Move Organization v. US Dept. of Justice

• Citation: 555 F. Supp. 684
• Decision Date: 10 January 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 82-143.
• Parties: MOVE ORGANIZATION v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

555 F. Supp. 684

MOVE ORGANIZATION v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.

Civ. A. No. 82-143.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

January 10, 1983.

Ramona Africa, The Move Organization, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM

GILES, District Judge.

Plaintiff filed a complaint suing a host of correctional authorities¹ for a litany of alleged afflictions.² The complaint was followed by a Supplemental Complaint detailing approximately nineteen separate grievances.³ Despite the greater detail provided by the Supplemental Complaint, this action must be dismissed for a variety of jurisdictional, substantive, and procedural reasons.

I. JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS

The jurisdictional problems presented by the complaints can be divided into three categories: sovereign immunity, eleventh amendment immunity, and standing. I use the term "sovereign immunity" to describe the general inability to sue the United States. Eleventh Amendment immunity relates to the ability to bring in a state or its agencies as defendants. Standing relates to the ability of this plaintiff, the "Move Organization," to sue any party for the grievances listed in its complaint.

A. Sovereign Immunity

The United States and its agencies may not be sued without consent. The complaint discloses no basis for consent, nor can I conceive of any.⁴ Thus, the federal defendants—the Bureau of Prisons, the Lewisburg Penitentiary, the Post Office, and the Treasury Department—must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

B. Eleventh-Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to bar federal court suits against states for retroactive damages. Pennsylvania and its agencies have not consented to this suit, and no other exception to eleventh amendment immunity applies. Therefore, the damage claims against the state and its alter egos, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and its justice department, corrections bureau, parole board, and public welfare department, as well as the governor, attorney general and corrections commissioner in their official capacities, must be dismissed.

C. Standing

As part of the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement, see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, a plaintiff must have standing to sue. See, e.g., Kirby v. United States, 675 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir.1982). See generally, e.g., C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531 (1975 & Supps. 1980 and 1982). The only plaintiff in this action is the "Move Organization." When an organization sues, its standing can be either "individual" or "representative." See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1124, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). In its individual capacity, an organization sues for harm to itself. In its representative capacity, the organization sues on behalf of its members. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2440-2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2211, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).

On its own behalf, an organization, like an individual, must allege an injury in fact and show a personal stake in the case sufficient to warrant federal-court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp., 102 S.Ct. at 1124; Kirby, 675 F.2d at 64. The complaint and supplemental complaint list incidents occurring over a five-year period. Each incident alleges some sort of brutality or judicial injustice to individual Move members.⁵ In general, however, a fair reading of the complaints discloses no allegation of distinct harm to Move itself.⁶ The exception is the alleged unconstitutional destruction of the Move house at the hands of the City of Philadelphia. See Supplemental Complaint ¶¶ 9-10. However, because, this incident is already the subject of pending litigation before me by Move and many of its members, I shall dismiss this aspect of the instant case as duplicative. See notes 8, 11, 14 and 16 infra and accompanying texts. As to all other aspects of the complaint, Move lacks individual standing.

The question remains whether Move has standing as a representative of its members. One requirement for representational standing is that "neither the claim asserted nor relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit."⁷ With the exception of the incidents preceding and including the destruction of the Move house, which have been dismissed from this case as duplicative,⁸ the complaints relate incidents where one or several Move members suffered harm. There is no statute, ordinance or other official action affecting all members.⁹ It would require individual testimony to establish the constitutional violations set forth in the complaint, and the relief would have to be tailored individually to the harm suffered by any Move member whose rights may have been violated. See, e.g., Comment, supra, note 7, at 132. Thus, both the claims asserted and relief requested require participation in this lawsuit by individual members.¹⁰ Since this prerequisite to associational standing is not satisfied, so this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

II. SUBSTANTIVE DEFECTS

Even assuming jurisdiction existed to hear this lawsuit, it would have to be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) because the complaint does not entitle plaintiff to relief. This conclusion is most easily demonstrated by considering, in order, each substantive paragraph of the amended complaint.

