Helton v. Secretary for the Dept. of Corrections

• Decision Date: 21 November 2000
• Docket Number: Docket No. 98-10110-CV-NCR,No. 00-10097,00-10097
• Citation: 233 F.3d 1322
• Parties: (11th Cir. 2000) KRIS EDWARD HELTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant-Appellant. D.C
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1322

233 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2000)

KRIS EDWARD HELTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-10097

D.C. Docket No. 98-10110-CV-NCR

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

November 21, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

Before TJOFLAT, HILL and POLITZ^*, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Circuit Judge:

The Florida Department of Corrections appeals the district court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus to Kris Edward Helton. For the reasons assigned, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 1991, Helton was living with his fiancee, Marcella Gunderson, and her three children, Matthew, Michael, and Marshall. On July 31, 1991, at around 6:30 P.M., Gunderson fed twenty-two month old Marshall a small amount of dinner, consisting of chicken, rice, and strawberry yogurt. She then put Marshall to bed at approximately 8:30 P.M. Helton arrived home at 9:30 P.M. and around 11 P.M. they retired to bed. Around 1:30 A.M. Gunderson awoke and found Helton sitting up in bed, smoking a cigarette, with what she described as a "worried look on his face." Helton told her that her movements had awakened him. Gunderson got up to check on the children. Upon entering Marshall's room, she discovered he was not in his crib. Alarmed, she called Helton and they found Marshall's body outside at the bottom of the front steps, lying face down. The child was taken to a local hospital in an ambulance and pronounced dead upon arrival.

An autopsy determined that the cause of death was a severe trauma to the head. The medical examiner found pink particulate in the boy's stomach, along with fibrous white matter described as rice. A specific time of death assessment was not made at that time.

Helton was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder of the child and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Florida Court of Appeal unanimously reversed, finding that the evidence was insufficient to support a circumstantial evidence conviction. That court granted a rehearing, withdrew its reversal, and examined the case under a restated standard for circumstantial convictions, specifically: a conviction can stand only if the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypotheses of innocence. Applying this standard, the appellate court determined that there was evidentiary contradiction to all logical hypotheses of Helton's innocence. They then affirmed the conviction.¹ In a dissenting opinion, one jurist stated that he would reverse the conviction and award a new trial, based largely on the gastric evidence. That jurist concluded, "There can be no doubt that this evidence might have affected the verdict rendered."² The Florida Supreme Court denied review of Helton's petition. The United States Supreme Court also denied his petition for review. Helton then pursued collateral relief in state court; however, this also was denied, as was his pro se petition for habeas corpus.

Helton then filed the instant petition, invoking 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Helton's challenge focuses on the trial attorney's failure to investigate and employ a time of death argument based on the gastric evidence. The state's reply to the habeas application centered mainly on its claim that the petition was untimely.

Following an evidentiary hearing on the gastric evidence/time of death claims, the court quo granted the writ, finding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the time of death and present the gastric evidence. As to the issue of timeliness, the district court found that equitable tolling was warranted in this case based on: 1) the petitioner's diligent pursuit of his legal rights on appeal; 2) the misinformation by Helton's counsel as to the expiration of the statute of limitations; 3) the inadequacy of the prison library; and 4) the "strange history of this case."³

ANALYSIS

In Sandvik v. United States,⁴ we held that 2254 was intended to be an ordinary statute of limitations and not a jurisdictional bar. The period of limitations, therefore, may be equitably tolled "when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence."⁵ We also stated that we reviewed the district court's dismissal of the motion de novo because this was solely an issue of law.⁶ In Sandvik, we were faced with determining, in the first instance, whether equitable tolling should be allowed under 2254. We here review whether the district court properly applied the standard for equitable tolling. This is a question of fact which is reviewed for abuse of discretion.⁷ We defer to the district court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.⁸ Whether a criminal defendant has received effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and law which we review de novo. We review for clear error, however, the trial court's findings of the historical facts underlying the claim.⁹

Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy which is generally applied sparingly.¹⁰ It is undisputed that the petitioner missed the one year deadline under the AEDPA. The district court opined that it was "not disposed to apply mechanically the limitations period when review is so glaringly warranted. Such result would belie the meaning of `equitable tolling'."¹¹ We agree. Although this court has recently held that attorney "miscalculation of the limitations period or mistake is not a basis for equitable tolling," we previously have not been faced with a situation, such as is here presented, where a combination of several factors results in such extraordinary circumstances.¹² The facts present in this case go beyond mere attorney miscalculation. Not only did Helton receive incorrect information as to the relevant statute of limitations, but he was further prevented from discovering the appropriate calculation due to the found deficiencies in the prison library system.

As the trial judge noted, the Supreme Court has declared that equitable tolling may be allowed in situations where the claimant has actively pursued his legal remedies.¹³ The district court specifically found that this case involved a petitioner who has diligently pursued his legal remedies without delay. This is not the case of a prisoner waiting several years to bring his petition for habeas corpus. Viewed in its totality, we cannot say that this finding is clearly erroneous.

Finally, we agree with the district court that the history of this case contributes to the determination of extraordinary circumstances. This was a circumstantial evidence conviction which originally was overturned by the Florida appellate court for insufficient evidence. On rehearing, that court chose to withdraw its reversal and affirm the conviction, rearticulating the standard of review for circumstantial evidence convictions. As noted above, the gastric evidence question presented to the Florida appellate court led at least one judge to believe that the verdict may have been different had the evidence been presented to the jury.

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled herein. We next consider Helton's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington,¹⁴ the Supreme Court established a two- prong analysis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The petitioner must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, falling below a constitutional minimum standard. Then, there must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different.

Florida maintains that the district court did not give appropriate due deference to the state court decision. This contention is based on our observations in Neelley v. Nagle¹⁵ about 2254(d)(1) which provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.¹⁶

In Neelley, this court held that the proper methodology for applying 2254(d)(1) involved a three-part inquiry. The court first must determine whether the federal law applicable to the petitioner's claim has been clearly established. Then, the court must determine whether the state court's adjudication of the claim was contrary to the established federal law. Finally, if the decision is not contrary to federal law, "[t]he state court decision must stand unless it is not debatable among reasonable jurists that the result of which the petitioner complains is incorrect."¹⁷ We recently recognized that the "viability of [the third] aspect of Neelley is questionable" because of the Supreme Court's subsequent holding in Williams v. Taylor.¹⁸ In Williams, the high court rejected the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of 2254(d)(1), which also looked to a "reasonable jurist" standard, and found that such standards would improperly cause a federal court to use a subjective inquiry, rather than an objective one. In light of this holding, we look only to whether the district court made the proper objective inquiry into the reasonableness of the state court's decision.

The first prong of the Neelley analysis is readily satisfied. The Supreme Court clearly established the law applicable to ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Strickland v. Washington. Application of the second prong presents a more difficult question. The state court decisions on Helton's habeas corpus petitions were summary denials, assigning no reasons. As the district court noted, we are...