Hemphill Drug Co. v. Mann

• Decision Date: 05 March 1973
• Docket Number: No. 46983,46983
• Citation: 274 So.2d 117
• Parties: HEMPHILL DRUG COMPANY and Maryland Casualty Company v. Stephen Wesley MANN (Revived in the Name of Yvonne Mann).
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 117

274 So.2d 117

HEMPHILL DRUG COMPANY and Maryland Casualty Company v. Stephen Wesley MANN (Revived in the Name of Yvonne Mann).

No. 46983.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

March 5, 1973.

Daniel, Coker, Horton, Bell & Dukes, Donald V. Burch, Jackson, for appellants.

Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada, Dan McCullen, Jackson, for appellee.

RODGERS, Presiding Justice.

Stephen W. Mann was seriously injured on September 3, 1968, while operating a delivery vehicle in the course of his employment with Hemphill Drug Company. As a result of this accident, Mr. Mann sustained a fractured femur and numerous minor lacerations, abrasions and contusions. While awaiting surgery for the fractured femur, the claimant developed a psychosis which manifested itself in hallucinations, delusions, and depersonalization. By May, 1969, Mr. Mann's femur had healed sufficiently, in his orthopedic surgeon's opinion, such that claimant could enjoy a pre-accident level of use of his leg. However, due to claimant's extreme emotional distress, he continued to be lethargic, and to suffer from nightmares, hallucinations, and delusions. In order to ameliorate Mr. Mann's severe depression and emotional tribulation, his psychiatrist had prescribed various tranquilizers and sedatives.

On July 23, 1969, almost two months after claimant's femur had healed to a pre-accident level of usefulness, he fell down a flight of stairs at his girl friend's apartment and fractured his hip. The medical testimony delivered at the Workmen's Compensation Commission hearing showed that there was no physical causal connection between claimant's fractured femur and a weakened leg which might make claimant susceptible to lose his footing and fall. The physicians, however, who attended claimant immediately after he was admitted to the hospital for the injuries received in his second accident, stated that he was also suffering from an 'organic brain syndrome', a condition apparently precipitated from an overuse of the medication prescribed for the claimant's psychosis. At the Commission hearing, claimant's psychiatrist testified that claimant's propensity to overmedicate was a result of claimant's attempts to quell his psychosis generated anxieties, and, thus, claimant's psychosis caused him to abuse his prescribed drugs.

By the time of the Workmen's Compensation hearing in November, 1969, claimant had recovered from his psychosis, and the hip injury sustained in the second accident was almost completely healed.

Claimant's employer voluntarily paid claimant's medical expenses as well as compensation benefits from September 3, 1968, until March, 1969, at which time all payments were terminated. In connection with the second accident, claimant's employer declined to pay medical expenses or compensation benefits.

A series of hearings was conducted before the attorney-referee, and on June 25, 1970, the attorney-referee entered an order awarding certain benefits to the claimant while denying certain other benefits connected with the second accident. On appeal to the full Commission, the decision of the attorney-referee was reversed, and additional benefits were awarded to claimant, including medical expenses and compensation arising out of the second accident of July 23, 1969. In an order dated January 12, 1972, the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, affirmed the order of the full Commission in its entirety.

Claimant died on June 10, 1971, of unexplained causes, and the lower court revived the cause in the name of the decedent's widow and sole heir-at-law, Yvonne Mann.

On appeal to this Court, appellant has assigned ten errors. However, in considering the merits of this appeal, there are only three broad issues which require consideration in determining the disposition of this cause.

First, it must be determined whether or not there is a chain of causation between the claimant's work-related accident and his subsequent psychosis and fall of July 23, 1969. In connection with the accidents of September 3, 1968, and July 23, 1969, the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Commission found the following facts:

'1. The admitted injury sustained by the claimant on September 3, 1968, aggravated a preexisting emotional or mental condition suffered by the claimant.

2. The accidental injury suffered by the claimant on July 23, 1969, was causally related to the admitted accident of September 3, 1968.

4. The evidence is insufficient to support a finding that the claimant has reached his maximum medical recovery.'

The appellant contends that these findings are erroneous, arbitrary, capricious and unsupported by the evidence presented in this case. However, our analysis of the facts presented in the proceedings conducted before the Commission, indicates that there was sufficient evidence presented to sustain the findings of the Commission.

The testimony of Dr. Roberts, claimant's psychiatrist, established a clear causal connection between claimant's work-connected automobile accident and claimant's subsequent emotional deterioration. In unequivocal language, Dr. Roberts stated:

'(W)hatever happened to him (Steve Mann) psychiatrically or emotionally, I feel like was brought on by the acute stress of the automobile accident. * * *'

Appellants presented no witnesses (expert or otherwise) to contradict Dr. Roberts' conclusion. In fact, the only witness called on behalf of the appellants was Dr. Paul Derian, the claimant's orthopedic surgeon. While Dr. Derian delivered testimony concerning the claimant's physical condition, he made no attempt to get involved in the claimant's psychiatric problem. There is, then, considering the testimony of Dr. Roberts, Steve Mann, and his father, Jack Mann, substantial uncontroverted evidence to support the full Commission's finding of fact that the accident of September 3, 1968, aggravated a preexisting emotional disorder to the level of a full-blown psychosis, and that the accident of September 3, 1968, was causally related to the accident of July 23, 1969.

There is a considerable body of authority to support the proposition that the findings of fact of the Workmen's Compensation Commission must be upheld so long as those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Malley v. Over the Top, 229 Miss. 347, 90 So.2d 678 (1956), contains a recital of the law which is representative of the decisions in the many cases dealing with the propriety of the Workmen's Compensation Commission's findings of fact. In Malley, this Court held:

'We are of the opinion that it was the intention of the legislature to make the Commission the trier of facts. . . . Accordingly, we hold that the Commission itself is the trier of facts and any question of fact decided by it is conclusive on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence.' 229 Miss. at 354-355, 90 So.2d at 681.

See also Bruton v. Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Com'n, 253 Miss. 694, 703, 178 So.2d 673, 676 (1965); Capital Broadcasting Company v. Wilkerson, 240 Miss. 64, 126 So.2d 242 (1961); Smith v. St. Catherine Gravel Co., 220 Miss. 462, 71 So.2d 221 (1954); Dunn, Mississippi Workmen's Compensation, 2d ed., §§ 272 & 289 (1967).

After weighing the evidence in this case and upon consideration of the applicable law, we hold that the findings of fact of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Commission are justified by the testimony presented in this case.

The second issue to be resolved by this Court deals with the compensability of an emotional disorder aggravated by a work-related injury. In Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, the general rule concerning the precipitation of nervous injury by physical trauma is stated as follows:

'. . . (W)hen there has been a physical accident or trauma, and claimant's disability is increased or prolonged by traumatic neurosis, conversion hysteria, or hysterical paralysis, it is now uniformly held that the full disability including the effects of the neurosis is compensable. Dozens of cases, involving almost every conceivable kind of neurotic, psychotic, depressive, or hysterical symptom or personality disorder, have accepted this rule.' Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, Vol. ,1A, § 42.22, p. 622.162 (1967).

Professor Larson also finds authority to indicate that when an emotional weakness precedes the aggravating physical injury, the claimant may be compensated to the extent his emotional weakness is worsened or to the extent a new, more serious psychological disorder is precipitated. The...