Muhammad v. Butler
| Decision Date | 13 January 1987 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 84-1822. |
| Parties | Lloyd A.R. MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. Joseph E. BUTLER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Stanley J. Hausman, Caldwell, N.J., for plaintiff.
Catherine M. Brown, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen. of N.J., Trenton, N.J., for defendants.
In this action by a prisoner alleging a procedural due process violation, defendants object to Magistrate Hedges' report and recommendation of November 18, 1986. The court affirms and adopts the Magistrate's recommendation.
Plaintiff, Lloyd Muhammad, a prisoner at Rahway, is serving a life term for murder. On August 12, 1984, plaintiff was transferred from Rahway Camp to the prison, and on September 12, 1984, his custody status was increased from "full minimum" to "gang minimum." The prison took this action to discipline plaintiff for allegedly planning to escape. The disciplinary charge was based on a telephone call from a former acquaintance of plaintiff that warned prison authorities of plaintiff's alleged plans to escape.
In an order and opinion filed December 5, 1985, 655 F.Supp. 1466, this court held that the prison's actions violated the due process rights of plaintiff. The court granted plaintiff preliminary injunctive relief and ordered that he be restored to full minimum custody status "unless a formal disciplinary hearing is forthwith conducted pursuant to Department of Corrections Standard 254."
On February 4, 1986, Michael Wiechnik, a disciplinary hearing officer for the Department of Corrections, conducted the hearing contemplated in the court's order. Prior to the hearing, Muhammad had been informed that he was charged with planning to escape and that the charge was based on "information from civilian Esther Williams." See Exhibit Joint-1 from Magistrate's hearing of October 23, 1986.
The principal evidence against plaintiff was a telephone call from the above-mentioned Ms. Williams, a former girlfriend of plaintiff. During the phone call of August 30, 1984, Ms. Williams informed Rahway investigator Ortiz that plaintiff was attempting to escape. Wiechnik had listened to a tape recording of this conversation prior to the hearing. At the hearing, Wiechnik did not play the tape recording; Wiechnik told plaintiff what he considered to be the relevant statements. Plaintiff introduced, in response, three letters from Williams to plaintiff, indicating that Williams was upset with plaintiff. Plaintiff suggested that Williams had fabricated the story of planned escape in response to plaintiff's having broken off their relationship.
Wiechnik was uncertain about Muhammad's guilt or innocence at the conclusion of the February 4 hearing. He advised Muhammad that he would undertake a further investigation and offered Muhammad the opportunity to take a polygraph test. Wiechnik then adjourned the hearing.
In the interim, Muhammad refused to take the polygraph test, on advice of his attorney. Muhammad was reluctant to sign the necessary waiver form for the test.
Wiechnik obtained a transcript of the phone conversation. Wiechnik did not advise Muhammad of the existence of the transcript. Wiechnik also obtained a statement from investigator Ortiz regarding Ms. Williams' credibility. Ortiz stated that he believed Ms. Williams, because she referred to information that she could not have known unless an inmate had told her. (Apparently, this information is that an inmate's clothing and money are taken from them upon entering prison.)
The hearing resumed on March 11, 1986. At the hearing, Wiechnik marked in evidence the following items: the tape recording itself, a transcript of the recording, the original Internal Affairs report of the phone call and charge, the memorandum from Ortiz on Williams' credibility, and documents relating to plaintiff's failure to take the polygraph examination. Wiechnik marked all of these items as confidential— plaintiff was given no opportunity to see the documents. Wiechnik made no independent determination whether the documents were confidential, but relied solely on the Department of Corrections finding that the documents should be treated as confidential. The "Adjudication of Disciplinary Charge" states that the materials were withheld from the inmate "to preserve source/security." Exhibit J-2.
At the resumed hearing, Wiechnik found Muhammad guilty. Apparently, Wiechnik found Ms. Williams' to be credible. Wiechnik's reports contain no reference to plaintiff's failure to take the polygraph examination.
