Helms v. Austin

• Decision Date: 23 April 1895
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: HELMS et al. v. AUSTIN et al.

21 S.E. 556

116 N.C. 751

HELMS et al.

v.AUSTIN et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 23, 1895.

Deed of Gift—Construction — Fee-Simple Estate—Partition—Proceeding before Clerk —Reformation of Deed—Delivery.

1. A deed by E. S., of the first part, and S. S., "his wife, and her heirs, named on the back of the deed, " of the other part, conveyed to the wife and her "children" certain land. The deed was executed for the purpose of providing for the grantor's family, a life estate being reserved by him. On the back of the deed, after the indorsement of the names of the children, was indorsed the provision that, if the wife had any other children, they should have an equal share with the above "heirs." Held, that the wife and children took a fee simple.

2. Though, in an action for partition before the clerk, he cannot reform the deed under which plaintiffs claim, yet the superior court, in case the action is transferred or appealed to it, may grant such relief.

3. Where a voluntary deed acknowledged for the purpose of registration is recorded, the grantor's subsequent declarations are inadmissible to disprove its delivery.

4. The presumption of the delivery of a voluntary deed by a father tor his wife and children, in which he reserves a life estate, arising from the fact of registry, is not overcome by the fact that the grantor retained possession of the deed and of the land which he listed for taxation, and. by an indorsement on the deed by the probate judge reciting that "the cause of my giving my lands to my family by deed, as well as by will, is in order to give the courses and distances of the same."

5. The "Rule in Shelley's Case" has no application to a conveyance of land by a father to his wife and her "children."

Appeal from superior court, Union county, Winston, Judge.

Special proceeding by T. A. Helms and others against M. C. Austin and others for reformation of deed, and for partition of land. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Shepherd & Busbee and F. I. Osborne, for appellants.

Burwell, Walker & Cansler, for appellees.

FAIRCLOTH, C. J. This was an action for partition before the clerk, and was trans-ferred to the superior court The defendants denied that the plaintiffs had any interest in the land to be divided, which was equivalent to the plea of "sole seisin." The question arises upon three deeds made by Ennis Staton, of the first part, and "Sarah Staton, his wife, and her heirs, named on the back of this deed, of the other part, " the said Ennis Staton reserving his life estate in the lands conveyed, and the consideration named is love and affection. On the back of each deed is indorsed the names of the several children of the grantor, the plaintiff's name being one each time. In the third deed the conveyance is to "Sarah Staton, his wife, and her children, " and in the indorsement on the back thereof, after repeating the names of the same children as in the other two, it is stated, "and, if the said Sarah Staton should ever have any other child or children, that he or they shall have an equal share with the above heirs." These deeds are dated September 13, 14, and 15, 1869, and were registered, after probate, on August 26, 1870, and September 2, 1870.

It is a well-known rule that if two constructions can be put on a deed, or any part of it, that shall be given to it which is most beneficial to the grantee. These deeds were inartificially drawn, using the words "heirs" and "children" indifferently, by one having no legal conception of their technical meaning, but the intent is clear. It would be unreasonable to assume that the father, in providing for his family, meant to give them only a life estate leaving the fee undisposed of, after reserving his own life estate. We are entirely satisfied from the context and from the nature and purposes of the deed that it was the intention of Ennis Staton to convey a fee simple to his wife and children, and we declare that to be the effect of each of the deeds. Fullbright v. Yoder, 113 N: G. 456, 18 S. E. 713; Holmes v. Holmes, 86 N. C. 205; Vickers v. Leigh, 104 N. C. 257, 10 S. E. 308; Pritchard v. Bailey, 113 N. G. 521, 18 S. E. 668.

Here we might rest this branch of the case, but the plaintiffs prayed the court, in the event that the deeds did not convey a fee-simple estate, to be allowed to reform the deeds...