Helwig v. InterCoast Career Inst.
| Decision Date | 09 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. CV-09-225 |
| Parties | AIMEE HELWIG v. INTERCOAST CAREER INSTITUTE |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
POST-JUDGMENT ORDERS
This matter is before the court on post-trial motions filed after a jury verdict finding that InterCoast Career Institute (ICC) discriminated against Aimee Helwig (Helwig) in an educational career program in nursing. The following motions are pending: plaintiffs post-trial brief1 regarding burden of proof with respect to a cap on damages; defendant's brief regarding a cap on the damages awarded under the retaliation claim; and defendant's motion for a new trial and/or to reduce or modify verdict or judgment and for judgment not withstanding the verdict. The court will address these motions ad seriatim.
This is an educational discrimination case2 in which Helwig was a nursing student at ICC, which has a campus in South Portland, Maine. Helwig alleged in her complaint that a faculty member sexually harassed her and then ICC retaliated against her when shecomplained about the harassment, culminating in her termination from ICC for allegedly violating the InterCoast Practical Nursing Code of Professional Conduct. Helwig alleged in her complaint a number of counts, but she proceeded at trial on the claims of retaliation, slander and breach of contract. She sought damages, including general and noneconomic damages, economic damages, lost wages, punitive damages and attorney's fees. ICC denied each of Helwig's claims and countered that ICC terminated her as a student for cause. ICC further alleged that Helwig failed to mitigate her damages.
At trial, the jury awarded Helwig the following: $100,000 in lost wages on her claim for retaliation; $150,000 on her claim for emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish and loss of enjoyment of life; $30,000 for punitive damages; and $20,000 on her claim of breach of contract.
The jury found as disclosed in the verdict form the following: (1) Helwig engaged in protected activity; (2) ICC made educational decisions that adversely affected Helwig; (3) her complaints about sexual harassment or retaliation were a motivating factor in ICC's adverse educational decisions; (4) ICC would not have made the same educational decisions even if it had not considered her complaints about sexual harassment or retaliation; (5) ICC caused Helwig lost wages of $100,000 by its unlawful discrimination based on retaliation; (6) ICC caused emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish and loss of enjoyment of life to Helwig because of ICC's unlawful discrimination based on retaliation; (7) ICC acted with malice or reckless disregard of the rights of Helwig to the amount of $30,000; (8) ICC did not disparage Helwig's reputation or character; (9) there was a contract to provide a business-like professional learning environment between ICC and Helwig; (10) ICC breached its contract withHelwig to provide a business-like professional learning environment; and (11) the damages for breach of that contract are $20,000.
After the jury had been dismissed, defendant raised an issue concerning a statutory cap on damages. The issue at that time was whether the court is to consider the number of employees statewide or nationwide pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(B)(8).3 The defendant argued that there was no evidence concerning the number of employees nationwide, that it has only 30 employees at its Maine Nursing School, and that the correct reference under 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(B)(8) is the number of employees statewide, thus damages should be capped at $50,000.
In its post-trial motion, ICC recognized that the cap under section 4613(2)(B)(8) does not apply because it relates to employment discrimination claims; however defendant argued that another cap under section 4613(2)(B)(7) applies to education claims. ICC contends that this statutory section imposes a cap of $20,000 on all damages in the first non-employment discrimination claim against a particular defendant.
The basis for defendant's post-trial argument is that this is not an employment discrimination case but an educational discrimination case. The court quite agrees that this is an educational discrimination case. The jury evaluated the facts on this basis.Helwig alleged and the jury determined that ICC made adverse educational decisions based on sexual harassment or retaliation, caused Helwig lost wages and pain and suffering, acted with malice or reckless disregard of Helwig's rights, and breached its educational contract with her. ICC terminated Helwig from an educational program for nurses that contained both an educational component and a clinical training component. Notwithstanding the clinical training program, this remains an educational discrimination case. The MHRA prohibits discrimination in education whether academic, occupational training or other educational program. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4602.4 The MHRA protects the opportunity to participate in all educational, apprenticeship, and on-the-job training programs without discrimination because of sex. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4601.5 Educational opportunities free of discrimination are declared to be a civil right. Id. The MHRA further prohibits retaliation and coercion with respect to opposing any discriminatory acts. 5M.R.S.A. §4633.6
Aggrieved persons alleging retaliation under section 4633 may utilize the procedures and obtain the remedies contained in sections 4611 to 4614 and 4621 to 4623. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4633(3). In any action filed under the MHRA, 5 M.R.S.A. §4613(2)(B) (emphasis supplied).7 Thus, the MHRA provides a list of remedies but does not limit remedies to those contained in the statutory list and directs the court to utilize appropriate remedies. Id. The only limitation on remedies is "an appropriate remedy" and a cap on the amount of civil penal damages.8 The MHRA further authorizes to the prevailing party reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4614.
There has been little case law interpreting the Maine Human Rights Act in an educational context. "It is appropriate to look to analogous federal case law for guidance in the interpretation of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). See Bowen v. Dep't of Human Servs., 606 A. 2d 1051, 1053 (Me. 1992); Watt v. Unifirst Corporation, 2009 ME 47 ¶ 22 n. 4, 969 A. 2d 897, 903 n. 4. Thus, Maine courts apply the MHRA in accordance with federal anti-discrimination law. Title IX of the Education Amendment of 19729 "imposes an obligation on educational institutions receiving federal funds torefrain from denying educational opportunities on the basis of sex." Lakshman v. University of Maine System, 328 F. Supp. 2d 92, 115 (D. Me. 2004).
In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), the United States Supreme Court unanimously concluded that Title IX authorized a high school student who had been sexually harassed by a sports coach/teacher to recover damages from the school district. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the presumption that Congress intends to authorize "all appropriate remedies" unless it expressly indicates otherwise. 503 U.S. at 66. The Court also concluded that "Congress did not intend to limit the remedies available in a suit brought under Title IX." 503 U.S. at 72. The general rule since Franklin is that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief for intentional discrimination. See, e.g., 503 U.S. at 75.
Similar conclusions can be reached in interpreting the MHRA, where the Legislature expressly authorizes appropriate remedies and states that it does not intend to limit the type of remedy or remedies that may be awarded, even though the Legislature listed some remedies that may be considered. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(B). However, Section 4613, in its broad permissive language, does not resolve what type of monetary damages may be considered.
In this regard, the analogy between Title IX and the MHRA demonstrates its limits. Compensatory damages are available for Title IX actions, but punitive damages are not. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 184-87 (2002). In Barnes, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that Title IX was enacted through the Spending Clause and found thatpunitive damages were prohibited. 10 Id. The Court reasoned that in exchange for federal funds received, the recipient of the funds agreed to comply with federally imposed conditions. Id. The Court explained that Spending Clause legislation is in the nature of a contract and stated that a "funding recipient is generally on notice that it is subject not only to those remedies explicitly provided in the relevant legislation, but also to those remedies traditionally available in suits for breach of contract." Id. at 187. The Court found that a punitive damages award was inappropriate because "punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages and injunction, are generally not available for breach of contract." Id. Unlike Title IX, the MHRA is obviously not a Spending Clause enactment, and therefore, Title IX case law concerning punitive damages has little application. In fact, the Maine Legislature explicitly allowed civil penal damages in Section 4613(2)(B)(7).
Further complicating the damages analysis is the unique nature of this case. There are no caps in the education discrimination section of the MHRA, except of course the civil penal damages cap. Additionally, by the plain language of the statute, the caps in the employment discrimination provisions of the MHRA do not apply. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(B)(8).
With regard to caps, the evidence adduced at trial included...
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