Rubeor v. Town of Wright

• Decision Date: 08 June 2016
• Docket Number: 1:13-cv-0612 (LEK/CFH)
• Parties: Steven RUBEOR, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF WRIGHT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

191 F.Supp.3d 198

Steven RUBEOR, Plaintiff,

v.TOWN OF WRIGHT, et al., Defendants.

1:13-cv-0612 (LEK/CFH)

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed June 8, 2016

Daniel A. Jacobs, Gleason, Dunn Law Firm, Albany, NY, for Plaintiff.

Gregg T. Johnson, Timothy J. Higgins, Lemire, Johnson Law Firm, Malta, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

Lawrence E. Kahn, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendants Town of Wright; Town Board of the Town of Wright ("Town Board"); Susan Crosby ("Crosby") Amber Bleau ("Bleau"); Alex Lunieski ("Lunieski"); and Ed Thornton's ("Thornton") (collectively, "Defendants") Motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Dkt. Nos. 7 ("Motion"); 7-1 ("Memorandum"). For the following reasons, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court presumes the parties' familiarity with the facts and history of this case and recites only those facts necessary to the resolution of the pending Motion.

Plaintiff Steven Rubeor ("Plaintiff") originally filed an Article 78 Petition in New York Supreme Court seeking an annulment of his removal as assessor for the Town of Wright on the basis of Defendants' failure to comply with state law and the United States Constitution. See Dkt. No. 1–1 ("Complaint"). The Complaint further asserted claims for back pay and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, citing deprivation of Plaintiff's property rights without due process of law. Id. Defendants removed the action to the Northern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Dkt. No. 1. Defendants then filed their Motion and Memorandum, and Plaintiff submitted a Response. Dkt. No. 12 ("Response"). Defendants replied and requested that the Court convert their Motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment in order for the Court to consider Defendants' attached Declaration and five Exhibits. See Dkt. Nos. 17 ("Bleau Declaration"); 17-1 to 17-5 ("Exhibits"); 17-6 ("Reply Memorandum") at 1.

The Court abstained from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Article 78 claims, and those claims were remanded to state court. Dkt. No. 26 ("2014 Decision"). The Court stayed Plaintiff's federal claims pending the resolution of the Article 78 proceedings.¹ Id. The New York State Supreme Court ruled in Plaintiff's favor, finding that Plaintiff was entitled to complete his term as Assessor for the Town of Wright. Rubeor v. Town of Wright, 134 A.D.3d 1211, 20 N.Y.S.3d 730, 732 (2015). The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals denied Defendants' Motion for leave to appeal. Id. at 733 ; lv. denied, 27 N.Y.3d 902, 32 N.Y.S.3d 53, 51 N.E.3d 564 (2016).

On April 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Letter Motion requesting that the Court lift the stay and issue a ruling on Defendants' pending Motion for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. No. 33 ("Letter Motion"). On April 7, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff's Letter Motion in a Text Order lifting the stay and reinstating Defendants' Motion. Dkt. No. 34 ("April Order").

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Judgment on the Pleadings

Any party may move for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) after the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings are decided by the same standard as Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.² Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir.2010). Thus, "[t]o survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’ " Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ), when the complaint's factual allegations are taken as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor. Kirkendall v. Halliburton, Inc., 707 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir.2013). Facial plausibility exists "when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Additionally, the "tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in [a complaint] is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id.

In evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion, a court is limited to the information contained in the pleadings themselves. See Cleveland v. Caplaw Enterprises, 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir.2006) (citing Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir.2005) ). Generally, a court must convert a Rule 12(c) motion into a motion for summary judgment in order to consider material outside of the pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). However, "[a] court may, without converting the motion into one for summary judgment, consider documents that are attached to, incorporated by reference in, or integral to the complaint; and it may also consider matters that are subject to judicial notice." Byrd v. City of New York, No. 04–1396–CV, 2005 WL 1349876, at *1 (2d Cir. June 8, 2005) (citing Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir.2002) ).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendants illegally removed Plaintiff from his office as the assessor for the Town of Wright. Compl. ¶ 2. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to comply with New York Public Officers Law § 36, under which public officers may only be removed for cause and after application to the Appellate Division. Id.¶ 1; N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 36 ; Enos v. Village of Seneca Falls, 288 A.D.2d 853, 732 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786–87 (2001). Plaintiff also brings claims for back pay, punitive damages, and compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his removal from office violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Compl. ¶ 76.

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Defendants cite four grounds for dismissal: (1) that individual members of the Town Board of the Town of Wright are entitled to legislative immunity and, therefore, claims against them should be dismissed; (2) that individual members of the Town Board are entitled to qualified immunity and, therefore, claims against them should be dismissed; (3) that the action should be dismissed as to Susan Crosby because the Complaint does not state a cause of action against her; and (4) that claims against individual Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed because they are redundant when the municipality is also named as a Defendant. Mem. at 3-4, 6-7.

In their Reply, Defendants request that "if the Court cannot dismiss the named individuals based on FRCP 12(c)... the Court convert this motion into a summary judgment motion pursuant to FRCP 56." Reply at 1. As will be discussed further, in light of the recent state court decision in this case on remand, the Court dismisses the Complaint as to Defendants Crosby, Bleau, Lunieski, and Thornton in their individual and official capacities pursuant to Rule 12(c) based on the pleadings alone. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider the Exhibits attached to Defendants' Reply or to convert the Motion into a motion for summary judgment. However, to the extent that Defendants move for dismissal as to the Town of Wright and the Town Board, their Motion is denied.

A. Legislative Immunity

Legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their legislative activities. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49, 118 S.Ct. 966, 140 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998). "The test for determining whether an act is legislative ‘turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.’ " Harhay v. Town of Ellington Bd. of Educ., 323 F.3d 206, 210 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966 ). In order to be considered legislative, "the act in question must be taken ‘in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.’ " Id.(quoting Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966 ).

Administrative firings are not protected by legislative immunity. Almonte v. City of Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir.2007). "A personnel decision is administrative in nature if it is directed at a particular employee or employees, and is not part of a broader legislative policy." Id.; see also Harhay, 323 F.3d at 210 ("Discretionary personnel decisions, even if undertaken by public officials who otherwise are entitled to immunity, do not give rise to immunity because such decisionmaking is no different in substance from that which is enjoyed by other actors.")

Defendants argue that "the individual members of the Wright Town Board are entitled to legislative immunity for the decision to withdraw from the CAP program, as these individuals were acting in a legislative capacity when making this decision." Mem. at 3. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff was never removed from his position as assessor for the Town of Wright because he was an employee of the CAP, not the Town of Wright itself. Reply at 8. Therefore, "the Town Board did not violate and was not required to comply with New York Public Officers Law § 36 as they did not remove Plaintiff from office of the CAP Assessor." Id. at 8–9. In sum, Defendants argue that their action was necessarily legislative because they never fired Plaintiff—an action that would presumably qualify as administrative—they simply withdrew from the CAP, which ended the Town's relationship with Plaintiff.

The critical issue with regard to legislative immunity is thus one of state law: were Defendants required to comply with New York Public Officers Law § 36, or was Plaintiff's six-year term as assessor truncated by the Town of Wright's withdrawal from the CAP. The state law governing CAPs provides little guidance on this particular issue, and New York state courts addressed the issue for...