Helms v. Hewitt, 85-5254
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
| Citation | 780 F.2d 367 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-5254,85-5254 |
| Parties | Aaron HELMS v. Lowell D. HEWITT, Supt.; B.B. Kyler, Co III; R.E. Stotelmyer, Major; B.K. Smith, Counselor III; K.R. Hileman, Farm Manager; D.R. Erhard, Deputy Supt. for Treatment; T.W. Henry, Director of Treatment; W.W. Mateer, C.I., Manager. Appeal of Aaron HELMS. |
| Decision Date | 03 January 1986 |
Page 367
v.
Lowell D. HEWITT, Supt.; B.B. Kyler, Co III; R.E.
Stotelmyer, Major; B.K. Smith, Counselor III; K.R.
Hileman, Farm Manager; D.R. Erhard, Deputy Supt. for
Treatment; T.W. Henry, Director of Treatment; W.W. Mateer,
C.I., Manager.
Appeal of Aaron HELMS.
Third Circuit.
Decided Jan. 3, 1986.
Robert H. Vesely (Argued), John M. Humphrey, Rieders, Travis, Mussina, Humphrey & Harris, Williamsport, Pa., for appellant.
Page 368
Francis R. Filipi (Argued), Office of Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, Pa., for appellee.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SLOVITER and MANSMANN, Circuit Judges.
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from the district court's denial of plaintiff's petition for attorney's fees filed pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 (1981), after the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The underlying action involved the plaintiff's claim that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated by the defendants' actions when he was confined to administrative segregation. The district court denied the plaintiff's fee application because it found that the plaintiff was not a prevailing party for purposes of section 1988. We reverse and remand to the district court for a hearing and computation of the amount of a fee award.
I.
The plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against officials of the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. In his complaint, the plaintiff protested his confinement in administrative segregation by the defendants after they alleged that he had assaulted a prison employee and participated in a riot. The plaintiff expounded three theories by which his due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by that confinement. Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487, 491-92 (3d Cir.1981) ("Helms I" ) (subsequent history omitted). First, Helms claimed that Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections' regulations governing administrative segregation established the process due under the Fourteenth Amendment and that the failure to accord him that process violated his constitutional rights. Second, the plaintiff asserted that the state's prison regulations created a liberty interest of which he could be deprived only by constitutionally mandated due process. Third, Helms argued that a finding of guilt resting on a hearsay account of uncorroborated information from a single unidentified informant contravenes principles of fundamental fairness implicit in the Due Process Clause.
The plaintiff requested the entry of declaratory judgment, "declaring plaintiff's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 violated as more specifically set forth in this Complaint." The plaintiff also prayed for the entry of a permanent injunction, a reversal of his disciplinary conviction, monetary relief and "such other relief as may be necessary and proper."
After discovery was closed, the district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed that decision, and we reversed. Helms I, 655 F.2d 487 (3d Cir.1981). We found that the state regulations had created an expectancy or entitlement which rose to the level of a protected liberty interest. We held that "Helms was denied due process unless he was afforded a hearing, within a reasonable time of his initial confinement, to determine whether he represented the type of 'risk' warranting administrative detention." Id. at 500. We also concluded that "Helms suffered a denial of due process by being convicted on a misconduct charge when the only evidence offered against him was a hearsay recital, by the charging officer, of an uncorroborated report of an unidentified informant." Id. at 502. The case was remanded to the district court to determine whether Helms had been afforded a hearing satisfying the requirements of due process and to decide whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the unconstitutional use of the hearsay report.
The United States Supreme Court granted the defendants' petition for writ of certiorari and reversed. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). The Supreme Court agreed that the state regulations created a constitutionally protected liberty interest. The Court
Page 369
held, however, that the plaintiff had been afforded sufficient due process after being confined to administrative segregation. The Supreme Court was not asked to review our finding that the defendants' use of the hearsay report violated the Constitution.Following the Supreme Court's decision, we remanded the case to the district court for resolution of the question of qualified immunity on the hearsay issue. Helms v. Hewitt, 712 F.2d 48, 49 (3d Cir.1983) ("Helms II" ). The district court subsequently found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and entered judgment against the plaintiff. We affirmed without opinion. Helms v. Hewitt, 745 F.2d 46 (3d Cir.1984) (aff'ing mem.) ("Helms III" ).
During the course of this litigation the Bureau of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania issued Administrative Directive 801: Inmate Disciplinary Procedures. This directive, effective May 1, 1984, detailed for the first time the procedures to be followed with respect to the use of confidential source information.
On December 7, 1984, the plaintiff filed the petition for attorney's fees which is the subject of this appeal. The district court denied that petition.
II.
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [section 1983] .... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 (1981). Congress enacted section 1988 because it believed that fee awards are essential to the private enforcement of the civil rights laws.
If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed with...
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