Williams v. Manitowoc Cranes, L.L.C.

• Decision Date: 03 August 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-60458,17-60458
• Parties: Wanda WILLIAMS, individually and as Conservator for John Robert Williams, Jr., incapacitated, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. MANITOWOC CRANES, L.L.C., Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

898 F.3d 607

Wanda WILLIAMS, individually and as Conservator for John Robert Williams, Jr., incapacitated, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.MANITOWOC CRANES, L.L.C., Defendant–Appellant.

No. 17-60458

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed August 3, 2018

Desmond V. Tobias, Esq., Bryan E. Comer, Jason S. McCormick, Esq., Tobias, McCormick & Comer, L.L.C., Mobile, AL, Ben F. Galloway, Esq., Owen, Galloway & Myers, P.L.L.C., Gulfport, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Keith Wade McDaniel, McCranie, Sistrunk, Anzelmo, Hardy, McDaniel & Welch, L.L.C., Covington, LA, Elizabeth Bradley McDermott, McCranie, Sistrunk, Anzelmo, Hardy, McDaniel & Welch, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, SOUTHWICK, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

DON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge:

A crane accident in Mississippi left John Williams Jr. physically and mentally incapacitated. Wanda Williams, his wife, sued the crane manufacturer, Manitowoc Cranes, under Mississippi's products liability statute. Following a lengthy trial, a jury found that Manitowoc failed to warn Model 16000 Series crane operators that, if the crane tips over, large weights stacked on the rear of the crane can slide forward and strike the operator's cab.

We AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Accident

John Williams Jr. worked as a certified crane operator at VT Halter Marine shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi. John typically operated a Manitowoc Model 16000 Series crawler crane.¹ Crawler cranes are so-named because they crawl along tracks in order to move. They can typically lift hundreds of tons of weight. The Model 16000 has a counterweight tray on its rear; the tray holds a stack of large, steel counterweights. Each counterweight is roughly seven-feet wide, eight-feet long, nine-and-a-half-inches tall, and weighs 18,000 pounds.

On June 25, 2014, John participated in a "tandem lift," which involved multiple cranes moving a bow section of a ship. As usual, John operated a Manitowoc Model 16000. Three total cranes participated at the start of the lift. As planned, the lift caused the bow to rotate. Soon after, one crane disconnected from the load, as planned.

Two cranes remained. John operated one, and David Smith operated the other. The two remaining cranes continued the lift by moving the bow unit forward toward the hull of the ship under construction. But, unexpectedly, the cranes began to separate from one another. Smith's crane pulled John's crane forward, causing the tracks on John's crane to rise up. John, however, stayed in the operator's cab in a last-ditch attempt to control the load.

As John's crane tipped, the nine-ton counterweights stacked in the rear of the crane began to rain down. At least one slid forward, striking the operator cab. The collision propelled John from the cab to the ground—an eight-foot, head-first fall onto concrete.

John survived. But his physical and mental capacities were permanently impaired.

B. The Preceding Proceedings

In the wake of the accident, Wanda Williams sued Manitowoc.² Focusing on the crane's counterweight system, she raised failure-to-warn, defective-design, and negligence claims under the Mississippi Products Liability Act.³ She also brought a loss-of-consortium claim.

In September 2016, the district court granted partial summary judgment for Manitowoc and dismissed Williams's design-defect claims with prejudice. The defective-warning and loss-of-consortium claims proceeded to a jury trial, which took place the next month.

On October 17, after Williams presented her case-in-chief, Manitowoc moved orally for judgment as a matter of law. Manitowoc claimed Williams failed to prove her failure-to-warn claim as a matter of law; that is, she did not show that the warnings were inadequate or that any inadequacy proximately caused John's injuries. The district court denied the motion.

