Hellmund v. Castelló
| Decision Date | 18 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 14-19-00689-CV,14-19-00689-CV |
| Parties | CELINA HELLMUND, Appellant v. GABRIEL CASTELLÓ, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 129th District Court Harris County, Texas
Appellant Celina Hellmund appeals an order granting appellee Gabriel Castelló's special appearance. Hellmund raises two issues. First, Hellmund contends the trial court erred in granting Castelló's special appearance because a Texas court has personal jurisdiction over him under specific jurisdiction principles. Second, Hellmund contends the trial court abused its discretion in striking her supplemental evidence filed three days before the hearing on the ground that it was untimely.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking Hellmund's supplemental evidence because it was untimely, and we overrule her second issue. As to Hellmund's first issue, for the reasons explained below, we conclude that she has not shown the trial court erred in granting Castelló's special appearance on specific jurisdiction grounds. Therefore, we overrule Hellmund's first issue.
We affirm the trial court's order granting Castelló's special appearance.
Hellmund, a resident of Switzerland, sued Castelló, also a resident of Switzerland, and Allegra LLC, a Texas limited liability company, in Harris County District Court. Purportedly, both Hellmund and Castelló are members and managers of Allegra. In her original petition, Hellmund alleged under the "jurisdiction" paragraph that the court "has jurisdiction to provide all relief requested," and that the parties have contractually agreed that mandatory venue lies in Texas courts. Hellmund asserted claims against Castelló for breach of an oral contract, fraud, fraudulent inducement, and breach of fiduciary duties to Hellmund and Allegra.1
Hellmund alleged the following facts:
In support of her breach of contract claim, Hellmund alleged that Castelló breached his oral promises to pay (through Allegra) for all costs related to the purchase and that he would gift the unit to Hellmund as her separate property.
In support of the breach of fiduciary duty claim, Hellmund alleged that Castelló owed fiduciary duties to Allegra and Hellmund; and that he breached those fiduciary duties by: (1) unilaterally making decisions regarding Allegra's operations; (2) failing to make additional capital contributions; (3) gross mismanagement; (4) misappropriating funds and other assets; (5) failing to disclose information about matters affecting Allegra; and (6) denying Hellmund access to financial information as requested.
In support of her fraud and fraudulent inducement claims, Hellmund alleged that Castelló fraudulently induced her into forming Allegra to purchase the condominium unit by promising to pay for the unit and gift it to her.
Castelló filed a special appearance and attached a sworn declaration, in which he averred among other things that he has never resided in Houston, that he is a resident of Switzerland, and that he has not entered into any venue agreements with Hellmund. Castelló asserted that his declaration rebutted the vague jurisdictional allegation in Hellmund's petition. Castelló further urged in his special appearance that his limited contacts with Texas, including a few trips to Houston and being a member of a Texas LLC, were not continuous and substantial enough to subject him to general jurisdiction in Texas. Castelló contended that his only connection to Texas is his membership in Allegra; and that his partial ownership of Allegra—an entity that owns property in Texas—is insufficient to call him into a Texas court because he never availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in Texas and because his Texas contacts are not substantially related to the operative facts of the litigation. According to Castelló, Allegra was conceived by Hellmund's tax attorney, and Hellmund unilaterally directed all of Allegra's activities without his input or consent. Finally, Castelló contended that exercising personal jurisdiction over him in Texas would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantialjustice. He further stated that he and Hellmund were involved in divorce proceedings in Switzerland that could impact this lawsuit. He set a hearing on his special appearance for July 8, 2019.
Hellmund filed a response. She contended that Castelló was subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas because: (1) he executed a contract for the purchase of real property in his individual capacity; (2) he and Hellmund formed a Texas limited liability company, Allegra, subject to the protections, provisions, and benefits of Texas law; (3) his contacts with Texas were directly connected to Hellmund's lawsuit; and (4) personal jurisdiction over Castelló does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Hellmund attached documentary evidence in support of her response. The documents, however, either were not authenticated or not translated into English from a foreign language. Hellmund did not attach any affidavit or sworn declaration in support of her jurisdictional allegations.
The special appearance hearing was reset to July 22. Seven days before the hearing, Castelló filed supplemental evidence. He filed an amended declaration, which restated the facts from his original declaration but added that the property at issue was included in a proposed divorce settlement with Hellmund in Switzerland. He attached a translated copy of the proposed settlement, which provided that he would sell his interest in Allegra to Hellmund and transfer his equity in Allegra to her sole ownership. Castelló also attached a sworn declaration from his Swiss divorce counsel, who stated among other things that Swiss law governs the parties' divorce and that the Swiss court will have the opportunity to adjudicate the disposition of the property acquired during the marriage and owned by Allegra.
Three days before the hearing, Hellmund filed a supplemental response, attaching sworn declarations by her and her Swiss divorce counsel. However, at theJuly 22 hearing, Castelló's counsel objected to Hellmund's supplemental response and evidence because it was filed less than seven days before the hearing and was therefore untimely. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a(3). The trial judge informed Hellmund's counsel that he could not consider the late declarations and asked what Hellmund wanted to do. Counsel decided to proceed with the hearing relying only on the initial response. Later during the hearing, Castelló's counsel also objected to the evidence attached to Hellmund's initial response because the exhibits were not authenticated or properly proven. The trial court did not rule on the objection during the hearing.
Two days after the hearing, Hellmund filed a motion to conduct jurisdictional discovery and for a new hearing.
On July 31, the trial court granted Castelló's special appearance and dismissed all claims asserted by Hellmund without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court also struck all of Hellmund's evidence submitted with both her initial and supplemental responses:
Hellmund timely appealed.
Hellmund presents two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by granting Castelló's special appearance; and (2) whether the trial court erred by striking hersupplemental evidence as untimely filed. She does not challenge the trial court's order striking the evidence attached to her initial response. We first clarify the universe of evidence before us, then proceed to evaluate whether the court erred in granting the special appearance.
Whether to admit or exclude evidence is within the trial court's sound discretion. Nat'l Liability & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (...
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