Hellman v. St. Louis County

Decision Date10 June 1957
Docket NumberNo. 1,No. 45842,45842,1
Citation302 S.W.2d 911
PartiesMilton A. HELLMAN, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Missouri; Luman F. Matthews, Supervisor, St. Louis County, Missouri; Harold D. Carey, James A. Singer, Frank L. Martini, E. Gordon Davis, Tom Dunne, James H. J. McNary, and Maurice Abramson, Members of the County Council, St. Louis County, Missouri; Philip G. Deuser, Assessor, St. Louis County, Missouri; Frank J. Burkamp, Treasurer, St. Louis County, Missouri; Clarence H. Hackmann, Auditor, St. Louis County, Missouri; Roy Wenzlick and Susan N. Wenzlick, co-partners, d/b/a Roy Wenzlick & Company; and Doane Agricultural Service, Inc., a Corporation, Respondents
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Robert S. Allen, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.

William B. Kline, St. Louis County Counseler, C. Wheeler Detjen, John F. Molloy, Asst. County Counselors, Clayton, for defendants-respondents.

HOLLINGSWORTH, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff, a resident-taxpayer of St. Louis County, sued to enjoin the enforcement of allegedly illegal contracts separately entered into between St. Louis County and two appraisal companies for the appraisal of certain real estate in the county and the rendition of other services in connection with the ultimate assessment of such real estate for purposes of taxation. The trial court found the issues in favor of defendants and entered judgment accordingly, from which plaintiff has appealed.

St. Louis County is a county of the first class, operating under a Home Rule Charter adopted by the voters pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, Sec. 18, of the Constitution of Missouri, V.A.M.S. In addition to the County, the following are also made parties defendant: the County Supervisor, the members of the County Council, the Assessor, the Treasurer, the Auditor, the co-partners composing one of the aforesaid appraisal companies doing business as 'Roy Wenzlick & Company', and the other appraisal company, Doane Agricultural Service, Inc., a corporation. (For convenience, Roy Wenzlick & Company will be herein referred to as 'Wenzlick' and Doane Agricultural Company, Inc., as 'Doane'.)

In June, 1955, a Special Committee on Assessment of Property for Tax Purposes, duly appointed by the County Council, reported in part that: (1) 'A parcel-by-parcel revaluation by experts in this field is the only way we can provide for the orderly assessment and collection of future taxes in St. Louis County.' (2) 'We have been impressed by the fact that it is not possible to purchase a professional revaluation of real estate in the same manner that we would purchase standardized items of supplies * * *. The services sought require the highest degree of professional skill based upon training and experience.' (3) 'These firms (Wenzlick and Doane), which make professional revaluations throughout the country, maintain home offices locally. Each has special knowledge of and experience in this area. Each has a national reputation for professional ability and integrity, the value of which cannot be calculated.'

On March 7, 1956, by resolution No. 140, in which reference was made to the report of the special committee, the Assessor and County Supervisor were authorized to execute the contracts in question 'pursuant to the provisions of Section 17.24 of the Administrative Code of St. Louis County as contained in St. Louis County Ordinance No. 713, 1955, * * *.' On March 8, 1956, without advertisement for bids, the contracts were duly executed.

The provisions of both contracts are substantially the same, except as to the real estate to be appraised and the compensation to be paid each of the appraisal companies. Wenzlick agreed to appraise all of the taxable land and improvements located within five designated school districts in the County and Doane agreed to appraise all of the taxable land and improvements within nine other designated school districts in the county. Each contract also required the appraisal company therein named to prepare and deliver to the Assessor certain manuals of procedure, field record cards, land value maps, indexing cards, identifying classification and other detailed information and services, and that the work be completed by March 1, 1957. In consideration of the aforesaid services, the county agreed to pay Wenzlick the sum of $185,225 and Doane the sum of $60,450.

Each contract also granted the county two options to employ the appraisal company therein named for appraisal of the property in certain other school districts of the county for each of the years of 1957 and 1958 and for the rendition of services similar to those set forth in the contracts for the year of 1956. If the county exercised 'Option 1' of the Wenzlick contract for the year of 1957, it became obligated to pay Wenzlick $273,609; if it exercised 'Option 2' for the year 1958, it became obligated to pay Wenzlick $169,416. If the county exercised 'Option 1' of the Doane contract for the year 1957, it became obligated to pay Doane $73,150; if it exercised 'Option 2' for the year 1958, it became obligated to pay Doane $73,150.

