Hempstead County v. Royston

• Decision Date: 14 October 1893
• Citation: 23 S.W. 650,58 Ark. 113
• Parties: HEMPSTEAD COUNTY v. ROYSTON
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

23 S.W. 650

58 Ark. 113

HEMPSTEAD COUNTY v. ROYSTON

Supreme Court of Arkansas

October 14, 1893

Appeal from Hempstead Circuit Court, RUFUS D. HEARN, Judge.

Reversed and dismissed.

Jas. H McCollum for appellant.

Hempstead county is not liable for the items charged for. By act April 6, 1889, (Acts 1889, p. 120,) Clark county was liable not for "costs" but for all "expenses." 4 Ark 473; 10 id. 467. It was intended to change the rule laid down in 40 Ark. 329, and make the original county pay all "expenses," the word costs being used in this sense. 34 Ark. 263; 35 id. 56; 27 id. 418; 40 id. 431.

R. B Williams, for appellee.

The summoning of jurors, issuing certificates to them, and such other like services, are a necessary part of the expenses of the court, and have never been treated as a part of the "costs" of any case. 40 Ark. 329. The language of the act of 1889 will not justify the construction given it by appellant. It created no new liability, but merely fixed a time within which the accounts were to be presented.

OPINION

WOOD, J.

Appellees, clerk and sheriff of Hempstead county, filed in the county court of Hempstead accounts for fees as follows:

Fee-bill, Hempstead county, October term, Circuit Court, 1891.

STATE OF ARKANSAS, v. WM. and AB. EASTER, Change venue, Clark county.

TO C. E. ROYSTON, Clerk:

To issuing 35 jurors' certificates of

attendance

$ 17.50

TO J. C. JONES, Sheriff:

Summoning 42 extra jurors

21.00

STATE OF ARKANSAS, v. LUKE SULLIVAN.

TO C. E. ROYSTON, Clerk:

Issuing 12 jurors' certificates of attendance

6.00

TO J. C. JONES, Sheriff:

To summoning 20 extra jurors

10.00

STATE OF ARKANSAS, v. JOE J. RICHARDSON.

TO C. E. ROYSTON, Clerk:

To issuing 12 juror certificates

6.00

TO J. C. JONES, Sheriff:

To summoning 35 extra jurors

17.50

This fee-bill was disallowed by the county court; appellees appealed to the circuit court, where the case was tried de novo by the court sitting as a jury, and upon the following agreement as to the facts, viz:--

"The cases of the State of Arkansas against Wm. and Ab. Easter, and the State of Arkansas against Luke Sullivan and J. J. Richardson, were tried in Hempstead circuit court upon change of venue from Clark county, and the plaintiffs, C. E. Royston, as clerk of Hempstead county, and James C. Jones, as sheriff of Hempstead county, performed the services herein charged for. The defendants, Wm. and Ab. Easter and Luke Sullivan, were acquitted, and J. J. Richardson was convicted. As shown by the fee-bill, the services charged for were rendered in connection with the several juries which tried said cases."

Under the act of the general assembly, approved April 6, 1889 (Acts of 1889, p. 120), is Hempstead county liable for the services rendered or Clark county? The act of 1889 is as follows: "Sec. 1. That within thirty (30) days after the termination of any cause, in any circuit court of this State, that was tried on change of venue from another county, it shall be the duty of the clerk of said court to make an itemized statement of all the expenses incurred by his county in the trial of any such cause, and present it to the county court of the county in which the cause originated."

"Sec. 2. That the county court to whom any such bill of costs are (is) presented, properly authenticated, shall allow the same as if though the case had terminated in his own county."

Prior to the passage of this act, the county where the offense was committed was liable only for those expenses which were proper to be taxed against the defendant, when convicted and not having property to pay, or, in other words, for the "costs in the cause." ^[*] The county trying the case was liable for all the current expenses of the court during the progress of the trial. This often placed heavy burdens upon the trial county. Capital cases and other felonies, on change of venue, have been known to consume days, and even weeks, in their adjudication. The expenses incident to holding a court are necessarily great, and, although incurred by reason of an offense committed in another county, they had to be borne by the trial county, under the law before the passage of the act of 1889.

Applying the general rules for the construction of statutes to the above act, we conclude that the legislature intended to relieve the trial county by making the initial county liable for "all the expenses incurred" by the trial county on account of the change, including the current expenses of the court as well as those for which it was already liable, to-wit: the costs in the cause. Hence, the word "costs" in sec. 2 should be interpreted expenses. Haney v. State, 34 Ark. 263; Reynolds v. Holland, 35 Ark. 56; State v. Jennings, 27 Ark. 419; State v. Smith, 40 Ark. 431; Sedgwick on Stat. and Const. Law, 354 (n); Potter's Dwarris, 214. See also Sutherland on Stat. Con. 341, where the following language is used: "Where one word has been erroneously used for another, or a word omitted, and the context affords the means of correction, the proper word will be deemed substituted or supplied. This is but making the strict letter of the statute yield to the obvious intent." This view, we think, gives meaning to the legislative enactment. Under the former law, the court, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, or anyone interested, or on its own motion, could have ordered the clerk to certify the costs to the proper county, and it was not necessary to pass the act in order to...