Heinz v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 03 March 1941
• Docket Number: No. 21.,21.
• Citation: 24 A.2d 917
• Parties: HEINZ v. MURPHY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

24 A.2d 917

HEINZ

v. MURPHY.

No. 21.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 3, 1941.

Appeal from Baltimore City Court; Eugene O'Dunne, Judge.

Action by Carl Murphy against Horace A. Heinze for assault and battery and false imprisonment. From a judgment for plaintiff for $1,000, defendant appeals.

Judgment modified with respect to amount of damages.

Before SLOAN, DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, FORSYTHE, and MARBURY, JJ.

Robert D. Bartlett, of Baltimore, for appellant.

Harry O. Levin, of Baltimore, for appellee.

FORSYTHE, Judge.

On June 17, 1941, the appellee, Carl Murphy, filed a suit in the Baltimore City Court, against the appellant, Horace A Heinze, a Baltimore City policeman, for assault and battery and for false imprisonment. The case was tried before the Court without a jury, and it resulted in a verdict, and judgment in favor of the appellee for $1,000. This appeal is from that judgment.

From the evidence the undisputed facts are that on May 2, 1941, the appellee's wife was driving an automobile on Thirty-third Street in Baltimore City, and had a collision with another automobile driven by Miss Evelyn Faupel. After the collision, and while awaiting the arrival of an officer whom Miss Faupel had called, the appellee arrived at the scene of the accident in his automobile, and before the arrival of the officer, had his wife drive away from the scene in the appellee's automobile, and the appellee drove away his wife's damaged automobile. He did not drive it to his home, but put it in a garage somewhere in the neighborhood.

Miss Faupel remained at the scene of the accident until the officer, the appellant Heinze, arrived. The appellant secured some information concerning the accident from Miss Faupel, but it was not sufficient to enable him to make a complete report, and with Miss Faupel, Heinze went to the home of the appellee to secure further information, which he believed was necessary for his report. When they arrived at the home of the appellee he was not there, but his wife invited the officer and Miss Faupel in, and "was very nice" to them, offering the use of her dining room table so that the officer could write his report. While the appellant was asking routine questions for his report, the appellee came into the room, and with some display of temper, forbade his wife to answer any questions, or to give the officer any information about the accident; and ordered the officer to leave his home, stating he would not permit his wife to answer any questions without the advice of counsel. Heinze and Miss Faupel then left the house, but a few minutes later Heinze returned and asked the appellee where he had left the damaged automobile. The appellee refused to tell him, or to give any information about it.

The following day, after the appellee had been afforded an opportunity to consult counsel, the appellant returned to the home of the appellee to secure the information he was denied the previous night. He found the appellee working on the lawn, and inquired if he could see the appellee's wife. On being informed she was not at home, Heinze asked several questions, one of them in reference to her age.

From that point, the testimony of what took place between the appellant and the appellee is in conflict. The appellee testified: "I am working in the garden and he comes up and he asks me, 'Where is Mrs. Murphy?' I told him, 'She is in town and won't be back until eleven o'clock'. Thereupon he wants to know something about the accident. I told him I wasn't there any more than he was there and he wasn't there and I didn't know anything about the accident except what she had said. Well, he said, 'How old is Mrs. Murphy?' I told him I didn't know and I don't know. That seemed to infuriate him. He said, 'You know, I can put you under arrest for refusing to answer questions'. I said, 'If its coming to that, you better let me go in and call up Mr. Levin. He is at home. I will ask him about it'. He said, 'You can't leave the spot, you are under arrest.' I asked him for what charge. He said, 'For resisting an officer'. I said, 'Let me go and ring the bell anyhow and call my daughter and let her call Mr. Levin'. He said, 'No, you can't ring the bell'. By that time, some of the neighbors came. He had seized me by the arm and when the neighbors came, an elderly lady across the street looking down from her second story window saw what was going on and she called one or two of the men and they came over and as they approached, the officer released my arm and stepped back. They asked what was the matter."

