Hein v. Holdridge

• Decision Date: 18 January 1900
• Docket Number: 11,756 - (52)
• Citation: 81 N.W. 522,78 Minn. 468
• Parties: WILLIAM HEIN v. EARL HOLDRIDGE
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

81 N.W. 522

78 Minn. 468

WILLIAM HEIN v. EARL HOLDRIDGE

Nos. 11,756 - (52)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

January 18, 1900

Action in the district court for Olmsted county to recover $5,031.50 damages for seduction of plaintiff's daughter. The case was tried before Snow, J., and a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $531; and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appealed. Reversed.

SYLLABUS

Seduction.

In a civil action by a father for the seduction of his daughter held:

Charge to Jury.

That it was not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury that, to entitle the plaintiff to recover any damages beyond his actual money loss, it must appear that the debauchment of his daughter was accomplished by seductive arts.

Evidence of Reputation for Chastity.

That the court did err in excluding evidence offered by the defendant to show that his general reputation for chastity was good. Schuek v. Hagar, 24 Minn. 339, followed.

James E. Bradford and Webber & Lees, for appellant.

The action is statutory, and the statute should be given an interpretation consonant with the ordinary signification of language. The word "seduce," in this connection, is universally understood to imply enticement by some art influence, promise, or deception. State v. Bierce, 27 Conn. 319; Croghan v. State, 22 Wis. 444; Abbott, Law Dict. "Seduction"; Hill's Code (Ore.) §§ 35, 36; Code Civ. Proc. (Cal.) § 375; Patterson v. Hayden, 17 Ore. 238. While seducing may include debauching, the injuries are distinct, and the rules of damages different. Only in cases of debauching with seduction are exemplary damages allowable. Smith v. Young, 26 Mo.App. 575; Hartman v. McCrary, 59 Mo.App. 571; McAulay v. Birkhead, 13 Ired. 28; Comer v. Taylor, 82 Mo. 341, 346; Grable v. Margrave, 3 Scam. 372; Rea v. Tucker, 51 Ill. 110; Morgan v. Ross, 74 Mo. 318. Where there has been no seduction, recovery cannot be had by the father beyond loss of services and incidental expenses. 2 Sedgwick, Dam. 518; Simpson v. Grayson, 54 Ark. 404; Comer v. Taylor, supra; Hill v. Wilson, 8 Blackf. 123. See Bell v. Rinker, 29 Ind. 267; Wood v. State, 48 Ga. 192.

Evidence of defendant's reputation for chastity and good moral character was admissible. Schuek v. Hagar, 24 Minn. 339; Bingham v. Bernard, 36 Minn. 114. Fonda v. St. Paul C. Ry. Co., 71 Minn. 438, is distinguishable, since the motorman was not charged with a crime involving moral delinquency. Townsend v. Graves, 3 Paige, Ch. 453.

H. A. Eckholdt, for respondent.

It is not essential that the act was accomplished by seductive arts. Russell v. Chambers, 31 Minn. 54; Kennedy v. Shea, 110 Mass. 147; Lavery v. Crooke, 52 Wis. 612; Barbour v. Stephenson, 32 F. 66; White v. Murtland, 71 Ill. 250; Leucker v. Steileu, 89 Ill. 545; Fox v. Stevens, 13 Minn. 252 (272); Furman v. Applegate, 23 N.J.L. 28, 30; Marshall v. Taylor, 98 Cal. 55; Dalman v. Koning, 54 Mich. 320; Lawrence v. Spence, 99 N.Y. 669; Reed v. Williams, 5 Sneed, 580.

Defendant's character was not put in issue, nor impeached. Until attacked, he must rely on the general presumption of good character. Cochran v. Toher, 14 Minn. 293 (385); Lotto v. Davenport, 50 Minn. 99. Schuek v. Hagar, 24 Minn. 339, is contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority elsewhere, and should not be followed. 1 Jones, Ev. §§ 147-156; 3 Am. & Eng. Enc., 861, et seq.; Delvee v. Boardman, 20 Iowa 446; McKern v. Calvert, 59 Mo. 243; Watson v. Watson, 53 Mich. 168; McAulay v. Birkhead, 13 Ired. 28; Pratt v. Andrews, 4 N.Y. 493. Schuek v. Hagar, supra, was not the law of this state when decided. Cochran v. Toher, supra. It has since been ignored by this court. Lotto v. Davenport, supra; Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 71 Minn. 438. A party to a civil action can give evidence of good character only in answer to impeaching evidence. As to slander this rule applies. Hitchcock v. Moore, 70 Mich. 112; Rhodes v. Ijames, 7 Ala. 574; Miles v. Vanhorn, 17 Ind. 245; Cooper v. Phipps, 24 Ore. 357. Lotto v. Davenport, supra. So in false imprisonment. Diers v. Mallon, 46 Neb. 121; Cochran v. Toher, supra. And in malicious prosecution. Fire Assn. v. Fleming, 78 Ga. 733. And in assault. Fahey v. Crotty, 63 Mich. 383. The same presumption applies to the character of the daughter seduced. Barbour v. Stephenson, supra; Cooper v. Phipps, supra; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. 861, note 2; Id. (2d Ed.) 852, note 4.