The trial continued. Days later, the jury ruled for Williams, finding that Manitowoc failed to warn John about the falling counterweights.⁴ The jury awarded $7 million in economic damages and $1 million in non-economic damages. It also awarded $500,000 for the loss-of-consortium claim. But the jury found that negligence contributed to the injuries, so it apportioned fault as follows: 50% to VT Halter, 40% to Manitowoc, and 10% to John. So the district court entered a final judgment against Manitowoc for $2.8 million in actual economic damages and $600,000 in non-economic damages—resulting in a total judgment of $3.4 million plus post-judgment interest.

Nearly a month later, Manitowoc filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial. Manitowoc asserted that it deserved judgment as a matter of law because Williams failed to prove her failure-to-warn claim. Manitowoc claimed that (1) it adequately warned about causing a tip-over, (2) John's misuse of the crane caused the tip-over, and (3) the proposed additional warning would not have prevented John's injuries. Manitowoc also asserted, in the alternative, that it deserved a new trial because the district court improperly qualified Dr. William Singhose as an expert, and the court erred in admitting evidence regarding prior accidents involving other Manitowoc cranes and in excluding evidence about John's character. The district court denied Manitowoc's motions, and Manitowoc timely appealed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Judgment as a Matter of Law

"We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same standards as the district court."⁵ Judgment as a matter of law is proper if "a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and ... a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue."⁶

"We review all the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party; we do not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence."⁷ Also, our court "cannot reverse a denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law unless the jury's factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence, or if the legal conclusions implied from the jury's verdict cannot in law be supported by those findings."⁸ In other words, the party moving for judgment as a matter of law can prevail only "if the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that reasonable jurors could not have arrived at a contrary verdict."⁹ Although our review is de novo, "[a]fter a jury trial, [the] standard of review is especially deferential."¹⁰

B. Motion for a New Trial

We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion.¹¹ "The district court abuses its discretion by denying a new trial only when there is an absolute absence of evidence to support the jury's verdict."¹² "If the evidence is legally sufficient, we must find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for new trial."¹³

C. Expert Testimony

"Whether an individual is qualified to testify as an expert is a question of law."¹⁴ "However, we review the admission or exclusion of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion,"¹⁵ and we afford the trial court "[w]ide latitude" in its determination.¹⁶ Given the district court's "broad discretion in deciding" whether to admit expert testimony, this court "will not find error unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous ."¹⁷ "Manifest error is one that is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law."¹⁸

D. Evidentiary Rulings

This court applies a "deferential abuse of discretion standard" when reviewing a district court's evidentiary rulings.¹⁹ "A district court abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence."²⁰ "The harmless error doctrine applies to the review of evidentiary rulings, so even if a district court has abused its discretion, [this court] will not reverse unless the error affected 'the substantial rights of the parties.' "²¹ "The party asserting the error has the burden of proving that the error was prejudicial."²²

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Failure-to-Warn Claim

The Mississippi Products Liability Act (MPLA) codifies a failure-to-warn cause of action.²³ To prevail, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that when the product left the manufacturer's control:

1. the product "failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions" about a dangerous condition that the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known about;

2. "the ordinary user or consumer would not realize [the] dangerous condition";

3. the inadequate warning "rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer"; and

4. the inadequate warning "proximately caused the damages for which recovery is sought."²⁴

Manitowoc claims Williams failed to prove her failure-to-warn claim as a matter of law, thus the district court should have granted Manitowoc judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, Manitowoc trains its sights on two components²⁵ of Williams's failure-to-warn claim: (1) the existing warning's adequacy; and (2) whether the allegedly inadequate warning proximately caused John's injuries.

1. Adequacy

Under Mississippi law,

An adequate product warning or instruction is one that a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances would have provided with respect to the danger and that communicates sufficient information on the dangers and safe use of the product, taking into account the characteristics of, and the ordinary knowledge common to an ordinary consumer who purchases the product.²⁶

"In Mississippi, a warning may be held adequate as a matter of law where the adverse effect was one that the manufacturer specifically warned against."²⁷ But there is no bright-line rule for whether a warning is adequate.²⁸ Typically, the jury resolves this fact question.²⁹

The (in)...