Heine Farms v. Yankton County
| Decision Date | 24 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 22055.,22055. |
| Parties | HEINE FARMS, A Partnership, Gary Heine, Ronald Heine, Gene Heine, Thomas Heine, and Steven Heine, Appellees, v. YANKTON COUNTY, South Dakota, By and Through its COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Appellant. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
William J. Klimisch, Yankton, for appellees.
Robert Chavis, Yankton County States Attorney, Yankton, James G. Abourezk of Abourezk Law Offices, Sioux Falls, for appellant. AMUNDSON, Justice.
[¶ 1.] Yankton County appeals a trial court judgment declaring an initiated zoning ordinance illegal and unenforceable and enjoining enforcement of the ordinance. We affirm.
[¶ 2.] Heine Farms (Heine) is a partnership made up of five brothers who are residents, landowners and taxpayers in Yankton County. In late 2000, Heine purchased land in Yankton County with plans to establish a large cattle feedlot on the property. Heine contemplated feeding as many as 20,000 cattle in its operation.
[¶ 3.] As Heine's plans were made known to the public, those opposed to the feedlot circulated an initiative petition to adopt a zoning ordinance that would effectively prevent Heine from operating its planned feedlot. In pertinent part, the ordinance provided specifications for waste management systems but, fatal to the Heine operation, it prohibited a waste management system for more than 7,500 animal units.
[¶ 4.] The initiative petition was filed with the Yankton County Auditor on January 24, 2001. On January 31, the Auditor verified that there were sufficient signatures on the petition to support its submission for a public vote. On the same date, the Yankton County State's Attorney opined that the petition was sufficient as to form and content to support its submission for a public vote. On February 2, Heine commenced the present action for a declaratory judgment that the initiated zoning ordinance was invalid and for an injunction prohibiting its enforcement. Heine also sought a temporary injunction to prohibit Yankton County from adopting the ordinance and from submitting it for a public vote. The County answered and moved to dismiss Heine's complaint. A hearing was held on February 5 and Heine's request for a temporary injunction was denied. Thus, on February 6, the Yankton County Commissioners adopted the proposed ordinance and set it for a county-wide vote on March 20.
[¶ 5.] A court trial on Heine's action against the County was held on March 15. Immediately before trial, the County renewed its motion to dismiss and argued in the alternative for summary judgment on the basis that Heine's exclusive remedy was an appeal of the County Commission's action submitting the initiated ordinance for a public vote.1 The trial court reserved ruling on Heine's motions and the trial proceeded.
[¶ 6.] On March 20, the Yankton County voters adopted the initiated ordinance by a vote of 3,790 to 1,714.2 On April 9, the trial court issued a memorandum decision denying the County's motions to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. Findings of fact, conclusions of law and a formal order of denial were entered on May 4. On June 13, the trial court entered a memorandum decision holding the initiated ordinance illegal and unenforceable and enjoining Yankton County from enforcing it. Conforming findings, conclusions and a formal judgment were entered on June 26. Yankton County appeals.
[¶ 7.] Did the trial court err in denying Yankton County's motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment?
[¶ 8.] Whether the trial court's ruling on Yankton County's pretrial motions is reviewed as a denial of a motion to dismiss or as a denial of a motion for summary judgment, the standards are the same. As recently indicated in Hagemann v. NJS Engineering, Inc., 2001 SD 102, ¶ 4, 632 N.W.2d 840, 842:
This Court's standard of review of a trial court's grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is the same standard as that which is applied upon review of a motion [for] summary judgment—"is the pleader entitled to judgment as a matter of law?" Therefore, we review all facts most [favorably] to the [nonmoving] party. We continue to review questions of law, particularly issues of statutory construction, de novo. (citations omitted).
[¶ 9.] Yankton County argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss or for summary judgment because an appeal of the County Commission's action submitting the initiated ordinance for a public vote was Heine's exclusive statutory remedy. In support of its argument, Yankton County relies principally upon SDCL 7-8-27 and 7-8-32 and this Court's decisions in Wold v. Lawrence County Com'n, 465 N.W.2d 622 (S.D.1991), Weger v. Pennington County, 534 N.W.2d 854 (S.D.1995) and Ridley v. Lawrence County Com'n, 2000 SD 143, 619 N.W.2d 254.
