Helms v. Tennessee Dept. of Safety

• Decision Date: 25 January 1999
• Citation: 987 S.W.2d 545
• Parties: Thurston Andrew HELMS, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY, Defendant/Appellee.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 545

987 S.W.2d 545

Thurston Andrew HELMS, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY, Defendant/Appellee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee,

at Nashville.

Jan. 25, 1999.

Rehearing Denied April 12, 1999.

E.E. Edwards, III, James A. Simmons, Edwards & Simmons, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant.

John Knox Walkup, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Albert L. Partee, III, Senior Counsel, Paula D. Godsey, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.

OPINION

BARKER, Justice.

We granted this appeal to determine if Article I, section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution affords the right to a jury trial in cases under Tenn.Code Ann. § 53-11-451 (Supp.1992), involving the forfeiture of personal property. The Court of Appeals held that Thurston Andrew Helms, the appellant and owner of the forfeited property in this action, was not entitled to a jury trial. We affirm the judgment of the court below and conclude that in Tennessee there is no right to a jury trial in statutory proceedings involving the forfeiture of personal property.

BACKGROUND

On May 4, 1992, Nashville police officers seized seven packets of cocaine and other drug paraphernalia from Mr. Helms' residence at 3447 Golf Club Lane. The Davidson County Criminal Court issued an ex parte order of seizure, pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 45-2-706 (Supp.1992), requiring NationsBank to freeze $30,808.09 in three of Mr. Helms' bank accounts. The trial court found probable cause to believe that the money was traceable to Mr. Helms' alleged illegal drug trade.

Following two hearings attended by Mr. Helms and his lawyer, the trial court determined that the money was subject to forfeiture under Tenn.Code Ann. § 53-11-451 (Supp.1992). The trial court directed NationsBank to surrender the money to the police at which point the police were to prepare and deliver the required notices of seizure. NationsBank complied with the court order by sending the police two cashier's checks, one for $30,808.09 and a second for $215.06. The police prepared a notice of seizure for each check identifying Mr. Helms as the owner of the seized money and listing his address as 3447 Golf Club Lane. The two notices were sent to the post office to be delivered by certified mail to the Golf Club Lane address.

During that time, Mr. Helms filed a change of address with the post office, listing his new residence as 286 April Lane. The post office delivered the two notices of seizure to the April Lane address on separate dates. Mr. Helms signed for the notice concerning the $215.06; however, no one was available at his residence to sign for the notice concerning the $30,808.09. The post office left a note at the April Lane address stating that the certified letter could be picked up at the local post office. Approximately one week later, the post office left a second notice at the residence and thereafter returned the certified letter to the police when Mr. Helms failed to retrieve it.

Mr. Helms did not file a timely claim for the money, and consequently, the entire $31,023.15 was forfeited without an administrative hearing. Mr. Helms' lawyer requested the Commissioner of Safety to reconsider the forfeiture order and to provide a hearing on the merits. When the request was denied, Mr. Helms filed a petition for review in the Davidson County Chancery Court alleging that the forfeiture statutes were unconstitutional on their face and as applied to him. He challenged the forfeiture on grounds that he did not receive adequate notice and that he was denied the right to a jury trial as guaranteed by Article I, section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution.

In a bench trial, the chancery court upheld the forfeiture and determined that Mr. Helms had received adequate notice of the forfeiture proceedings and that he did not have the right to a jury trial under the forfeiture statutes. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

On appeal, Mr. Helms contends that the statutes governing the forfeiture of personal property denied his right to a jury trial under the Tennessee Constitution. The Department of Safety, (D.O.S.), argues for the first time that this Court is without jurisdiction to determine the merits of Mr. Helms' claim because Mr. Helms failed to raise it in a contested case hearing before the D.O.S. Mr. Helms filed a claim for the money approximately twelve days after the Commissioner of Safety issued the order of forfeiture. Mr. Helms raised the constitutional issue of the right to a jury trial in his petition for judicial review in the chancery court and in the Court of Appeals. ¹

Although it appears from the record that Mr. Helms was untimely in both his claim for the money and his petition for judicial review, the D.O.S. waited throughout the proceedings in chancery court and the Court of Appeals to raise any objection concerning timeliness. We, therefore, conclude that the D.O.S. has waived any defense that it might otherwise have had in that regard.

