Heiserman v. Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern Railway Co.
| Decision Date | 10 April 1884 |
| Citation | 18 N.W. 903,63 Iowa 732 |
| Parties | HEISERMAN ET AL. v. THE BURLINGTON, CEDAR RAPIDS & NORTHERN RAILWAY CO |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Fayette Circuit Court.
ACTION at law to recover certain sums paid by plaintiff to defendants for the transportation of grain upon defendant's railroad, in excess of reasonable and just charges therefor. The cause was tried to the court without a jury, and judgment was rendered for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. The facts of the case are fully stated in the opinion.
REVERSED.
Stoneman Rickel & Eastman, for appellants.
J. & S K. Tracy, for appellee.
I.
The petition alleges that between the twenty-eighth day of August, 1877, and the fourth day of February, 1878, the plaintiffs delivered to defendant for transportation upon its railroad, from West Union to Postville, Cedar Rapids and Burlington, all points within this state, certain large quantities of grain, to be delivered to connecting lines of railroad, for transportation to Milwaukee, in the state of Wisconsin; that no other railroad than defendant's reached West Union, and plaintiffs were, therefore, compelled to procure transportation upon it; and that defendant charged and exacted large sums in excess of reasonable and just charges for the transportation of the grain, which plaintiffs were compelled to pay. The number of shipments, the quantity of grain in each, the charges paid, and the sums paid in each instance in excess of reasonable charges and other particulars, are shown by an exhibit to the petition, which need not be now particularly noticed.
As defenses to the action, defendant alleges: First, that the grain in question was transported by defendant as shipments from West Union to Milwaukee, in "through" cars and upon "through" bills of lading, and that the contract for transportation pertained to commerce between the states, and that the statute of this state, then in force, prescribing the charges which could be lawfully made for the transportation of property upon railroads, was, therefore, inapplicable and inoperative as to the transaction in question, being, as to them, in conflict with the constitution of the United States; Second, that plaintiffs "knowingly, voluntarily and willingly" paid the charges, now claimed by them to be excessive and unreasonable; and, Third, that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. The defendant alleges in its answer that the charges of which plaintiffs complain, were reasonable, and that the contracts for the transportation of the grain were to be performed by the delivery at Milwaukee, in the state of Wisconsin. The allegations of the pleadings in the case need not be further referred to or recited.
II. The evidence, without contradiction, establishes that it was the purpose of plaintiffs to ship the grain in question to Milwaukee, or other points out of this state, and that it was delivered in the cars of defendant, or in cars in use upon its road, at West Union. The contract for transportation between the parties, in each instance, was expressed by an instrument in writing, in the following form and language:
Marks and Consignee, Chandler, Brown & Co.
Destination, Milwaukee, Wis.
1402
Bulk Wheat.
B., C. R. & N.
This contract in the plainest language provides for transportation to Postville, and no farther. While it provides for the delivery of the grain to another railroad company, yet defendant's obligation, under the contract, was fully performed when this was done, and, by the express language of the instrument, defendant's responsibility ceased when it delivered the grain to another carrier. The facts established by the evidence, that defendant's compensation was fixed by contract with the connecting line at Postville, and, for the whole route taken together, the charges were reasonable, and even less than was provided for by the statute of the state then in force, cannot affect or modify the controlling point in the case, namely, that the contract was wholly performed in this state by the delivery of the grain at Postville, and that it provided transportation between points within the state, and did not extend to carrying the grain without the state. Discussion can add nothing to the conclusiveness of our position, based upon the obvious meaning of the contract.
III. It will be observed that this action is not brought to recover the penalties for over-charges by the railroad companies, provided by chapter 68, Acts of the Fifteenth General Assembly, in force when the acts complained of by plaintiffs were done. The plaintiffs seek to recover the sums paid by them in excess of reasonable charges, and nothing more. The liability of defendant for money collected for the transportation of property, in excess of reasonable charges, existed at common-law. The enactment of a statute imposing penalties for excessive charges, recoverable by the party injured, or providing that for exacting and collecting them the agent of the railroad company shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, does not take away the right existing at common-law to recover money paid in excess of reasonable charges. See City of Dubuque v. Ill. Cen. R'y Co., 39 Iowa 56; City of Burlington v. B. & M. R'y Co., 41 Iowa 134; Crittenden v. Wilson, 5 Cow. 165; Gooch v. Stephenson, 13 Me. 371; Candee v. Hayward, 37 N.Y. 653.
The injured party may waive the tort created by statute, and sue upon the implied contract raised by the law, whereby the carrier is obliged to repay the consignee or consignor of the property all sums exacted in excess of...
To continue reading
Request your trial