Heller v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 August 1983
• Parties: , 37 UCC Rep.Serv. 156 Robert HELLER, Plaintiff, v. U.S. SUZUKI MOTOR CORP., and Jim Moroney's Harley-Davidson Sales Inc., Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 822

465 N.Y.S.2d 822

120 Misc.2d 321, 37 UCC Rep.Serv. 156

Robert HELLER, Plaintiff, v. U.S. SUZUKI MOTOR CORP., and Jim Moroney's Harley-Davidson Sales Inc., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Orange County Spec I.

Aug. 2, 1983.

Meyer, Diesenhouse, Feinson & Shapiro, Middletown, for plaintiff.

Lester, Schwab, Katz & Dwyer, New York City, for defendant Suzuki.

Schleider, Dupee & Madison, Goshen, for defendant Jim Moroney's Harley-Davidson Sales Inc.

ANTHONY J. FERRARO, Justice.

Plaintiff moves, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (subd. b), for judgment dismissing the second affirmative defense of statute of limitation contained in the answer of defendant U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp. (Suzuki), on the ground that it has no merit.

Defendant Suzuki cross-moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it is time-barred.

Defendant Jim Moroney's Harley-Davidson Sales, Inc. (Moroney) submits an affirmation in support of plaintiff's motion and in opposition to defendant Suzuki's cross-motion.

It is conceded by all parties that the complaint only asserts one cause of action, i.e., breach of warranty. It is also conceded that the applicable statute of limitation is that contained in Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 2-725. (See Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 335 N.E.2d 275.) That section provides for a four (4) year limitation period and for accrual of the cause of action upon tender of delivery of the allegedly defective goods (UCC § 2-725, subd. [2] ).

The dispute in this action centers on the date of accrual, and whether it is the tender of delivery of the goods to the ultimate purchaser or by the manufacturer to the first distributor in the chain of distribution.

The Court holds that it is the date of sale or tender of delivery to the ultimate purchaser that controls and is the accrual date of the breach of warranty. (McCarthy v. Bristol Labs., 86 A.D.2d 279, 284, n. 5, 449 N.Y.S.2d 280; Fazio v. Ford Motor Corp., 69 A.D.2d 896, 415 N.Y.S.2d 889; Reis v. Pfizer, Inc., 61 A.D.2d 777, 402 N.Y.S.2d 401; Weinstein v. General Motors Corp., 51 A.D.2d 335, 381 N.Y.S.2d 283; Mills v. International Harvester Co., 554 F.Supp. 611; Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 F.Supp. 1088; Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill.2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550; Cumberland Valley Joint School Auth. v. Halderman, Inc., 23 D. & C.3d 616. [Pa.Ct. of Com.Pl. Cumberland Co.: 1977].) To the extent that it may be contrary to this holding, dicta in Doyle v. Happy Tumbler Wash-O-Mat, Inc., 90 A.D.2d 366, 370, 457 N.Y.S.2d 85 is not controlling.

The Court's determination is not only governed by statute and controlling decisional law but is based upon logic and common sense. The very purpose of the statutory enactment is to protect the consumer. The blanket of protection cannot be applied until he first gets into bed. There is neither rhyme nor reason to protect him until he first receives the merchandise. To hold that the cause of action accrues to the consumer when delivery is made to the distributor would frustrate the very purpose of the law. The...