The appellant testified: "I drove up in the car and I saw Mr. Murphy on the lawn and I walked up to him and first asked where Mrs. Murphy was. He said, 'I told you I wasn't going to tell you anything about the accident. Besides, Mrs. Murphy isn't here' and he told me—I asked him if he would give me the following information, it was merely a routine matter as to her age, how long she had been driving, and he said it was none of my Goddamn business and I begged him, I said, 'Listen, Mr. Murphy—' and I touched him by the arm and he said, 'Damn it, I resent that'. He was—in other words, I was between him and the house and he was trying to get in the house, he walked that direction and I said, 'You are under arrest'.

"By the Court:

"Q. For what? A. For disorderly conduct.

"Q. What was the disorderly conduct? A. I was up on the lawn asking him questions and he told me I was too damn nosey, it was none of my business asking questions.

"Q. That's why you arrested him? A. He was interfering with my police business.

"Q. They are the facts you arrested him on? A. Yes.

"Q. What did you do after you arrested him? A. Mr. Murphy had been cutting the grass and asked could he put the rake and some other garden utensils, could he clean up before he went to the station house and couldn't he check the house, if it was locked. Of course, when I placed him under arrest, we walked up to the door but I didn't let him go in the house and his daughter, I believe it was, gave him a coat and she left and he took his garden utensils and put them in the back garage and by the time he tried up the house and put his utensils away—

"Q. Never mind about the utensils. Where did you take him? A. I took him to the Northeast Police Station.

"Q. What happened there? A. I charged him with disorderly conduct.

"Q. What happened to him? A. He was—I left him in charge of the turnkey."

At the station house, according to the testimony of Officer Warms, which is uncontradicted, the appellee was searched and placed in a cell; "he wasn't in there longer than ten minutes at most", when he was released in the custody of his attorney.

The record does not contain the evidence of any witnesses, other than that of the appellee, in support of his case, although the appellee said "an elderly lady across the street looking down from her second story window saw what was going on and she called one or two men and they came over." The morning after the arrest the appellee was given a hearing which consumed "two or three minutes", and he was discharged.

In reference to accidents in which automobiles are involved, the Statute in this State prescribing the respective duties of motorists and officers is clear and specific. Art. 56, sec. 198, Flacks Code, provides, "In case of any accident, such as collision with a person, animal or vehicle, the operator of the motor vehicle in such collision must immediately stop and give his name, residence, and the number of his license to operate, and render such assistance as may be reasonable and necessary within his power." Section 210 of the same Article provides, "The several police officers * * * shall make immediate report to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, on forms to be provided by him, of all arrests made on charges of violating the Motor Vehicle Laws of this State," etc. A violation of that provision subjects the officer to a fine.

In this case the evidence is undisputed that the appellant, when he approached the appellee on his lawn, was seeking information to enable him to complete the report required of him. That, he had a perfect right to do. But his action in arresting the appellee, under the circumstances as detailed in the evidence, and charging him with disorderly conduct, does not seem to have been fully justified. The disorderly conduct attributed to the appellee was, that he refused to give the information sought, and used profane language. There is no evidence that the profane language, if used, was heard by anyone except the appellant, or beyond the appellee's premises. Under those circumstances the charge could not be sustained.

The principal ground of this appeal is that the damages awarded are excessive. The Court awarded punitive damages.

The generally accepted rule in reference to punitive damages, when an officer, such as a policeman, is involved, is that "An officer who acts in good faith in making an arrest is absolved from punitive or exemplary damages, even though he is liable for compensatory damages. However, such damages may be allowed against an officer under circumstances upon which bad faith or malice may be attributed to him in making the arrest." 22 Am.Jur. sec. 133, p. 439; Bernheimer v. Becker, 102 Md. 250, 62 A. 526, 3 L.R.A.,N.S., 221, 111 Am. St.Rep. 356; Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89, 100. But, "exemplary damages are never allowed where the false imprisonment was brought about innocently, in good faith, without malice in fact, or in law, by public officers in the belief that they are performing their public duties." 25 C.J. sec. 179, p. 565. It is also the established rule that punitive damages "may not be allowed when no actual damage has been sustained." 22 Am.Jur. sec. 132, p. 438. "A judgment on a verdict awarding punitive damages but no actual damages has been held error. However, nominal compensatory damages, in a proper case, will support a verdict for punitive...