Helton v. Mayo
| Decision Date | 29 October 1943 |
| Citation | 153 Fla. 616,15 So.2d 416 |
| Parties | HELTON v. MAYO. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Charlie Helton, in pro. per.
J. Tom Watson Atty. Gen., and John C. Wynn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Petitioner was convictee, and judgment and sentence of three years imposed on an information charging the removing and concealing of several gallons of 'moonshine whiskey' with intent to defraud the State of the tax imposed on such whiskey. The original sentence of five years was suspended and later, on September 8, 1942, the Court of Record of Escambia County held the original sentence void and resentenced the defendant to three years in the State Prison, and commitment issued.
This Court granted writ of habeas corpus on October 4, 1943. On the facts admitted in the return, the above judgment, sentence and resentence are all void, as the information charged no offense, and the petitioner must be discharged from custody under the commitment issued pursuant to said judgment and sentence.
Respondent admits that under the recent decision of this Court in Brown v State, 13 So.2d 458, the information upon which the above judgment and sentence were imposed fails to charge an offense against the laws of this State, but respondent alleges that petitioner is also held in custody in the State Prison under a commitment issued by the same court pursuant to a subsequent judgment and sentence rendered on September 22, 1942, whereby petitioner was sentenced to five years for larceny of a hog, 'said sentence to begin and run from expiration of sentence imposed in this Court on September 8, 1942,' evidently referring to the void judgment and sentence above referred to. Apparently, this was a valid judgment, but inasmuch as the sentence of September 8, 1942 was legally unauthorized and nonexistent at the time the second judgment and sentence of five years was rendered on September 22, 1942, the five year sentence imposed by the second judgment and sentence should be construed to run just as if the above-quoted words, to the effect that said sentence should begin to run at the expiration of the (void) sentence of September 8, 1942, had not been included therein. Otherwise petitioner would be done a grave injustice. As we have construed the legal effect of the judgment and sentence of September 22, 1942, no good purpose could be served by ordering the petitioner returned to Escambia County for the imposition of a...
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Ex parte Sams
...reached in this particular by the attorney general. See State ex rel. Farrior v. Faulk, 102 Fla. 886, 136 So. 601; Helton v. Mayo, 153 Fla. 616, 15 So.2d 416; sections 775.01, 775.02 and 775.06, Florida Statutes, 1951, It is upon the concession made by the attorney general that the sentence......
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Simmons v. State
...Fla.1958, 106 So.2d 79; Rodriguez v. State, Fla.1960, 119 So.2d 681; Drayton v. State, Fla.App.1965, 177 So.2d 250; Helton v. Mayo, 1943, 153 Fla. 616, 15 So.2d 416. The facts in the instant case show that the sentence was imposed and found later to be void. At the time the appellant was se......
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Simmons v. Wainwright, 71-1452 Summary Calendar.
...106 So.2d 79 (Fla. 1958); Rodriguez v. State, 119 So.2d 681 (Fla.1960); Drayton v. State, 177 So.2d 250 (Fla.App.1965); Helton v. Mayo, 153 Fla. 616, 15 So.2d 416 (1943). As to all other grounds set forth in the petition, the district court correctly denied relief because it does not appear......
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Cappetta v. Wainwright, 29628 Summary Calendar.
...v. Wainwright, 5 Cir. 1969, 406 F.2d 1238. The respondent has now conceded this court's jurisdiction on the merits. Helton v. Mayo, 1943, 153 Fla. 616, 15 So.2d 417. Petitioner has asserted six grounds upon which he contends he is entitled to relief: (1) that he was twice put in jeopardy fo......