In an order dated July 15, 1986, this court referred to Magistrate Hedges the question of whether the hearing conducted by Wiechnik afforded plaintiff appropriate due process protections. Magistrate Hedges conducted a hearing on October 23, 1986; plaintiff Muhammad and Michael Wiechnik testified.
The Magistrate issued a report and recommendation on November 18, 1986. The Magistrate found that the disciplinary hearing afforded plaintiff was not consistent with federal constitutional due process concerns, because of Wiechnik's use of confidential information. The Magistrate also found that the hearing raised questions under state law, but that the eleventh amendment, as interpreted by the Pennhurst decision, bars this court from addressing these concerns. The Magistrate recommended that Muhammad be restored to minimum custody forthwith, that his claims for injunctive relief under state law be dismissed, and the court address Muhammad's claims for damages, if any.
The defendants object to the magistrate's recommendation of injunctive relief under federal law. Plaintiff has offered no objection to the report and recommendation.
Defendants specifically object to two aspects of the report and recommendation. First, defendants object to the Magistrate's conclusion of law that the hearing officer, by his use of "confidential" information, violated plaintiff's federal due process rights. Second, defendants object to the recommended remedy of restoring plaintiff to minimum custody, because any error committed was not outcome-determinative, and thus harmless.
The magistrate's conclusion that plaintiff was denied due process rested on two findings. First, it is undisputed that Wiechnik made no independent determination to treat any document as confidential, even though the applicable regulations vested him with such discretion. Second, the magistrate found that no credible reasons are presented in the record to justify the confidentiality finding by the Department of Corrections (which Wiechnik adopted). Report and Recommendation, at 1481. The magistrate concluded that these actions violated the limited due process requirements for prison disciplinary hearings set forth by the Supreme Court. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487 (3d Cir.1981).
Defendants claim that the procedure employed by Wiechnik—relating portions of the confidential documents that Wiechnik deemed relevant to plaintiff at the hearing—is constitutionally sufficient. Defendants stress that plaintiff knew of the charges against him by Ms. Williams and that he had an opportunity to respond at the hearing. Defendants contend that the magistrate's ruling conflicts with the holding of Wolff that a prisoner is not entitled to rights of confrontation or cross examination in a disciplinary hearing. Defendants claim that "plaintiff's right to present a defense was not in any way abridged by the failure of the hearing officer to permit him to examine the documentary evidence." Defendants' objections to magistrate's report, at 6.
The court finds defendants' position untenable. The sole evidence against plaintiff was the telephone conversation between Ms. Williams and Investigator Ortiz. Plaintiff was never given the opportunity to hear this conversation or to read the transcript. Plaintiff had some opportunity to respond to Ms. Williams general allegation, but his right to present a defense was clearly abridged by his inability to review these statements.
In determining what process is due a prisoner in a disciplinary hearing, a court must "adjust the tensions between the necessity for efficient and orderly administration of state prisons on the one hand and the protection of important constitutional interests of their inmates on the other." Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487, 489 (3d Cir.1981). Legitimate concerns of prison administration may justify deviation from the traditional due process model. Thus, prison officials can refuse to disclose confidential documents if disclosure would impair prison control or jeopardize informants. See Calloway v. Fauver, 544 F.Supp. 584, 604 (D.N.J.1982). In this case, however, no legitimate rationale has been offered for the refusal to disclose the tape or transcript of the Williams conversation. The proferred reason—"to preserve/protect security"—is unpersuasive given that the prison authorities had earlier informed plaintiff that Williams' statements were the basis for the charge.
Unquestionably, plaintiff was given some opportunity to respond to the evidence against him. Such limited opportunity might be constitutionally sufficient if the limitations were taken in aid of a legitimate concern of prison administration. However, even a prisoner, with his curtailed constitutional protection, has a right to be free from arbitrary government action. The prison authorities cannot arbitrarily limit the plaintiff's rights, simply because they have afforded him some procedural protections.
The court affirms and adopts the Magistrate's conclusion that the hearing officer's use of confidential information violated the plaintiff's due process rights.
Defendants contend that any error made by the hearing officer was harmless, and therefore cannot be the basis for preliminary relief. Defend...
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