Hendel v. Weaver

• Decision Date: 02 February 1961
• Docket Number: No. 4311,4311
• Citation: 77 Nev. 16,359 P.2d 87
• Parties: Charles A. HENDEL, Appellant, v. Charles E. WEAVER, Mineral County Assessor, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Page 87

359 P.2d 87

77 Nev. 16

Charles A. HENDEL, Appellant, v. Charles E. WEAVER, Mineral County Assessor, Respondent.

No. 4311.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

Feb. 2, 1961.

Ernest S. Brown and Jack I. McAuliffe, Reno, for appellant.

Roger D. Foley, Atty. Gen., John A. Porter, Deputy Atty. Gen., W. T. Mathews, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., L. E. Blaisdell, Dist. Atty. of Mineral County, Hawthorne, for respondent.

BADT, Chief Justice.

This appeal tests the constitutionality of NRS 361.090 reading in part as follows: 'Veterans' exemptions. The property, to the extent of $1,000 assessed valuation, of any actual bona fide resident of the State of Nevada for a period of more than 3 years who has served * * * in the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war * * * shall be exempt from taxation.'

The statute has a long history. 'An Act exempting property of veterans,' approved March 10, 1917 (Stats.1917, 65) granted to veterans an exemption to the amount of $1,000, provided the veteran's income did not exceed $900 per annum and he did not own property over $3,000 in value. This was amended in 1921 (Stats.1921, 166) by increasing the maximum income proviso to $1,200 and increasing the property proviso to $4,000. A further amendment in 1923 (Stats.1923, 360) increased the maximum income proviso to $1,800, but left intact the maximum ownership proviso of $4,000. In 1925 (Stats.1925, 250) the legislature exempted property used by any post or unit of any national organization of ex-servicemen. In 1927 (Stats.1927, 140) the legislature deleted the provision limiting the benefit of the act to persons having income of less than $1,800 p er annum. In 1945 (Stats.1945, 43) the burden of obtaining the exemption was lightened in certain cases by eliminating the necessity for filing annual affidavits. In 1947 (Stats.1947, 674) the legislature required proof of continuation of the veterans' status. In 1949 (Stats.1949, 28) the statute was re-enacted providing for the $1,000 exemption without limitation as to income or ownership of property. Further amendments are found in Stats.1951, 301, Stats.1953, 595, Stats.1953, 598, Stats.1954, 30, and Stats.1955, 341. The last group of amendments do not involve any matters with which we are here concerned.

The constitutional limitation, which the present act is said to contravene, is contained in the Nevada constitution, art. 10, Sec. 1. This section, so far as here pertinent, now reads as follows: 'The legislature shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property * * * and there shall also be excepted such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, educational, literary, scientific or other charitable purposes.' Since its adoption in 1864 this section of the constitution has been amended several times. These amendments require no discussion, other than to recognize the amendment proposed and passed by the legislature in 1939 (Stats.1939, 360), agreed to and passed by the legislature in 1941 (Stats.1941, 559), and ratified by the people in 1942, which preserved the exemption from taxation of 'such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, educational, literary, scientific or other charitable purposes.'

It is conceded that only under the last-quoted clause and particularly under the last phrase thereof--'or other charitable purposes,' can the veterans' statutory exemption be justified. State v. Carson City Savings Bank, 17 Nev. 146, 30 P. 703. It must be conceded also that the decisions of the several states are not in harmony as to the validity of such legislation, under varying constitutional provisions. See discussion in Annotation, 116 A.L.R. 1437. The court below held that the statute did not violate the constitutional provision in question.

Appellant presents the following contentions:

'1. Conceding that the original statute was for a charitable purpose the statute has been so changed by the legislature that the original purpose no longer exists.

'2. Conceding that rehabilitation of veterans is a proper charitable purpose, it must be limited and restricted to veterans who need rehabilitation.

'3. That the statute as it now exists does not accomplish a charitable purpose within the meaning of the Constitution of the State of Nevada.'

These three contentions present but a single and readily understandable concept. Paraphrasing appellant's argument, to confer a financial benefit on a wealthy veteran is not an act of charity. A statute that accomplishes this does not effectuate a charitable purpose. The original statute restricting to needy veterans the benefit conferred did effectuate such a purpose. The legislature could reasonably recognize that years of military service could materially affect the financial status of the veteran. A partial relief from taxation could help and hasten his rehabilitation, could lessen the danger of his becoming a public charge and could, to that extent, reduce the burden of government. The amendment stripped the statute of its only justification. This argument is not without persuasiveness but, by reason of the matters hereinafter discussed, we are compelled to reject the same.

For definitional purposes, appellant quotes at length from Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Germantown v. City of Philadelphia, 323 Pa. 401, 187 A. 204, 210. The case itself is not in point on its facts. The holding is simply that the local Y. M. C. A. was properly exempted from taxation with reference to that part of its property devoted wholly to charitable uses, but that its dormitory rooms rented at reasonable prices were used in commercial transactions and therefore not exempt. The holding is supported by authorities from many states. The opinion does however contain an exposition of why charitable institutions are exempted from taxes, namely, because they do, pro tanto, assume a share of the public burden, the care of persons for whom the government would otherwise have to provide. Appellant then ties this into his main contention that our veterans' exemption statute, valid so long as it applied only to veterans with limited income and with limited ownership of property, became invalid when these limitations were removed. The Y. M. C. A. case, and all the scores of the Y. M. C. A. cases, are undoubtedly correct as applied to 'charitable institutions,' but that does not touch our problem, which is more analogous to the question of exempting (to the same extent) the property of widows and orphans.

The learned trial judge, citing State ex rel. Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15 (5-6-7 Nev. 17), noted the view of this court that contemporaneous legislation may always be considered in force in constitutional interpretation, and that this was given greater weight by reason of the fact that a number of the members of the legislature enacting the legislation granting the exemption to widows and orphans had likewise been members of the constitutional convention that 'framed' the particular constitutional provisions in point. The district judge proceeded: 'In the instant case certain contemporaneous legislation throws considerable light on the question of the intention of the constitutional convention of 1864 with respect to the power and authority granted to the legislature concerning tax exemptions. The revenue act passed at the First Session of the Legislature of Nevada contained a provision for the exemption of the property of widows and orphans of the value of not more than $1,000.' Under the analogy, then, of a veteran's exemption from taxation to the extent of $1,000 (without regard to the veteran's annual income or ownership of property) with the $1,000 exemption granted to widows and orphans by the first legislature (Stats. 1864-5, 273), he concluded that the veterans' exemption did not violate the constitutional limitation.

Appellant rejects this reasoning as follows: 'Inasmuch as the philosophy of the English-speaking world since time immemorial has been to collectively aid widows and orphans, it is a traditional burden of the body politic to ensure that such unfortunates should not be cast out where they cannot make their way. It is, therefore, perfectly consistent for the taxing authority to alleviate distress with tax exemptions. But it defies reason to equate all veterans with widows and orphans. In most families the man is the breadwinner. A child is not capable of assuming such a task, nor is a woman capable of fully meeting the requirements of the situation. It would appear to appellant that this factor and this factor alone is the only legitimate basis for a tax deduction to widows and orphans.'

This concession by appellant must be read in connection with his primary thesis,...