Helms v. Helten

• Decision Date: 23 April 1980
• Docket Number: No. 62820,62820
• Parties: Algene M. HELMS, Individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of Carl M. Helms, and Carla A. Lamphere, Appellees, v. Anna M. HELTEN, Louise Cummings, Walter Cummings, Edward Helms and Henry Helms, Appellants, Edward Helms, Counterclaimant-Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 876

290 N.W.2d 876

Algene M. HELMS, Individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of Carl M. Helms, and Carla A. Lamphere, Appellees, v. Anna M. HELTEN, Louise Cummings, Walter Cummings, Edward Helms and Henry Helms, Appellants Edward Helms, Counterclaimant-Appellant.

No. 62820.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 23, 1980.

George Lindeman of Lindeman & Yagla, Waterloo, for appellants.

Donald H. Gloe of Miller, Pearson, Gloe & Burns, Decorah, and M. S. O'Brien of O'Brien Law Firm, P. C., Oelwein, for appellees.

Considered en banc.

REES, Justice.

The defendants and the counterclaimant appeal from judgments entered in favor of plaintiffs in their action to quiet title to certain farmland. Edward Helms appeals from an adverse judgment on his counterclaim to recover the proceeds from the sale of crops from farmland separate from that involved in the plaintiffs' original action.

On January 20, 1977 Algene Helms, both individually and as the administrator of the estate of Carl Helms, and her daughter, Carla Lamphere, filed their petition in equity against the defendants to quiet title to a 105-acre tract of farmland or, alternatively, to establish Algene's dower interest in the property. The defendants and the counterclaimant are brothers, sisters, and a brother-in-law of Carl Helms, the common law husband of Algene. On August 5, 1977 defendant Edward Helms filed his counterclaim for one-half of the net proceeds from the 1975 crops on a 240-acre farm which he had held with Carl in joint tenancy with right of survivorship. In response, plaintiffs asserted the six-month statute of limitations for claims against estates, § 633.410, The Code 1977, as a defense.

Following trial to the court, Edward moved to amend his counterclaim to conform to proof, asserting that he was entitled to all the proceeds from the sale of the 1975 crops. His motion was overruled on October 30, 1978, the court concluding that the record did not support such an amendment. At the same time the court ruled on the merits of the controversy, quieting title in the plaintiffs and dismissing the counterclaim. Notice of appeal from these rulings was filed on November 29, 1978.

The factual underpinnings of this dispute are somewhat involved and require a brief recitation, with subsequent elaboration as needed.

In 1954 Carl Helms began cohabiting with Mrs. Don (Algene) Wittenberg, who had recently been divorced. A daughter, Carla, a plaintiff in the action, was born to the couple in January of 1955. Carl and Algene lived together until Carl's death on October 2, 1975, but never formalized their union by a ceremonial marriage. In its findings of fact the trial court found Algene to be Carl's common law wife at all times material to this appeal.

The 105-acre parcel of land in dispute was initially owned by Albert Helms, who, as shall become apparent, did not approve of Carl's relationship with Algene. Albert was the father of Carl, Anna M. Helton, Louise Cummings, Edward Helms and Henry Helms. In 1957 Albert executed a will devising the 105-acre farm to Carl "as long as he refrains from marrying or associating with in any way Mrs. Don Wittenberg". Albert Helms died in 1967, after which his will was probated. The final report in his estate makes no mention of the condition attached to Carl's inheritance of the 105-acre tract of land.

In June of 1968 Carl joined in the execution of a warranty deed conveying the farm in question to the defendants, his brothers and sisters and their spouses, who would have taken the farm under the will upon the enforcement of the limitation on Carl's devise. The conveyance was expressly made subject to the life use of the premises by Carl Helms. The deed made reference to consideration of "one dollar and other valuable consideration". The marital status of all those joining in the instrument, with the exception of Carl, was noted on the face of the deed. No reference was made in the instrument to Carl's marital status, although all of the parties to the transaction knew of Carl's relationship with Algene. The deed was recorded in May of 1969. The testimony of the parties to the transaction indicated that Carl was given the life estate in the premises in lieu of the enforcement of the condition contained in the will because his siblings felt it inequitable that Carl should be wholly deprived of the devise in his father's will. It is this conveyance which Algene sought to set aside or, in the alternative, against which she asserted her dower interest.