Paragraph two alleges that a child of a Move member was "trampled to death by cop Palermo and other maniac cops;" various Move members were brutalized by police, and no policeman charged with murder, all on March 28, 1976. Assuming all this to be true, the complaint states no cause of action against any named defendant. See note 1 supra (list of defendants). Furthermore, no citizen has a right to have murder charges brought. Finally, the incidents are beyond the period of the statute of limitations.¹¹

Paragraph three alleges that another baby died as the result of a beating of its mother outside a Philadelphia courtroom by Philadelphia sheriffs. This likewise fails to state a cause of action against any named defendant and is barred by time limitations.

Paragraph four alleges that various female Move members miscarried due to beatings "by Phila. cops and sheriffs in the past ten years." This fails to state a claim against a named defendant. In addition, it is not specific enough to allow the court or named defendants to identify when plaintiff's rights allegedly were violated. See, e.g., Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 923 (3d Cir.1976) (plaintiff must plead "when, where, and how" its rights were violated).¹²

Paragraph five complains about warrants "on Move people" issued by Philadelphia Common Pleas Judge Lynne M. Abraham in May, 1977. Judge Abraham is not a defendant. If she were, she would be protected by absolute judicial immunity as well as the statute of limitations.¹³

Paragraph six complains that ex-mayor Frank Rizzo, the water commissioner, the former city solicitor, Judge DiBona, the Postmaster General, Bell Telephone, and "the whole Phila. administration conspired to legally murder off this family" when the Move house was blockaded under court order. This is frivolous for many reasons. First, the allegations of conspiracy are not sufficiently specific. Second, most of the alleged responsible parties are not defendants. Third, the blockade terminated on August 8, 1978, see, e.g., Move Organization v. City of Philadelphia, 530 F.Supp. at 766, so the statute of limitations bars any action. Fourth, the pleading that these actions were "legal" seems to rule out the possibility that they were illegal and thus actionable. Furthermore, Move and its members are already engaged in a lawsuit over the entire range of events surrounding the Move blockade and shootout.¹⁴

Paragraph seven complains about "blanket warrants on all Move members" issued by Judge DiBona on August 2, 1978. This paragraph fails as a claim for the same reasons as paragraph five of the complaint. See text accompanying note 13, supra.

Paragraph eight alleges that as a "direct result of these blanket warrants," two Move members living in Richmond, Virginia, were arrested and jailed "for absolutely no reason at all" in the month preceding their scheduled trial.¹⁵ In addition to its internal contradictions, this paragraph does not plead a claim to the extent that it refers to warranted arrests for purposes of a criminal trial which resulted in conviction. To the extent it complains about events surrounding the arrests in Richmond, it is not addressed to any named defendant. In any event, it is barred by limitations. See note 11 supra.

Paragraphs nine and ten relate to the Move shootout and destruction of the Move house. These paragraphs must be dismissed for the reasons given in the discussion of paragraph six. See note 14 and accompanying text, supra.

Paragraph eleven complains about an evidentiary ruling in a criminal trial. If the ruling resulted in a conviction, the conviction must first be overturned in state court before it can be raised in federal court. If there was no conviction, the ruling was harmless and cannot be the basis of a claim. Furthermore, in failing to say when this incident occurred, the claim is not sufficiently specific.

Paragraph twelve complains that children of Move members were taken to a child-care center while their parents were jailed. The children allegedly were given processed food and dressed in diapers, to which they were unaccustomed. None of this alleges a constitutional violation. Furthermore, the complaint fails to state when this happened. Thus this paragraph is not sufficiently specific.¹⁶

Paragraph thirteen states that police officers who beat a Move member were not charged with murder. As with paragraph two, see text preceding note 11 supra, failure to bring charges...