[¶ 10.] Wold summarizes the rules that make a circuit court appeal the exclusive remedy for a person aggrieved by a county commission decision:
Wold, 465 N.W.2d at 624 (emphasis original). Based upon the foregoing principles, this Court held in Wold that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss a declaratory judgment action challenging a commission decision because the action was an impermissible collateral attack on the decision. Similarly, in Weger, this Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of a declaratory judgment action challenging a commission decision because the action would violate the exclusive appeal remedies provided in SDCL ch 7-8. More recently, in Ridley, this Court upheld the circuit court's dismissal of a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging a commission decision by adhering to the rule that a circuit court appeal is the sole avenue for relief from a decision of a board of county commissioners.
[¶ 11.] It is notable that in each of the foregoing cases relied upon by Yankton County, it was a decision of a county commission that was being challenged. In Wold, the decision was a waiver of certain zoning requirements. In Weger, the decision concerned personnel appointments to a county air quality board. In Ridley, the decision was the grant of a rezoning request. That only the decisions of a county commission are subject to a circuit court appeal is made clear by the plain language of SDCL 7-8-27 which provides in part: "[f]rom all decisions of the board of county commissioners upon matters properly before it, there may be an appeal to the circuit court by any person aggrieved[.]" (emphasis added). Weger, strongly relied upon by Yankton County, makes reference to the type of commission decision that constitutes an appealable decision under SDCL ch 7-8. As noted in Weger:
In Codington County v. Board of Commissioners, 51 S.D. 131, 212 N.W. 626 (1927), we held the word "decision" in the predecessor statute to SDCL 7-8-27 and 7-8-28 means a determination quasi-judicial in nature and it is only from a quasi-judicial determination that an appeal will lie. We do not reach the issue [of] whether Pennington County's action in appointing board members is quasi-judicial or administrative in nature since the issue has not been briefed and argued.
Weger, 534 N.W.2d at 857 n1 (some citations omitted). The definition of an appealable commission decision was explored in greater detail in the Codington County case cited above. Quoting with approval from Fulkerson v. Stevens, 31 Kan. 125, 1 P. 261 (1883), this Court observed:
[W]hat are the limitations upon the privilege of persons to take appeals from the decisions of the board of county commissioners? The district court is simply a court, and exercises only judicial power; hence we would suppose that appeals from the board of county commissioners to the district court must be limited to such cases as require the exercise of purely judicial powers; and therefore that when the board of county commissioners exercises political power or legislative power, or administrative power, or discretionary power, or purely ministerial power, no appeal will lie.
Codington County, 51 S.D. at 134, 212 N.W. at 627 (emphasis added).
[¶ 12.] "Ministerial power" was defined in First Nat. Bank v. Hirning, 48 S.D. 417, 421, 204 N.W. 901, 903 as follows:
When the law requires a public officer to do a specified act in a specified way, upon a conceded state of facts, without regard to his own judgment as to the propriety of the act, and with no power to exercise discretion, the duty is ministerial, and may be controlled by mandamus. (quoting Farmers' Loan and Trust Bank v. Hirning, 42 S.D. 52, 172 N.W. 931(19)).
Applying the concept of ministerial power in a more recent case, this Court held in Willoughby v. Grim, 1998 SD 68, ¶ 9, 581 N.W.2d 165, 168, that a township's duty to maintain its roads is ministerial. In reaching its holding, this Court observed:
[T]he words "shall" and "all" in SDCL 31-13-1, indicate the Legislature intended to create a compulsory obligation to repair and maintain all township roads. "[T]he term, shall, manifests a mandatory directive and does not confer any discretion in carrying out the action so directed." Therefore, the duty to maintain township roads is ministerial and [a] proper subject for mandamus when a township fails or...
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