The counterclaim of Edward Helms involves crop income from a 240-acre farm owned by Carl and Edward in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, which was rented to a neighbor in 1975 on a crop-share basis. In June and December of 1976 Algene, as administrator of Carl's estate, received two checks from a grain elevator for grain sold from the premises totaling $29,631.77 as the landlord's share of the corn and beans harvested from the farm in 1975. This money was taken into the estate of Carl and eventually distributed to Algene and Carla.

At trial, the farm tenant on the 240-acre farm testified to his estimated expenses per acre for the corn and bean crops. After the evidence was in Edward sought to amend his counterclaim to conform to proof, claiming that he was entitled to all of the crop proceeds from the farm for that year. His motion to amend to conform to proof was overruled by the trial court in its decree as the trial court found a lack of evidentiary support for the motion.

Numerous issues are stated by the parties for review. We find resolution of the following issues essential to disposition of this appeal:

(1) Did the condition attached to the devise of the farm to Carl Helms in his father's will prevent his ever taking title to the farm?

(2) Was plaintiffs' action, begun more than five years but less than ten years after the execution of the deed in question, barred by the five-year limitation for fraud or permitted under the ten-year period of limitation for the recovery of real estate?

(3) Was the trial court correct in setting aside the deed of conveyance between Carl and the defendants due to illegality of consideration?

(4) If the consideration for the transaction was not illegal, did Algene retain a dower interest in the farm due to the fact she had not joined in the deed of conveyance?

(5) Was the trial court correct in finding for plaintiffs on the counterclaim for crop proceeds on the alternative grounds that the claim was barred by section 633.410, The Code, or that the counterclaimant had failed to carry the burden of proving the net rental value of the premises?

I. As this action to quiet title was brought in equity, our review is de novo. We will give weight to the findings of the district court, but are not bound by them. Hansen v. Chapin, 232 N.W.2d 506, 509 (Iowa 1975).

The defendants first contend that title to the 105-acre farm never vested in Carl due to his alleged violation of the condition attached to the devise in his father's will. They argue that since the farm never belonged to Carl, he had no interest to transfer in the deed in which he joined, and Algene has no basis for her claimed dower interest in the property. Algene responds by arguing that the limitation on the devise is a condition subsequent which is not self-executing, but must be specifically enforced to have effect. Since there is no indication in the record that the condition was enforced, she contends that Carl took the property under the will. We find Algene's position persuasive, as did the trial court.

Paragraph seven of the will of Albert Helms provides:

Seventh: I give, devise and bequeath to my son, Carl Helms, of Winthrop, Iowa, as long as he refrains from marrying or associating with in any way, Mrs. Don Wittenberg, the following described real estate:

The Northwest fractional Quarter ( 1/4) of the Northwest Quarter ( 1/4) and the West Half ( 1/2) of the Northeast fractional Quarter ( 1/4) of the Northwest Quarter ( 1/4) of Section Six (6), Township Eighty-nine (89) North, Range Seven (7), and the Southeast Quarter ( 1/4) of the Northeast Quarter ( 1/4) of Section One (1), Township Eighty-nine (89) North, Range Eight (8), all West of the 5th P.M., in Buchanan County, Iowa, except easement for road, if living, if not, then to his child or children or adopted child or children in equal shares, who may be living at the time of my death; in the event he has no child or children or adopted child or children living at the time of my death, then to my living sons and daughters in equal shares, further in the event that he does associate with or marry Mrs. Don Wittenberg then the last above described real estate shall go to my sons and daughters in equal shares, if living, and if not, then to their respective children or adopted children in equal shares who may be living at the time of my death; in the event any of them has no child or children or adopted child or children living at the time of my death, then to my living sons and daughters in equal shares.

The devise vested title to the farm in Carl subject to the associational limitation. Thus Carl took the farm subject to a condition subsequent. As we explained in a similar situation:

It will be noted that Item VII, while first giving to the plaintiff what, standing alone, would be a fee simple absolute, closes with the words "subject to the contingency as hereinafter set forth". This makes the title granted subject to a condition or conditions. It creates what is variously known in the law as a conditional, or defeasible, or base or qualified fee.

Rodenburg v. Rodenburg, 247 Iowa 444, 447, 74 N.W.2d 241, 243 (1956). The will of Albert Helms gave to Carl a defeasible interest in the farm.

The import of the limitation in Albert's will being a condition subsequent cannot be overstated. It is clearly the law in this state that a testamentary condition subsequent is not self-executing and...