Consent of the daughter is no defense. Barbour v. Stephenson, supra; McAulay v. Birkhead, supra.

OPINION

START, C.J.

This is an action by a father for the alleged seduction of his daughter by the defendant. Verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $531, and the defendant appealed from an order denying his motion for a new trial. The assignments of error present two general questions for our decision. They are:

1. Did the trial court err in refusing the defendant's request to instruct the jury that, to justify a verdict for the plaintiff, it must appear that the alleged debauching of his daughter was accomplished by some act, influence, promise, or deception naturally calculated to mislead a virtuous woman, and in instructing them that if the daughter was a virgin, and the defendant deflowered her, the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict? The evidence was such as to require the giving of the requested instruction, if it was a correct statement of the law as applied to a civil action by the father for the seduction of his daughter.

The contention of the defendant, briefly stated, is that this action is one given by statute (G.S. 1894, § 5163), and that the word "seduction," as therein used, is to be taken in the technical and limited sense in which it is used in penal statutes. This is not strictly a statutory action. It is a common-law action modified by statute. The only change made by the statute is to dispense with the necessity of proving loss of service, -- a fiction invented to enable the father to recover damages for the shame and suffering brought upon him and his household by the debauching of his daughter. The injury to the father is, as stated by the learned trial judge:

"Not only * * * his subjection to material loss and expense, but it is the degradation of his daughter, and the consequent dishonor of himself and family. It is the conversion of the chaste child of his loins into what the world deems an unclean thing. It is a wounding of his paternal pride, and a forcing of grief and shame into his home and domestic circle. On principle, what matters it by what particular means this wrong was inflicted?"

Our statute, while dispensing with the fiction as to the loss of services by the father, uses the word "seduction," not in the sense in which it is used in penal statutes, but in the same sense as it was used in common-law actions by a father for the seduction of his daughter. In such actions "seduction" and "debauching" were used as substantially similar terms, and it was not important which word was used in the declaration. Nor were the special circumstances of the daughter's debauchment material to the father's cause of action, except as to the amount of his recovery. The adjudged cases are not uniform on the question here under consideration. But upon principle and authority we hold that, in an action under our statute by the father for the seduction of his daughter, it is not necessary to show that her debauchment was accomplished by seductive arts, in order to entitle him to damages, including those which are exemplary, in excess of his actual pecuniary loss. The age of the daughter, and the circumstances under which she was debauched, may aggravate or mitigate the damages to be awarded; but they do not afford any basis for limiting, as a matter of law, the father's damages to his actual money loss. Fox v. Stevens, 13 Minn. 252 (272); Russell v. Chambers, 31 Minn. 54, 16 N.W. 458; Stoudt v. Shepherd, 73 Mich. 588, 41 N.W. 696; McAulay v. Birkhead, 13 Ired. 28; Kennedy v. Shea, 110 Mass. 147; Barbour v. Stephenson, 32 F. 66; Lawrence v. Spence, 99 N.Y. 669, 670, 2 N.E. 145; White v. Murtland, 71 Ill. 250.

It follows that the trial court rightly refused the defendant's requested instruction, and correctly instructed the jury.

2. Did the trial court err in excluding evidence offered by the defendant to show that his general reputation for chastity was good? The only evidence as to the alleged acts of sexual intercourse between the defendant and the plaintiff's daughter was the testimony of the daughter and of the defendant. They flatly contradicted each other. The daughter, who was at that time a servant in the family of the defendant, testified to such acts, and that the defendant was the father of her illegitimate child. The defendant, who was a married man, positively denied her testimony. Thereupon the defendant offered to show, by witnesses who had known him from his birth, and lived near him, that his general reputation for chastity was good. The court excluded the evidence, and the defendant duly excepted. Was the ruling correct?

The charge against the defendant involved the commission of a crime by him, and, if this were a criminal case, it is certain that the excluded evidence would have been admissible. The accused in a criminal case, whether the charge be a felony or misdemeanor, may always prove his previous good character, of which his general reputation is evidence, as tending to disprove the commission of the offense; that is, as tending to show the improbability of a person of his previous character committing the act charged. The rule is not limited to cases where the probative force of the evidence against the accused is weak. There would seem to be no logical reason why the same rule should not apply to civil actions...