The present appeal arises from that order.
The parties have focussed research and argument in large part on the question whether GS-1239, the state grazing leasehold, is personal property or real property. The focus on whether under New Mexico law we classify a state grazing lease as realty or personalty arises in part from Heimann's arguments that a lien must exist before the sheriff may levy upon or sell real property pursuant to a writ of execution and that no lien existed in this case. Heimann also asserts that the leasehold's classification as realty or personalty is germane to the issue whether the sheriff's levy and sale complied with certain statutory requirements that are applicable to real estate. See NMSA 1978, §§ 39-4-4, 39-4-9, 39-5-5 (Repl.Pamp.1991).
Relying primarily upon statutory arguments, Heimann asserts that such a property interest constitutes real property. See NMSA 1978, § 39-5-1.2 (Repl.Pamp.1991); NMSA 1978, § 47-1-1 (Repl.Pamp.1995). On the other hand, Alamo Ranch relies on case law for the proposition that a state grazing leasehold is personal property. See American Mortgage Co. v. White, 34 N.M. 602, 605, 287 P. 702, 703 (1930); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Binford, 114 N.M. 560, 567-70, 844 P.2d 810, 817-20 (1992). We conclude that the focus on classification of a state grazing leasehold as real or personal property is misplaced. We need not classify the property at issue in order to resolve the issues raised on appeal.
Heimann's argument that a lien must exist before a sheriff may levy upon and sell real property in the course of efforts to enforce a judgment is not quite accurate. He equates two supplementary proceedings that are in fact different. The two distinct remedies in question are execution in aid of a judgment and foreclosure on a lien. This Court recognized in Armstrong v. Csurilla, 112 N.M. 579, 589-591, 817 P.2d 1221, 1231-33 (1991), that these are distinct proceedings and that execution in aid of a judgment, no less than foreclosure of a lien, may affect a debtor's real property. See NMSA 1978, § 39-4-2 (Repl.Pamp.1991) (); see also Crowell v. Kopp, 26 N.M. 146, 150-52, 189 P. 652, 653-54 (1919) (), overruling recognized, Abarca v. Henry L. Hanson, Inc., 106 N.M. 25, 26, 738 P.2d 519, 520 (Ct.App.) ( that the New Mexico Supreme Court has overruled Crowell on other grounds), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 7, 738 P.2d 125 (1987).
Executions at common law were carried out "by the use of several distinct execution writs." 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies § 1.4, at 15 (2d ed. 1993). Each writ provided "for execution on a different sort of interest of the debtor." Id. at n. 1. "[F]oreclosure actions originated in equity and have always been characterized as equitable actions." Armstrong, 112 N.M. at 590, 817 P.2d at 1232. Our statutes now provide for both sales on execution, by the sheriff, and foreclosure sales under the supervision of a court. Id. at 590-91, 817 P.2d at 1232-33.
The Union County proceeding involved execution in aid of a judgment. In these supplemental proceedings, neither the statute nor cases arising under the statute have required a preexisting lien. 2 We conclude a preexisting lien is not required, whether or not the property executed against constitutes realty or personalty. Cf. Armstrong, 112 N.M. at 589-91, 817 P.2d at 1231-33 (...
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