Heiney v. State

• Decision Date: 02 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 56778,56778
• Citation: 447 So.2d 210
• Parties: Robert D. HEINEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 210

447 So.2d 210

Robert D. HEINEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 56778.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 2, 1984.

Rehearing Denied April 19, 1984.

Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, and Michael M. Corin, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Miguel A. Olivella, Jr., and Lawrence A. Kaden, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Robert Heiney appeals his convictions for first-degree murder and robbery with a deadly weapon and his sentence of death. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. Having reviewed the record and considered the issues presented by Heiney, we find no reversible error and affirm his convictions and sentences.

On June 4, 1978, Heiney was residing in Houston, Texas, with Lawanna Wickline, Terry Phillips, and David Benson. On that date, after fighting with his girl friend, Lawanna Wickline, Heiney shot Terry Phillips in the abdomen. Wickline called the police. Upon learning that Phillips was in critical condition and that the police had been notified of the shooting, Heiney requested Benson to give him a ride out of town. Benson drove him to near the Texas state line. Heiney told Benson he was broke and that he planned to hitchhike to Florida. Benson gave Heiney $4.

Heiney was next seen in Jackson, Mississippi, at approximately 4 p.m. on June 5, 1978, in the company of the victim, Francis M. May, Jr. They went to the victim's mother's house where they remained for a brief period of time. They left with Heiney driving the victim's car. The victim's mother and his wife later positively identified Heiney as having been with the victim the day prior to his death. They both testified at trial.

On June 6, 1978, the victim's body was found a quarter of a mile south of the I-10 entrance on highway 189 near Holt, Florida. His head had been savagely beaten. A claw hammer was found just west of the body. The victim's wounds were consistent with a beating with the claw hammer. The medical examiner testified that the death was recent, probably occurring somewhere between 5 and 7 a.m., June 6. There were at least seven blows to the head and perhaps nine. There were also defensive wounds on the back side of the victim's hands and wrists. At the time of his death, the victim had a blood alcohol content of .28 percent. He died as a result of brain injury due to severe blows delivered to both sides of his skull. The victim's pant pocket had been turned inside out, and he had no identification on him.

On June 8, 1978, the investigating officer gave information on the victim's vehicle to the National Crime Information Center in Washington.

In the meantime, Heiney was driving back and forth across the country using the victim's credit card to buy gasoline, food, and lodging. On June 12, 1978, still driving the victim's car, he went to the Nevada National Bank in Reno, Nevada, and attempted to get a $75 cash advance by using the victim's Mastercharge card. When the teller at the bank began checking for approval of the advance, Heiney left, leaving the credit card behind. The teller followed Heiney and got the license tag number from the car he was driving and reported it.

Then on June 26, 1978, an Ohio state trooper saw Heiney driving the victim's car on the interstate in Ohio. He arrested Heiney for unauthorized use of an automobile (auto theft) and impounded the car. When Heiney was arrested, he had in his possession the victim's personal property including a ring the victim's wife had given him when they were married. Sheriff's deputies from Okaloosa County went to Ohio and, pursuant to a search warrant, searched the car. They found the victim's checkbook in the car's glove compartment, another credit card belonging to the victim, other papers belonging to the victim, and bloodstains matching the victim's blood type in the car. The victim's wallet was found inside Heiney's suitcase which was in the trunk of the car.

Mastercharge slips made on the victim's credit card signed after the victim's death came in from all over the country. A handwriting expert testified that the signatures on some of the credit card receipts from June 6 to June 26 could be positively identified as being forged by Heiney.

Heiney was tried and convicted of murder in the first degree and robbery with a deadly weapon. At the close of the state's case, he moved for judgment of acquittal as to both counts of the indictment. He contended that the circumstantial evidence introduced was insufficient to support verdicts of guilty for either of the crimes charged. The trial court denied the motion and submitted the case to the jury. This issue was raised again in a motion for new trial, which the trial court also denied.