Plaintiff contends, as he contended in the trial court, the contracts are unenforceable on grounds: (1) the county had no authority to enter into them; (2) each contract, in fact, constitutes a three-year plan of reappraisal and is violative of Article VI, Sec. 26(a), of the Constitution and of the statutes requiring an annual assessment of all of the taxable property within the county; and (3) each contract involves an expenditure of more than $500 and was not advertised as required by Section 50.660 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. (All statutory references herein are to RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.)

The Charter of St. Louis County (Art. III, Sec. 22) authorizes the Council, by ordinance: 'To provide for the assessment, levy, equalization and collection of all taxes now or hereafter authorized by the Constitution or by law and to prescribe a method or system to facilitate the assessment, calculation, extension and collection of taxes including the design of the books and forms and the purchase and installation of necessary nechanical devices.'

Ordinance 713, enacted pursuant to the above charter provision, established a Division of Assessment, defined the powers and duties of the Assessor and prescribed 'a method to facilitate the scientific and uniform assessment of property for taxation.'

The following sections thereof are pertinent:

Section 17.11: 'The Assessor shall be the head and shall have general supervision of the Division of Assessment. The Assessor shall perform all duties required of a Division Head by the St. Louis County Charter, and by law, and shall have, in addition to the powers and duties prescribed by law, the powers and duties prescribed by this Ordinance.'

Sections 17.13 through 17.23 provide a detailed method for the uniform assessment of the taxable property in the County.

Section 17.24 provides: 'When the assessor shall have determined that it is necessary to conduct a revaluation of all taxable property, in order to insure uniformity of assessments within St. Louis County, he may request the County Supervisor to employ, by and with the approval of the County Council, experts and consultants, to assist the assessor in such revaluation program.'

Section 17.25 provides: 'The assessment system set forth in this Ordinance shall be followed by the Assessor assessing all land and buildings; provided, however, that if, in his judgment, any modifications are necessary in order to arrive at the true value, in money, of such property, he shall be authorized to make such modification.'

At the trial, August F. Rumping, chief deputy assessor of St. Louis County, called as a witness in behalf of plaintiff, testified: The assessor's office would use every portion of the information furnished by the appraisal companies that the office sees fit for the purpose of making a uniform assessment. Mr. Rumping did not know whether the assessor contemplated using the valuation of the appraisers as they were reported each year or whether he would wait until all of the appraisals were made. He said that the information furnished by the appraisers 'will be used in one way or another in making a uniform assessment'; that the assessor would use his own judgment as to the assessments made on the appraisals, using them for his guidance along with any other factors that he may feel are essential 'to determine the valuation in his own judgment'; and that the appraisals are not binding upon him.

Plaintiff's contention that St. Louis County had no authority to enter into the contracts in issue is predicated upon the contention that both the statutes of Missouri and the charter of St. Louis County require that the property of the county be assessed for state and county purposes by the assessor of the county only and that the statutes and the charter do not (and the charter lawfully could not) authorize the county by ordinance or otherwise to employ experts to make the appraisals set forth in the contracts for the reason that they constitute an unlawful delegation of the powers enjoined by law solely upon the assessor.

In support of his contention with respect to the statutes, he cites numerous sections relating to the duties of county assessors, generally illustrative of which are Section 137.115, requiring the assessor or his deputies to make a list of all taxable property in his county and to assess the same at its true value, etc., and Section 53.030, requiring each county assessor to take an oath to assess all of such property at what he believes to be the actual cash value.

With respect to the powers and duties of the assessor, as fixed and declared by the County Charter, plaintiff's argument runs thus: He first directs our attemtion to the three following provisions of the Charter: (a) Article I, Section 2, declares that St. Louis County 'shall have all the powers now or hereafter vested by the...

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    ...280 S.W.2d 656, the powers granted to it must be exercised in a manner not contrary to the public policy of the state. Hellman v. St. Louis County, Mo., 302 S.W.2d 911. And, as was said in State ex rel. Cole v. Matthews, Mo., 274 S.W.2d 286, 292: 'The provisions of the charter and ordinance......
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