Heise v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. Amtrak
| Decision Date | 17 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-CV-0878 (LEK/ATB) |
| Parties | RICHARD ANTON HEISE II, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION AMTRAK, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Pro se plaintiff Richard Anton Heise II brings this civil action against Defendants National Railroad Passenger Corporation ('Amtrak"), Lisa Hubbard ("Hubbard"), and Kevin Graham ("Graham") (collectively "Defendants"). See Dkt. No. 30 ("Amended Complaint"). Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. Nos. 32 ("Motion to Dismiss"), 32-3 ("Defendants' Memorandum of Law"). Plaintiff has opposed the motion to dismiss, Dkt. Nos. 36 ("Opposition"), 36-1 ("Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law"), and Defendants have replied, Dkt. No. 39 ("Reply"). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss.
The following factual allegations are assumed to be true. See Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist, 801 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff has been employed in the railroad industry since 2003. Am. Compl. ¶ 8. He has maintained his Locomotive Engineer's license since 2007, and is currently a Locomotive Engineer for Amtrak. Id. ¶¶ 3, 8.
In October 2011, Plaintiff applied for an open Passenger Engineer Trainee position with Amtrak. Id. ¶ 9. The job application listed two rates of pay: one for apprentice engineers and one for those who possessed experience and certification as a Locomotive Engineer under the federal regulations. Id. In December 2011, Plaintiff was invited to interview for the position. Id. ¶ 10. Mr. Kevin Graham, a Human Resources Manager, Mr. Richard Carroll, Road Foreman of Engines, and Mr. Richard Nunziato of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (the "Union") were present at the interview. Id. ¶¶ 6, 10. During the interview, the parties discussed the two separate rates of pay. Id. ¶ 11. In addition to having a higher pay, an applicant with the requisite experience and certification would have the same amount of vacation time that they would have been entitled to on their former railroad. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he asked the panel if they wanted to make a copy of his current engineer license and evidence of his prior experience, but the panel declined to do so. Id. Specifically, the panel explained that this could be resolved in training in Wilmington, Delaware if Plaintiff was offered a position. Id
On December 13, 2011, Plaintiff reported for a preemployment physical and drug test. Id. ¶ 12. According to Plaintiff, that date should have been established as his seniority date under the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between Amtrak and the Union. Id. Instead, January 9, 2012 is listed as Plaintiffs seniority date under a different provision of the CBA. Id
On December 20, 2011, Plaintiff received a formal offer letter from Mr. Graham. Id. ¶ 13. The offer letter listed the position as an "off corridor engineer trainee." Id. Plaintiff inquired with Mr. Graham on why his position was listed as a "trainee." Id. Mr. Graham explained that all offer letters show the "engineer trainee" title, regardless of whether an engineer is an apprentice or a re-entry. Id. Plaintiff then signed and returned the offer letter on December 31, 2011. Li In the time period between receiving the offer and signing it, Plaintiff spoke to several Amtrak managers and employees regarding the engineer training program and associated rates of pay, vacation, and seniority. Id. ¶ 14. According to Plaintiff, he learned that it had been past practice for Amtrak to state one rate of pay at the interview and then pay the lower apprentice rate until either the employee complained or the union remedied the issue. Id. Then, an employee would receive a check for back wages for the difference, and would also receive the correct seniority date and number of vacation weeks. Id
On January 9, 2012, Plaintiff entered Amtrak's locomotive engineer training program in Wilmington, Delaware. Id. ¶ 15. On this day, Amtrak sent a Labor Relations Manager to talk to Plaintiff and his entire class regarding their new jobs, their rates of pay, and their CBAs. Id. Plaintiff, and two other engineers, approached the Manager and wanted to discuss their rate of pay, vacation entitlement, and seniority. Id. The Manager collected their information, and responded that she would review the information and get back to them. Id. Plaintiff alleges that neither he nor the other engineers received any type of response from the Manager. Id.
Furthermore, during training, Plaintiff was instructed that these pay disputes are very common, and that Plaintiff should not spend his time in Wilmington on trying to remedy the pay disparity. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff was told by Amtrak managers that he would be paid correctly in the future. Id. Plaintiff was also reminded that under the CBA, he was on probation until 90 days after his graduation from the program. Id On March 14, 2012, Plaintiff graduated from the program and commenced his 90-day probation period. Id. ¶ IV. During this period, Plaintiff was an at-will employee and not a member of the Union. Id. ¶ 16. On April 15, 2012, a supervisor telephoned Plaintiff to inform him that he received an email that would have adjusted Plaintiffs pay to the correct rate, and would have provided the correct vacation entitlement and seniority date. Id. ¶ 19. The supervisor collected Plaintiffs evidence and submitted them for approval. Id. Approximately one week later, the supervisor informed Plaintiff that the decision to correct his rate of pay, vacation entitlement, and seniority date was reversed, and Plaintiff was now back to being an apprentice engineer. Id. ¶ 20.
On April 22, 2012, Plaintiff was approached by Amtrak Assistant Superintendent Lisa Hubbard. Id. ¶ 21. Ms. Hubbard reminded Plaintiff that he was a student engineer and could be dismissed for any reason. Id. Plaintiff interpreted Ms. Hubbard's remarks as a threat for trying to remedy his dispute. Id.
Finally, on June 15, 2012, Plaintiffs probationary period was over and he became a member of the Union. Id. ¶¶ 16, 22. In August 2012, Plaintiff contacted Mr. Nunziato to file a grievance about the dispute, but Mr. Nunziato refused to handle it. Id. ¶ 23. Between September 2012 and 2015, Plaintiff was able to file grievances with Amtrak and the Union, and he eventually submitted the case to the First Division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board in Chicago on November 15, 2017. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff also reported his concerns to various internal and external government agencies. Id. ¶¶ 25-28.
On September 24, 2018, the First Division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board dismissed Plaintiffs claim because it was untimely filed under the CBA. Id. ¶ 30; Am. Compl.
Ex. I.[1] Plaintiff now alleges that: (1) Defendants breached a contract[2]; (2) Defendants fraudulently misrepresented the employment position and offer letter; (3) Defendants violated their duty of good faith and fair dealing in contracts; (4) Defendants were unjustly enriched; (5) Defendants' conduct and contract were unconscionable; and (6) Defendants' conduct created promissory and equitable estoppel. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32-37.
On June 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Defendants in New York Supreme Court, Rensselaer County. See Dkt. No. 2. On August 5, 2020, the action was removed to this Court. See Dkt. No. 1. Subsequently, Defendants filed their first motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 6. On September 14, 2020 Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the Complaint. See Dkt. No. 22. On March 23, 2021, this Court granted the motion to amend, dismissed the motion to dismiss without prejudice, and instructed Defendants to refile a single, collective motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 29. On April 2, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint. Am. Compl. On April 16, 2021, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss. Motion to Dismiss.
Any party may move for judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). "Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where material facts are undisputed and where a judgment on the merits is possible merely by considering the contents of the pleadings." Sellers v. M.C. Floor Crafters, Inc., 842 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1988). Courts will assess whether judgment on the pleadings is warranted "by the same standard as Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Rubeor v. Town of Wright, 191 F.Supp.3d 198, 202-03 (N.D.N.Y. 2016) (Kahn J.). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter ... 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Put another way, a claim is plausible if it is supported by "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged misconduct]." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In assessing whether this standard has been...
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