Helfrich v. Branstool, 2009 Ohio 2865 (Ohio App. 6/16/2009), 08 CA 0072.
| Decision Date | 16 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 08 CA 0072.,08 CA 0072. |
| Citation | 2009 Ohio 2865 |
| Parties | James Helfrich, pro se., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W. David Branstool, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
James Helfrich, Pro Se, P.O. Box 921, Pataskala, Ohio 43062, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Anthony W. Stocco, 20 South Second Street, 4th Floor, Newark, Ohio 43055, For Defendant-Appellee-Licking County.
Lisa M. Zaring, 36 E. Seventh Street, Suite 2100, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for Defendant-Appellee-W. David Branstool.
Paul Michael La Fayette, 65 East State Street, Suite 400, Columbus, Ohio 43215, For Defendant-Appellee Ginna Smith and, City of Newark.
Before: Sheila G. Farmer, P.J., Julie A. Edwards, J., Patricia A. Delaney, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, James Helfrich, appeals from the March 21, 2008, April 28, 2008, and May 21, 2008, Entries of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶2} In 2002, appellant, James Helfrich, assisted appellee, Judge W. David Branstool, in his campaign for Common Pleas Court Judge. When, in 2003, appellee Judge Branstool asked appellant for his support again, appellant refused, and the two engaged in a heated letter writing campaign. The letters ended up being published in the newspaper.
{¶3} At the time, a forcible entry and detainer case was pending in the Licking County Municipal Court before appellee Judge Branstool, titled Helfrich v. Mellon. The defendant in such case had filed a counterclaim against appellant alleging breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, trespass and violations of R.C. 5321.04 and 5321.15, sexual harassment and retaliation.
{¶4} The case proceeded to trial on May 17, 2005. On May 20, 2005, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant in the amount of $569.56, but also a verdict in favor of the defendant in the amount of $2,500 on her counterclaim.
{¶5} On June 3, 2005, appellant filed a motion to reverse the jury verdict. On June 15, 2005, appellant filed a motion to disqualify appellee, Judge Branstool. After appellee Judge Branstool recused himself, Judge Douglas James Bennett was assigned by the Supreme Court of Ohio to the case on September 8, 2005. Judge Bennett denied appellant's motion.
{¶6} Appellant then appealed. Pursuant to an Opinion filed on June 27, 2007, in Helfrich v. Mellon, Licking App. No. 06-CA-69, 2007-Ohio-3358, this Court held, in relevant part, that appellant was estopped from arguing that the trial court had erred in denying his motion to reverse the jury verdict because appellant had failed to provide Judge Bennett with the trial transcript.
{¶7} Subsequently, on January 8, 2008, appellant filed a complaint against appellee Judge W. David Branstool, Ginna Smith (nka Walker), the City of Newark, who appellant alleged employed both appellee Judge Branstool and appellee Smith, and Licking County, who appellant alleged employed appellee Judge Branstool. Appellant, in his complaint, alleged that in May of 2005, he had contacted appellee Ginna Smith, who was the court reporter for appellee Judge Branstool, and asked her to transcribe excerpts of the trial transcript in Helfrich v. Mellon. Appellant alleged that he provided appellee Smith with a deposit for the transcript and that, on or about June 1, 2005, when he was discussing transcripts with her, appellee Judge Branstool "abruptly barged in to the room screaming that [appellant] could not have a copy of the transcript." Appellant further alleged that on August 8, 2005, appellee Smith informed him that she would not transcribe partial transcripts and that, during the next few months, he renewed his request for excerpts of the trial transcript to no avail. Appellant, in his complaint, further alleged that he was not permitted to take part in bench conferences and conferences in appellee Judge Branstool's chambers during the pendency of Helfrich v. Mellon and that he never received a copy of a motion in limine filed by the opposing counsel in such case and was never permitted to argue the merits of the motion.
