Heiskell v. Mozie, 6564.
| Decision Date | 24 February 1936 |
| Docket Number | No. 6564.,6564. |
| Citation | 65 App. DC 255,82 F.2d 861 |
| Parties | HEISKELL v. MOZIE. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Thos. Morton Gittings, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
Richard A. Harman, Richard L. Merrick, and John G. Epaminonda, all of Washington, D. C., for Richard A. Harman.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, GRONER, and STEPHENS, Associate Justices.
Petitioner in October, 1925, executed a monthly lease to respondent of certain property in the city of Washington. The lease contained the usual covenants with relation to the payment of the rent and the occupancy and redelivery of the property. In June, 1935, petitioner, claiming default in payment of the rent, instituted and prosecuted in the municipal court, in proper person, a landlord and tenant proceeding for the recovery of possession of the premises. Summons was served, and on the return day, respondent not appearing, a member of the bar, as a friend of the court, moved that the complaint be dismissed and the plaintiff be held in contempt of court for violation of rule 22. The rule provides:
"No person shall be permitted to appear in a representative capacity in any cause except for the purpose of securing a continuance, or signing pleadings, writs, or other papers filed in the Court, except he be a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia."
Petitioner answered the motion and the specifications filed to support it, and some evidence was taken. The admitted facts are that petitioner is engaged in the real estate business, including the collection of rents and the leasing of properties for the owners; that in the case of property turned over to him by the owner to rent, he would ordinarily execute the lease in his own name as landlord — whether with or without formal authority does not appear. That he would receive 5 per cent. of the amount of rents collected by him and, when a tenant failed to pay the rent, he would file a landlord and tenant proceeding in his own name to recover possession of the premises and would prosecute such cases in proper person; that in the lease of the premises involved in the case under consideration, petitioner was not the owner of the premises, but the rental agent for the owner.
The municipal court held petitioner in contempt and imposed a fine of $5. We granted a review because of the local importance of the principle involved, and the single question we are called on to decide is whether petitioner, not being a member of the bar, may nevertheless conduct, in proper person, a proceeding of the nature, and in the circumstances, hereinbefore mentioned.
The District of Columbia Code of 1929 (title 18, § 225) provides that, upon default in the terms of a lease, the landlord may bring an action in the municipal court of the District to recover possession. Counsel for petitioner says that, since the owner of the property is not a party to the lease, but petitioner is, the relation of landlord and tenant exists between petitioner and the tenant; and he further says that in this jurisdiction an agent for an undisclosed principal is personally bound on the contract and that this liability is reciprocal, that the lessee in this case was bound to petitioner for the performance of the contract, and that this gave petitioner the right, in his own name, to institute the recovery proceeding.
We shall assume, for the purposes of this case, and in the absence of any statute to the contrary, that when a civil contract is made with an agent for an undisclosed principal in the agent's own name, either the agent or the principal may sue upon it. We shall also assume that petitioner, having lawful possession of the property, had the right to make the lease in his own name. In this view the action could properly be brought in the name of the agent. But we do not regard this as conclusive.
Section 272 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 394 (Rev.St. § 747...
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