DISCUSSION

In this case, we must determine whether the statutory forfeitures of personal property may be conducted without jury trials. The forfeiture of personal property in drug-related cases is governed by the Drug Control Act. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 53-11-451 (Supp.1992). Forfeitures under that statute are conducted by administrative agencies under the procedures contained in Tenn.Code Ann. § 53-11-201 (Supp.1992) and Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-33-201 to -214 (1997). Those statutes provide public hearings when persons claim an interest in the seized property. Neither statute allows for a jury trial. Although Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-33-201 to -214 did not yet exist at the time of the forfeiture in this case, ² we shall review it together with Tenn.Code Ann. § 53-11-201 in addressing Mr. Helms' constitutional claim.

During the times relevant in this case, the forfeiture proceedings were provided in Tenn.Code Ann. § 53-11-201 (Supp.1992). Mr. Helms was required to file a timely claim with the Commissioner of Safety if he wished to claim an interest in the seized property. Tenn.Code Ann. § 53-11-201(c)(1). ³ Claimants were entitled to a public hearing before the Commissioner of Safety in which the State had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the property should be forfeited. Tenn.Code Ann. § 53-11-201(d)(1)(A)--(2). Any party aggrieved by the Commissioner's decision had the right to seek judicial review in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, with review limited to the administrative record and conducted without a jury in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-322(a)(1), (b)(1), (g) (Supp.1992).

Similar to those proceedings, the new procedure codified at Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-33-201--214 (Supp.1994), follows an administrative model for the forfeiture of property. Persons seeking to contest forfeiture of personal property under the Drug Control Act must file a timely claim with the Commissioner of Safety. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-33-206 (1997). Claimants are then entitled to a contested case hearing under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act in which the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property at issue is subject to forfeiture. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-33-209(d), 210(a). The party dissatisfied with the Commissioner's final order may seek judicial review by filing a written notice in either the circuit or chancery court of Davidson County. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-33-213(c) (1997). Judicial review is conducted without a jury and is limited to the administrative record, except to the extent that Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 4-5-322(e) and 322(g) permit the introduction of additional evidence.

Mr. Helms contends that the forfeiture statutes violate Article I, section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution because they do not provide for jury trials in the public hearings or judicial review. We disagree.

Article I, section 6 of our Constitution does not guarantee the right to a jury trial in every case. The text of that provision reads, "[t]hat the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and no religious or political test shall ever be required as a qualification for jurors." This right has been interpreted to be a trial by jury as it existed at common law, Marler v. Wear, 117 Tenn. 244, 246, 96 S.W. 447, 448 (1906), or more specifically, "the common law under the laws and constitution of North Carolina at the time of the adoption of the Tennessee Constitution of 1796." Patten v. State, 221 Tenn. 337, 344, 426 S.W.2d 503 506 (Tenn.1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 844, 91 S.Ct. 88, 27 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970). For rights and remedies created after the formation of our Constitution, the legislature is free to enact procedures that do not include jury trials. Newport Housing Authority v. Ballard, 839 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tenn.1992).

The Court of Appeals has previously addressed whether Article I, section 6 affords the right to a jury trial in forfeitures of personal property. See Jones v. Greene, 946 S.W.2d 817, 823-24 (Tenn.App.1996). ⁴ In an opinion by Judge Koch, the court detailed the history of Tennessee's civil forfeiture law, beginning with the Uniform Narcotic Act of 1937. Id. at 820. That statute established a judicial forfeiture proceeding in which a judge or magistrate presided without a jury on the forfeiture of various narcotic drugs. Id. (citing Tenn.Code Ann. § 52-1315).

As the court in Greene noted, Tennessee's forfeiture laws followed a judicial model until 1955. Id. at 820. In that year, the General Assembly adopted an administrative proceeding in which the Commissioner of Safety was authorized to decide forfeiture claims. Id. at 820-21 (citing Tenn.Code Ann. § 52-1404). Judicial review was available by filing a common-law writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court of Davidson County. Id. at 821 (citing Tenn.Code Ann. § 52-1405). However, in both the initial hearings and judicial review, there was no allowance...