Helpert v. Walsh
| Decision Date | 27 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-40963,17-40963 |
| Parties | STEPHEN J. HELPERT, Plaintiff - Appellant v. STEVEN P. WALSH, Defendant - Appellee |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
*
This case arises out of a motor-vehicle collision between Stephen Helpert and Steven Walsh. Although Walsh admitted the accident was his fault, a jury found he was not negligent. Helpert now appeals the district court's denial of his motion for directed verdict and the subsequent denial of his motion for new trial. We AFFIRM.
The accident occurred in Corpus Christi on July 17, 2014. Walsh, a pilot in the U.S. Coast Guard, was in town to inspect an airplane-housing facility and to obtain flight hours. After leaving work, Walsh became lost and pulled into a parking lot to call a friend for directions. Upon completing the call and reorienting himself, Walsh placed his mobile phone in the center console of his rental vehicle and began moving towards the parking lot's exit. To reach his destination, Walsh needed to turn left out of the parking lot and head south, a maneuver that required him to cross two lanes of northbound traffic. After looking to his left and determining the coast was clear, Walsh began to execute his turn. He did not see Helpert, who was traveling north in the second, innermost lane. Just as Walsh crossed the first lane of oncoming traffic, he struck Helpert's passenger side and, because Helpert's vehicle was still moving, became jammed in the rear wheel of Helpert's vehicle, damaging the tire and surrounding area.
Walsh apologized for the accident and offered to replace Helpert's tire. The pair traveled to several tire stores and Walsh bought a new tire and helped install it on Helpert's vehicle. After completing the installation, Helpert commented the vehicle looked "okay" and drove away. That evening, at the behest of his wife, Helpert went to an emergency room and complained of pain to his knee, back, and neck.
Helpert sued Walsh in Texas state court for several million dollars. Walsh removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Settlement attempts failed and the case went to a jury. During trial, Walsh admitted that he caused the accident, failed to keep a proper lookout, and failed to yield the right of way. On balance, however, Walsh also testified that he stopped, looked, and proceeded to cross the road only after he believed the coast was clear; he further explained that Helpert might have been in his blind spot, thus escapinghis view. Much of Helpert's testimony concerned the extent of the injuries he suffered as a result of the car accident. Walsh attempted to cast doubt on Helpert's credibility by introducing evidence of Helpert's prior theft convictions, in addition to a post-accident video that showed Helpert using physical force that appeared to rebut the extent of his claimed injuries.
At the close of evidence, Helpert moved for a directed verdict on the question of Walsh's negligence, stating that "the evidence is undisputed as a matter of law, and [Walsh has] admitted that he failed to keep a proper lookout, [] failed to yield to the right of way, and he acknowledged that this wreck was caused by his negligence and failing to do so." Walsh countered that his negligence, if any, was "a fact issue for the jury to determine." The court overruled Helpert's request for a directed verdict. On May 17, 2017, and after deliberating for two hours, a unanimous jury returned a no-negligence verdict for Walsh.
On June 27, 2017, Helpert filed a "motion for judgement [sic] notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, motion for new trial." The district court entered its final judgment two days later, on June 29, 2017, without ruling on Helpert's motions. On July 20, 2017, Helpert filed a second motion for new trial. Believing that Helpert's first motion had been overruled, Walsh filed a motion for clarification to determine whether the district court's June 29 final judgment "was intended to dispose of [Helpert's] motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motions for new trial, and motion to seal, and is a final, appealable judgment[.]" The district court denied Walsh's motion, clarified that its final judgment "was not intended to preclude [Helpert's] post-judgment motion for a new trial," and then overruled Helpert's second motion for new trial. Helpert filed a notice of appeal on September 15, 2017.
We first address Walsh's argument that we lack jurisdiction because Helpert's notice of appeal was untimely. As mentioned, Helpert filed a motion for new trial two days before the district court entered final judgment. Walsh contends the final judgment implicitly and necessarily overruled Helpert's prejudgment motion, thus running the 30-day clock for purposes of filing a notice of appeal. Helpert disagrees; he argues the 30-day period started on August 18, when the district court explicitly denied his second motion for new trial and clarified that its final judgment was not intended to dispose of Helpert's prejudgment motion.
Although a notice of appeal must generally be filed within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order that is being appealed, see FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A), some motions toll the notice-of-appeal clock. If, for example, a party files a motion for a new trial under Rule 59, as Helpert did here, the time to file an appeal runs "from the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion." FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A). The question for us is whether the district court's June 29 final judgment "disposed" of Helpert's prejudgment motion for new trial, thus starting the 30-day appeals clock and causing his September 15 filing to be untimely.
Walsh relies on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Dunn v. Truck World, Inc., which holds that "[w]hen a party files a pre-judgment motion for a new trial, the judgment itself is the order 'denying a new trial'" and that "[f]inal judgment necessarily denies pending motions, and so starts the time for appeal." 929 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1991). Although we have acknowledged the "ample precedent in this Circuit for the proposition that a district court's final judgment may impliedly deny an outstanding motion," we have never held that a final judgment necessarily decides all pending motions. See Perez v. Lucas, 176 F.3d 480, at *2 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (); see also Addington v. Farmer's Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 650 F.2d 663, 666 & n.2 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981). Instead, we employ a case-by-case approach to determine the effect of final judgments on pending motions. See Lapeyrouse v. Texaco, Inc., 670 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1982).
The district court's final judgment did not operate to overrule Helpert's prejudgment motion for new trial so as to start the time to file an appeal because the court clarified its intent and subsequently made a decision on the merits. Under circumstances such as these, "the entry of judgment obviously was not intended to dispose of the motion for new trial." See Greater Hous. Chapter of the Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Eckels, 755 F.2d 426, 428 (5th Cir. 1985) (); see also United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 299 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. 382 U.S. 25 (1965). Of course, a final judgment may operate to impliedly deny a prejudgment motion, as noted by this circuit and other sources.1 But that is not the case here, so we turn to the merits.
"The court reviews de novo a motion for directed verdict, applying the same standard as the district court." X Techs., Inc. v. Marvin Test Sys., Inc., 719 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 2013). "If the facts and inferences point so stronglyand overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motion is proper." Id. (citation omitted). "But 'if reasonable persons could differ in their interpretations of the evidence,' a determination of the issue is for the jury." Id. (quoting Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2005)). In conducting this analysis, we view the facts and draw inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. "Although our review is de novo, 'after a jury trial, the standard of review is especially deferential.'" Williams v. Manitowoc Cranes, L.L.C., 898 F.3d 607, 614 (5th Cir. 2018) ().
Helpert argues the district court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because the evidence established that Walsh was negligent as a matter of law in failing to keep a proper lookout and in failing to yield the right of way. This is so, according to Helpert, because Walsh: (1) admitted he caused the accident; (2) admitted that he did not see Helpert's vehicle; (3) apologized for causing the accident; (4) testified that he failed to keep a proper look out and failed to yield the right of way; and (5) stated that Helpert was not responsible for the accident. Helpert additionally argues that Walsh's statement in the parties' joint pre-trial order that "the July, 2014 accident was his fault" constitutes a judicial admission and is similarly conclusive.
Addressing Helpert's arguments, we conclude the district court did not err in denying Helpert's motion for directed verdict because reasonable persons could differ in their interpretations of the evidence. X Techs., 719 F.3d at 411. Under Texas law, "[a]ll persons have the duty to maintain a proper lookout and to observe in a...
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