Lawhorn v. Haley
| Citation | 323 F.Supp.2d 1158 |
| Decision Date | 22 March 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. CV01C0029E.,CIV.A. CV01C0029E. |
| Parties | James Charles LAWHORN, Petitioner, v. Michael W. HALEY, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
William C. Wood, Norman Wood Kendrick & Turner, Birmingham, AL, Richard L Neumeier, Morrison Mahoney & Miller LLP, Boston, MA, for James Charles Lawhorn, petitioner.
William H. Pryor, Jr., Beth Jackson Hughes, Office of the Attorney General, Montgomery, AL, for Michael Haley, Commissioner, Alabama Dept. of Corrections, Attorney General of State of Alabama, the, respondents.
The magistrate judge filed a report and recommendation on February 11, 2004, recommending this petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be granted. Petitioner and respondent filed objections.
The court has carefully reviewed and considered de novo all the materials in the court file, including the report and recommendation and the objections thereto. The objections of each party shall be addressed separately, beginning with petitioner's objections.
Petitioner contends the magistrate judge erred when he recommended the findings made by the Rule 32 trial court in its order denying petitioner relief constituted an "adjudication" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which petitioner contends is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as ".... the process of judicially deciding a case." (Document # 27, at 17-18). Petitioner argues that "the Circuit Court merely signed [an] order [drafted by the state], without adding or deleting a word or comma." Id. at 18. Thus, he concludes the Circuit Court did not adjudicate (e.g., engage in the process of judicially deciding) this case. Petitioner cites Helton v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 233 F.3d 1322, 1326-27 (11th Cir.2000), to support this conclusion, in which he argues the state court "correctly concluded that federal law was ignored in state court habeas summary denial decisions which contained, `no reasoning, analysis, findings of fact, or legal basis for denial of ...claims.'" (Document # 27, at 18) (citing Helton, 233 F.3d at 1326-27).
Petitioner's claims are without merit. The Circuit Court in petitioner's case did not summarily deny his Rule 32 petition. The Circuit Court signed a sixty-seven (67) page Order ruling on the issues presented by petitioner in his Rule 32 petition. The content of that Order contains reasoning, analysis, findings of fact and legal analysis. What petitioner is truly complaining about is the trial court's adoption of an order proposed by the state. Such action does not translate into a failure by the trial court to make its own decisions concerning the issues presented in the Rule 32 petition.
Petitioner also presents three reasons why he believes the magistrate judge erred in failing to recommend relief based upon his Batson claim. Petitioner contends he has provided prima facie evidence the prosecutor used "its peremptory challenge[s] ... to exclude 8 out of 14 black venire members (57%) but struck only 10 out of 24 white venire members (29%) who were qualified to serve as jurors." Id. at 19. However, the magistrate judge discounted this evidence by misconstruing the record on appeal, thus recommending that any prima facie evidence of discrimination was eroded because petitioner also struck black venire-members and because three black venire-members were chosen to serve on the jury.
With regard to the first reason, petitioner contends the facts "before the court on direct appeal were the same as the facts on collateral review and in federal court." Id. at 21. Petitioner argues he did not introduce new facts into the record. Instead, counsel contends he is permitted to "analyze [those facts] in any way which a court finds persuasive." Id. (citing Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 S.Ct. 324, 52 L.Ed. 551 (1908)(the Brandeis brief)).
Petitioner declares his analysis of the Batson issue in this case shows the magistrate judge should have considered petitioner's proposed method of statistical analysis to be in the nature of a "Brandeis brief." Id. Moreover, the magistrate judge should have found "[i]t ... useful to compare" the number of jurors struck in Maxine Walker's (petitioner's co-defendant) trial to those struck in petitioner's trial. In Maxine Walker's case (which involved the same District Attorney who prosecuted petitioner's case), the Court of Criminal Appeals found a prima facie case of discrimination because D.A. Rumsey "struck 11 of the 15 black venire members (73%) as contrasted with 9 of the 36 white venire members (25%)", .... "even though four blacks served on Walker's jury." Id. at 24 (citing Walker v. State, 586 So.2d 49 (Ala.Cr.App.1991)).
Second, petitioner contends the fact petitioner struck three potential black venire members himself is irrelevant to the question of whether petitioner has established a prima facie case of discrimination. Bui v. Haley, 279 F.3d 1327, 1339 n. 17 (11th Cir.2002).
Finally, petitioner contends that the magistrate judge's reliance on Central Alabama Fair Housing Center v. Lowder Realty Co., 236 F.3d 629, 638 (11th Cir.2000)("Central"), is misplaced, as that court's assertion "that the unchallenged presence of a particular race on a jury substantially weakens the basis of a prima facie case of discrimination under p[e]remptory striking of jurors of that race[,]" is mere dicta in light of Cochran v. Herring, 43 F.3d 1404, 1412 (11th Cir.1995).
Petitioner is correct that even if a defendant also arguably has unclean hands because he too struck members of a particular race from a jury venire, same is irrelevant in the consideration of whether petitioner has made a prima facie case of discrimination. Thus, that portion of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation is due to be rejected.
Petitioner now clarifies he only introduced "the Fisher exact test" and the formulation of the jury in Maxine Walker's case as "Brandeis brief facts," not as evidence in support of nor proof of a prima facie case of discrimination. Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine, Cent. Institute, 296 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir.2002). He concludes the magistrate judge could have found same to be persuasive or helpful.
This court finds a review of the Fisher exact test to be unnecessary because the magistrate judge recommended the percentage of black jury venire-members struck in petitioner's case should be considered statistically significant. (Report and Recommendation, at 33 (citing Central, 236 F.3d at 637)). "`[A] challenge rate nearly twice the likely minority percentage of the venire strongly supports a prima facie case under [Batson].'" (other citation omitted)). Second, the statistical impact of black venire members struck in Walker's case was far greater than in petitioner's case.
Further, the magistrate judge's reliance on Central is not flawed, nor is the material portion of Central to which he referred mere dicta in light of Cochran v. Herring, 43 F.3d 1404, 1411-12 (11th Cir.1995). In Cochran, the Eleventh Circuit quoted United States v. Allison, 908 F.2d 1531, 1537 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 904, 111 S.Ct. 1681, 114 L.Ed.2d 77 (1991), writing,
In Allison, the Government used three out of six peremptory challenges to strike black jurors. However, the [Allison] court found that the "unchallenged presence of three blacks on the jury undercuts any inference of impermissible discrimination that might arise simply by the striking of other blacks."
The Cochran court went on to state, Id. at 1412. Petitioner argues Cochran's holding means "the presence of some blacks on the jury [are] insufficient to rebut [a] prima facie case." (Document # 27, at 20). Thus, he contends evidence of blacks on the jury can only be rebuttal evidence in response to a prima facie showing of racial discrimination.
However, the Cochran court did not find such evidence was only relevant to the state's burden of showing a racially neutral reason for striking jurors after a prima facie case had been established. Further, the United States Supreme Court in Batson instructed trial courts to consider all relevant circumstances when deciding whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing of discrimination. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). It wrote,
A defendant making allegations regarding the improper use of peremptory strikes against jurors of a suspect class (emphasis added).
Id. at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (citing Washington v. Davis, [426 U.S. 229, 239-242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-2049, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976))]and Alexander v. Louisiana, [405 U.S. 625, 632, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 1226, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972)]. Elsewhere, the Court repeated that it was the defendant's burden to
show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury ... raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
Thus, it was in the Alabama Supreme Court's discretion to review the entire record, and take into consideration the percentage of black venire...
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