During the penalty phase of the trial, the jury recommended that a life sentence be imposed. The trial court, finding three aggravating and no mitigating circumstances, imposed the death penalty.

Heiney initially challenges his convictions on the basis that the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal and for new trial. He argues that the circumstantial evidence was not legally sufficient to support the jury verdicts in that the evidence does not exclude the hypothesis of innocence that someone else killed the victim and that Heiney lawfully gained possession of the victim's property prior to his death.

When a case is based on circumstantial evidence, a special standard of sufficiency of the evidence applies. Jaramillo v. State, 417 So.2d 257 (Fla.1982). This standard is: "Where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence." McArthur v. State, 351 So.2d 972, 976 n. 12 (Fla.1977); Jaramillo v. State; McArthur v. Nourse, 369 So.2d 578 (Fla.1979). The question of whether the evidence fails to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to determine, and where there is substantial, competent evidence to support the jury verdict, we will not reverse a judgment based upon a verdict returned by the jury. Rose v. State, 425 So.2d 521 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909, 103 S.Ct. 1883, 76 L.Ed.2d 812 (1983). In the present case, we find the evidence supports the jury's verdict that Heiney was guilty of first-degree murder and robbery. The victim was with Heiney just before he was murdered. His pant pocket where he normally carried his wallet was turned inside out. His wallet, as well as his personal belongings and his car were in Heiney's possession at the time of Heiney's arrest. Blood of the victim's blood type was found on the front seat covering and on a portion of the rear seat cover. The victim's body was completely stripped of everything of value, and Heiney was found in possession of everything of value which the victim had with him. We hold that the trial court properly denied Heiney's motions for judgment of acquittal and for new trial.

Heiney next argues that he was deprived of a fair trial when the court allowed the state to present the testimony of Lawanna Wickline, Terry Phillips, and David Benson who testified that Heiney argued with Wickline, argued with Phillips and subsequently shot Phillips in the abdomen with a .32 calibre pistol and that Heiney, upon learning of Phillips' critical condition and that the authorities wanted to talk to him, asked Benson to drive him out of town and to give him money since he was broke. Benson also testified that Heiney told him he was going to hitchhike to Florida.

Heiney contends that the conduct shown by the testimony was unrelated to the crimes he was accused of committing and that this evidence tends to prove only propensity and bad character. The state responds that the evidence of the shooting in Texas was relevant to show motive for the subsequent crimes and to provide the "entire context of the crimes charged."

We agree with the state that this testimony was properly allowed into evidence. The test for admissibility of evidence of collateral crimes is relevant. In Ruffin v. State, 397 So.2d 277 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 368, 70 L.Ed.2d 194 (1981), we described this test of relevancy and said:

In Williams v. State, [110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959) ], we announced a broad rule of admissibility based upon relevancy. Necessity has never been established by this Court as an essential requisite to admissibility. In Williams, we declared that any fact relevant to prove a fact in issue is admissible into evidence even though it points to a separate crime unless its admissibility is precluded by a specific rule of exclusion. We further held that evidence of collateral offenses is inadmissible if its sole relevancy is to establish bad character or propensity of the accused. We emphasized that the question of relevancy of this type of evidence should be cautiously scrutinized before it is determined to be admissible, but that nonetheless relevancy is the test. Evidence of other crimes is relevant if it casts light on the character of the crime for which the accused is being prosecuted. For example, this evidence is relevant when it shows either motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme or plan, identity, or a system or general pattern of criminality. Subsequently, in Williams v. State, 117 So.2d 473 (Fla.1960), we reaffirmed the rule of admissibility enunciated in our first Williams case but reversed a defendant's conviction because the State had made a collateral offense a feature instead of an incident of the trial.... Thereafter, in Wilson v. State, 330 So.2d 457 (Fla.1976), we held that the introduction of six hundred pages of trial transcript pointing to separate crimes committed by the defendant was not reversible error because this evidence was relevant to establish a pattern of conduct similar to the conduct...