{¶8} Appellant, in his complaint, stated as follows under "Cause of Action":
{¶9} "Plaintiff brings this action as a result of Defendants' intentional abuse of process, violations of Ohio Revised Code, Plaintiff's State and Federal Constitutional rights, violations of Plaintiff's freedom of speech, and right to pursue legal action pro se, whereby the Defendants were negligent, acting in bad faith, and acting in a clear absence of all jurisdiction, and failed to perform duties."
{¶10} On February 4, 2008, appellee Judge Branstool filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), arguing, in part, that he was absolutely immune from all liability, that appellant had failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and that such claim failed on the merits. On February 6, 2008, appellee Licking County filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), arguing that appellee Judge Branstool had immunity for the acts that are alleged to have occurred and that appellee Licking County was not his "employer."
{¶11} Pursuant to an Entry filed on March 21, 2008, the trial court granted the motions filed by appellees Judge Branstool and Licking County, finding that appellee Judge Branstool was immune from liability because the conduct that appellant "complains of are judicial acts" and were taken in his official capacity as Judge. The trial court further held that appellee Judge Branstool was not an "employee" of appellee Licking County.
{¶12} Thereafter, on April 24, 2008, appellees Smith and Newark filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C). Such appellees, in their motion, argued that appellee Smith was immune from liability under the doctrine of judicial immunity and also that because neither appellee Judge Branstool nor appellee Smith were liable to appellant, appellee City of Newark could not be liable under a theory of respondeat superior.
{¶13} Appellant filed a Motion to Strike the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, arguing that the same was untimely. As memorialized in an Entry filed on April 28, 2008, the trial court denied appellant's Motion to Strike.
{¶14} Pursuant to an Entry filed on May 21, 2008, the trial court granted the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by appellees Smith (nka Walker) and City of Newark. The trial court found that appellee Smith was immune from liability and that since she was immune, appellee City of Newark could not be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
{¶15} Appellant now raises the following assignments of error on appeal:
{¶16} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ON MARCH 21, 2008 AND MAY 21, 2008 WHEN IT GRANTED APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS, BECAUSE IT DID NOT CONSIDER ARGUMENTS AND VIOLATIONS OF HELFRICH'S STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS.
{¶17} "II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ON MAY 21, 2008, WHEN IT GRANTED SMITH'S MOTION TO DISMISS, BECAUSE, AMONG OTHERS, THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED LOYER V. TURNER AND IMMUNITY.
{¶18} "III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING LICKING COUNTY AND THE CITY OF NEWARK'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
{¶19} "IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY TO BRANSTOOL, WHO ACTED OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF HIS JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES.
{¶20} "V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING IMMUNITY FOR A PERIOD THAT BRANSTOOL WAS NOT EVEN THE PRESIDING JUDGE.
{¶21} "VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING HELFRICH'S PLEADING WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
{¶22}
{¶23} Appellant, in his first, fourth and fifth assignments of error, argues that the trial court erred in granting appellee Judge Branstool's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). We disagree.
{¶24} The standard of review on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362 at paragraph 5. Therefore, this Court applies the same standard of review to the motion to dismiss as the trial court. When a trial court rules on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint's factual allegations must be taken as true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Vail v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 279, 649 N.E.2d 182; Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753, 756. A motion to dismiss can only be granted where the party opposing the motion is unable to prove any set of facts that would entitle the party to the relief requested. Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 650 N.E.2d 863, 865-866; York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 573 N.E.2d 1063 {¶25} Appellant, in his brief in the case sub judice, specifically argues that appellee Judge Branstool denied or interfered with appellant's request for a transcript and is not immune from liability. The trial court, in the case sub judice, granted appellee Judge Branstool's Motion to Dismiss, finding that appellee Judge Branstool was immune from liability.
{¶26} Borkowski v. Abood, 117 Ohio St.3d 347, 2008-Ohio-857, 884 N.E. 2d 7, paragraph one of the syllabus, following Wilson v. Neu (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 102, 465 N.E.2d 854. This broad grant of immunity protects even acts "done maliciously, or * * * in excess of * * * authority," so long they are...
To continue reading
Request your trial