Helmer v. Bank of Am., N.A.
| Decision Date | 26 August 2013 |
| Parties | EDWARD SCOTT HELMER, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 37.) In support, Defendant also submitted a Request for Judicial Notice. (Req. for Judicial Notice, ECF 38.) Plaintiff opposed the motion. (Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 40.) Defendant submitted a reply in response. (Def.'s Reply in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 41.) For reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.1
Plaintiff Edward Scott Helmer ("Plaintiff") was the previous owner of property located at 135 Montana Court, Yuba City, CA 95991. (SAC, ECF 34 at ¶ 2.) Defendant Bank of America, N.A., ("Defendant") is a diversified financial corporation engaged in residential mortgage banking and other related businesses. (ECF 34 at ¶ 3.)
In or around 2005, Plaintiff entered into a mortgage agreement with Countrywide Lending to purchase a house at 135 Montana Court, Yuba City, CA 95991. (ECF 34 at ¶¶ 2, 6.) Defendant subsequently acquired Plaintiff's mortgage via merger with BAC Home Loans LP, formerly known as Countrywide Home Loans Servicing. (ECF 34 at ¶¶ 3, 6.) In January 2011, Plaintiff contacted Defendant to negotiate a possible loan modification. (ECF 34 at ¶ 7.) Defendant allegedly suggested that Plaintiff should cease making his mortgage payments in order to qualify for a loan modification and reassured him that it would not initiate foreclosure proceedings during this process. (ECF 34 at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff alleges that he subsequently began purposefully skipping his mortgage payments while he waited for the necessary loan modification paperwork from Defendant. (ECF 34 at ¶ 7.) Later that month, Plaintiff also applied for a refinance of his mortgage after Defendant notified him that he qualified. (ECF 34 at ¶ 10.)
After Plaintiff repeatedly contacted Defendant for six months, he finally received, and subsequently submitted, the loan modification paperwork in July 2011. (ECF 34 at ¶¶ 8-9.) During these conversations, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant continuously advised him to not make any mortgage payments until he received a loan modification offer. (ECF 34 at ¶ 8.)
Over the next few months, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant delayed or disregarded his attempts to complete his loan modification application. (ECF 34 at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant never gave him definitive updates, transferred him between numerous phone lines, and placed him on hold for such lengths of time that Plaintiff was no longer able to maintain calls. (ECF 34 at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant repeatedly claimed to have lost his documents and repeatedly forced him to resubmit the materials for his loan modificationapplication. (ECF 34 at ¶ 11.)
In September 2011, Defendant initiated foreclosure proceedings against Plaintiff by filing a Notice of Default ("NOD"). (ECF 34 at ¶ 12; see also ECF 38-9 at 2-4.) When Plaintiff sought clarification regarding the NOD, Defendant allegedly told Plaintiff that he need not worry because it had not yet made a decision on his loan modification application. (ECF 34 at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff allegedly offered to reinstate his loan by tendering his arrears of approximately $30,000, but Defendant allegedly told him it was unnecessary because his home would not face foreclosure proceedings. (ECF 34 at ¶ 12.)
In December 2011, Plaintiff received a Notice of Trustee's Sale ("NTS"). (ECF 34 at ¶ 13; see also ECF 38-10 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant again told him to ignore the NTS because his application was still in review. (ECF 34 at ¶ 13.) Defendant allegedly also told Plaintiff that his reinstatement offer was unnecessary because the sale would not take place. (ECF 34 at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff states that despite these assurances, Defendant foreclosed upon and sold Plaintiff's property even though he allegedly could have reinstated his arrears had Defendant not deceived him. (ECF 34 at ¶ 14.)
Defendant requests that the court take judicial notice of several documents recorded with the Sutter County Recorder and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California. (ECF 38 at 2.) Plaintiff does not oppose this request. In resolving a motion to dismiss, courts may consider matters that are subject to judicial notice, which includes matters of public record. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). This includes records of a country recorder. See Grant v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (). Courts may also take notice of proceedings in other courts if they have a direct relation to the matters at issue. United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Because the Sutter County Recorder's documents (ECF 38-1 through ECF 38-12) are records of an administrative body andPlaintiff's wife's Voluntary Petition for Bankruptcy (ECF 38-13) is a matter directly related to these proceedings, the court takes judicial notice of these documents.
Plaintiff filed his first complaint on February 15, 2013, in California State Superior Court for the County of Sutter, asserting claims for: (1) Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (2) Promissory Estoppel, (3) Wrongful Foreclosure in Violation of California Civil Code § 2924 et seq, (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ("IIED"), and (5) Unfair Competition under California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. (See Def.'s Notice of Removal, ECF 1-2.) On March 22, 2012, Defendant removed the matter to this court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint ("FAC") as a matter of course under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) on April 26, 2012, asserting the following claims: (1) Breach of Good Faith and Fair dealing, (2) Promissory Estoppel, (3) Wrongful Foreclosure in violation of California Civil Code § 2924, et seq., (4) IIED, (5) Unfair Competition pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq., and (6) Quiet Title. (ECF 13 at 5-11.)
On July 13, 2012, Defendant moved to dismiss all six claims asserted in the FAC. (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 17.) On March 22, 2013, the court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion. (See generally Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 29.) Specifically, the court dismissed Plaintiff's claims for Wrongful Foreclosure, IIED, and Unfair Competition with leave to amend. (ECF 29 at 11.) The court also dismissed Plaintiff's claims for Quiet Title and Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing without leave to amend. (ECF 29 at 11.) The court, however, denied Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for promissory estoppel. (ECF 29 at 11.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed his SAC on April 12, 2013, asserting the following claims: (1) Promissory Estoppel, (2) Wrongful Foreclosure pursuant to California Civil Code § 2924, et seq., (3) IIED, and (4) Unfair Competition under California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq. (See ECF 34 at 5-9.)
On May 6, 2013, Defendant moved to dismiss the SAC's second, third, and fourth claims for wrongful foreclosure, IIED, and unfair competition.2 (ECF 37 at 2.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to state plausible claims and did not remedy the complaint's deficiencies identified by the court's previous Order. (ECF 37 at 2.) Defendant asserts that the FAC fails to state a claim for Wrongful Foreclosure because Plaintiff does not allege that he can tender the full amount of the secured indebtedness, cannot allege a specific violation of California Civil Code § 2924, et seq., and fails to establish prejudice. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 37-1 at 6.) Defendant also maintains that Plaintiff's claim for IIED does not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendant's conduct was "extreme and outrageous," and that Defendant intended to inflict emotional distress. (ECF 37-1 at 6-7.) Defendant further insists that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for Unfair Competition because Plaintiff's predicate claims fail and because Plaintiff does not specify which prong of the statute Defendant violated. (ECF 37-1 at 7.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). "This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the complaint. RetailClerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege "'specific facts' beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that...
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