Henderson and Nashville R. R. Co. v. Dickerson

• Decision Date: 25 June 1856
• Parties: Henderson and Nashville Railroad Company <I>vs.</I> Dickerson.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

Page 173

56 Ky. 173

Henderson and Nashville Railroad Company vs. Dickerson.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 25, 1856.

APPEAL FROM TODD CIRCUIT.

J. M. Harlan for appellants —

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

R. M'Kee for appellee —

Judge SIMPSON delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellee obtained a judgment against the appellants, for the injury he had sustained by the passage through his land of the railroad which they were constructing. The appellants being dissatisfied with the judgment he had recovered against them, brought the case to this court to reverse it. Their appeal was, however, dismissed upon the ground that it was not authorized by their charter. Afterwards, by an act of the legislature passed at the session 1855-6, (Session Acts, p. 67,) the act incorporating the Henderson and Nashville Railroad Company was amended, as follows:

"Where any assessment of damages for the right of way has been or shall hereafter be made, it shall be lawful for either of the parties, the person whose land has been condemned, or the said company, to prosecute an appeal to the court of appeals, at any time within three years from the time such assessment was made, for the correction of any errors that may have been made to the prejudice of the party appealing."

Since the passage of this amendatory act, the appellants have again brought the case to this court; and the counsel for the appellee contends that the amended act, so far as it is intended to operate retrospectively, is unconstitutional and void.

As a general principle, retrospective legislation is undoubtedly impolitic; but with the wisdom or policy of that part of the act under consideration which operates retrospectively, we have no concern. The question that we have to decide, is whether that part of the act violates any of the provisions of the constitution of this state, or of the United States.

Retrospective legislation is not expressly prohibited by any of the provisions contained in either of the constitutions. Where it affects or impairs the obligation of a contract, it is prohibited; but it does not have that effect in this case, because there was no contract existing between the parties. It is not an ex post facto law, for such laws relate exclusively to offences against the public, and not to private wrongs and injuries. (Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dallas, 386.)

No constitutional provision has been designated as prohibiting this species of legislation. But it is said, that at the time of the passage of the amendatory act, the judgment appealed from was, by the laws then in force, final and conclusive, and that consequently the appellee had a vested right to the amount thereof, of which he has been deprived by the legislation in question, which must for that reason be deemed to be unconstitutional.

A vested right may be considered as the power to do certain actions, or to possess certain things lawfully. In its latter aspect, it is substantially a right of property, and as such is protected by those provisions in the constitution which apply to such rights. But a right to property is a perfect and exclusive right, and a right, therefore, to recover the amount of a judgment cannot be called a perfect or a vested right. (Calder vs. Bull, supra, page 394.) The appellee has a vested right in his land. This right he cannot be divested of under the constitution until just compensation has been made him for it. The judgment which he obtained did not divest him of his right to his property, nor did it enlarge his rights, nor invest him with any additional ones. He could not have a vested right to the land, and also to the amount of the judgment. A vested right to the latter, in the proper sense of the term, could not accrue until the money was collected. He has a constitutional right to have just compensation made him before he shall be deprived of his property; but the legislature has the power to prescribe the mode in which such compensation shall be ascertained and determined in a fair and just manner. The amendatory act under consideration did not violate nor impair any vested right, but only furnished to either party the same opportunity which other litigants had, to correct any errors that may have been committed by the court below. We do not, therefore, regard the act as unconstitutional.

The constitution (art. 13, sec. 14,) declares that no man's property shall be taken or applied to public use, without just compensation being previously made to him. And according to the construction given to to this provision in the cases of Sutton's heirs vs. The City of Louisville, 5 Dana, 28, and Rice et al. vs. The Danville, Lancaster, &c., T. R....